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The Gay Panic Defense 
Cynthia Lee* 
In this Article, Professor Lee examines the use of gay panic defense 
strategies in the criminal courtroom.  “Gay panic” refers to the situation 
when a heterosexual man charged with murdering a gay man claims he 
panicked and killed because the gay man made an unwanted sexual 
advance upon him.  Professor Lee argues that gay panic arguments are 
problematic because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes 
about gay men as sexual deviants and sexual predators.  Gay panic 
arguments are also troubling because they seek to capitalize on 
unconscious bias in favor of heterosexuality, which is prevalent in today’s 
heterocentric society.  In light of such concerns, most critics of the “gay 
panic defense” have proposed that judges or legislatures bar gay panic 
arguments from the criminal courtroom.  Professor Lee takes a contrary 
position and argues that banning gay panic arguments from the criminal 
courtroom is not the best way to undermine the damaging effects of such 
arguments, and may have the unintended consequence of bolstering their 
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corrosive potential. Rather than precluding defendants from making gay 
panic arguments, Professor Lee argues that the criminal courtroom is the 
place where such arguments can and should be aired and battled. 
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On February 12th, an openly gay 15-year-old boy named Larry 
who was an eighth-grader in Oxnard, California was murdered 
by a fellow eighth-grader named Brandon.  Larry was killed 
because he . . . was gay.  Days before he was murdered, Larry 
asked his killer to be his Valentine . . . .  And somewhere along 
the line the killer Brandon got the message that it’s so 
threatening and so awful and so horrific that Larry would want 
to be his Valentine that killing Larry seemed to be the right 
thing to do.  And when the message out there is [that it is] so 
horrible . . . to be gay you can be killed for it, we need to 
change the message. 
 Ellen DeGeneres (Feb. 29, 2008)1 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans today have mixed feelings about homosexuality.2  A 2007 
Gallup/USA poll found that while 48% of those polled felt 
homosexuality was an acceptable alternative lifestyle, 46% felt the 
opposite way.3  Another 2007 poll found that 51% of those polled 
thought homosexual behavior is morally wrong, and only 35% felt 
homosexual behavior is acceptable.4  Americans are also deeply 
divided over whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to marry.5 
 
 1 DeGeneres spoke about the killing of Lawrence King on the Ellen DeGeneres 
show during an opening segment on February 29, 2008.  For footage of this clip see The 
Ellen DeGeneres Show, A Tragedy That Should Never Have Happened, 
http://ellen.warnerbros.com/2008/07/a_tragedy_that_should_never_ha.php (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2008). 
 2 Toni Lester, Adam and Steve v. Adam and Eve:  Will the New Supreme Court Grant 
Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 254 (2006) (noting 
that “[w]hile studies indicate that most Americans support the adoption of laws that 
grant gays the most basic of civil rights, like the right to the kind of privacy in the 
bedroom that Lawrence [v. Texas] envisioned, many also believe that homosexuality is 
immoral”). 
 3 Gallup & USA Today, iPOLL Databank, Gallup/USA Today Poll (Sept. 7-8, 
2007), available at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html (basing poll on 
telephone interviews with national adult sample of 1,028 individuals).   
 4 Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., Polling the Nations, Quinnipiac University Poll 
(Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://poll.orspub.com (reflecting views of Florida voters).  
The same poll found similar results in Pennsylvania and Ohio.  Id. (finding 53% of 
Pennsylvania voters felt homosexual behavior morally wrong versus 34% who found it 
acceptable, and 55% of Ohio voters felt homosexual behavior morally wrong versus 
30% who found it acceptable). 
 5 According to a 2007 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 55% 
of Americans oppose same-sex marriage while 36% percent support it.  Press Release, 
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While there is more acceptance of lesbians and gays today compared 
to just a few years ago,6 gays and lesbians still experience a significant 
amount of prejudice and discrimination.7  Approximately three-
quarters of gays and lesbians have been the target of verbal abuse and 
approximately one-third have been the target of physical violence 
based on their sexual orientation.8  Violence against gays and lesbians 
 
Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press & Pew Forum on Religion & Public 
Life, Clinton and Giuliani Seen as Not Highly Religious; Romney’s Religion Raises 
Concerns 15 (Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/353.pdf.  
In 2004, after Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage, see 
Pam Belluck, Same-Sex Marriage:  The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in 
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/05/18/national/18MARR.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=727bcbb424713e7a
&ex=1225339200 (last visited Oct. 16, 2008); Move to Ban Gay Marriage Is Killed in 
Massachusetts, WASH. POST, June 15, 2007, at A12, 11 states passed constitutional 
referendums banning same-sex marriage.  Jonathan Rauch, Saying No to ‘I Do,’ THE 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at A8 (“On Nov. 2, 11 out of 11 states passed 
constitutional referendums banning same-sex marriage”).  In May of 2008, the 
California Supreme Court became the second state in the nation besides 
Massachusetts to legalize same-sex marriage.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 
453 (Cal. 2008); Maura Dolan, California Supreme Court Overturns Gay Marriage Ban, 
L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-
gaymarriage16-2008may16.0,6182317.story.  Almost immediately, opponents of 
same-sex marriage began collecting signatures to place an initiative amending the 
California Constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage on the November ballot.  See 
Justin Ewers, California Court Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
May 15, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/05/15/california-
court-legalizes-same-sex-marriage.html; Rauch, supra note 5, at A8.  On November 4, 
2008, a majority of California voters passed Proposition 8, amending the California 
Constitution to ban same-sex marriage in California. Randal C. Archibold & Abby 
Goodnough, California Voters Ban Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06ballot.html?partner+rssnyt&emc+r
ss (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).  On October 10, 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
reversed a legislative ban on same-sex marriage.  William Branigan, Conn. Ban on Gay 
Marriage Reversed, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2008, at A2.  As of the writing of this Article, 
Massachusetts and Connecticut are the only two states in the nation that allow same-
sex marriage. 
 6 See Jeni Loftus, America’s Liberalization of Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 1973 
to 1998, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 762, 765 (2001). 
 7 See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUBL’N. NO. 3194, INSIDE-OUT:  A REPORT ON 
THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIANS, GAYS AND BISEXUALS IN AMERICA AND THE PUBLIC’S VIEWS 
ON ISSUES AND POLICIES RELATED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 19 (2001), available at 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/New-Surveys-on-Experiences-of-Lesbians-Gays-
and-Bisexuals-and-the-Public-s-Views-Related-to-Sexual -Orientation-Report.pdf.   
 8 Id.; see also Dominic J. Parrott & Amos Zeichner, Effects of Sexual Prejudice and 
Anger on Physical Aggression Toward Gay and Heterosexual Men, 6 PSYCHOL. OF MEN & 
MASCULINITY 3, 3 (2005) (“Alarmingly, over one third of gay men and lesbians have 
been victims of interpersonal violence, and up to 94% report some type of 
victimization related to their sexual orientation.”).  In 2006, 1,415 of the 9,080 hate 
  
2008] The Gay Panic Defense 475 
is a problem even in cities with sizable gay and lesbian populations.  
In a survey of young adults in the San Francisco Bay Area, “almost 1 in 
5 men admitted to physically assaulting or threatening people whom 
they believed were homosexual.”9   
When a heterosexual man kills a gay man and faces a murder 
charge, a common defense strategy is to use the concept of “gay panic” 
to explain the killing.10  There is no officially recognized “gay panic” 
defense, but many use the term to refer to defense strategies that rely 
on the notion that a criminal defendant should be excused or justified 
if his violent actions were in response to a (homo)sexual advance. 11  
Such strategies include using gay panic to bolster claims of insanity, 
diminished capacity, provocation, and self-defense.  In this paper, I 
use the term “gay panic defense” as shorthand for these strategies. 
Initially, the term “homosexual panic” was used to promote “the 
idea that a latent homosexual — and manifest ‘homophobe’ — can be 
 
crimes reported to the FBI were based on the victim’s sexual orientation.  FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2006 HATE CRIME STATISTICS 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2006/table1.html (last visited June 17, 2008).  In 
2007, the number of reported bias incidents nationwide fell 1.3 percent.  Hate Crimes:  
Good news on bias incidents based on race and religion.  Bad news on those based on 
sexual orientation, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A22.  This decrease was driven by a 
4.2 percent reduction in the number of reported bias crimes based on religion and a 
3.2 reduction in those based on race.  Id.  These decreases were accompanied by a 5.5 
percent increase in reported hate crimes based on the victim’s perceived sexual 
orientation.  Id. 
 9 Karen Franklin & Gregory M. Herek, Homosexuals, Violence Toward, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIOLENCE, PEACE, CONFLICT 139, 144 (Lester Kurtz & Jennifer 
Turpin eds., 1999). 
 10 See Duncan Osborne, The Homosexual Panic Defense:  Are Juries Really Buying 
It?, LGNY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1999, at 4; see also Gary David Comstock, Dismantling the 
Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 81, 81-82 (1992) [hereinafter 
Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense];  Developments in the Law — 
Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1542-46 (1989); Joshua 
Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men:  Reflections On Provocation 
Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 726-32 (1995) [hereinafter Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill 
“Homosexual” Men]; Robert Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter:  The Homosexual 
Advance As Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 133-34 (1992); Martha C. 
Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”:  Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAW 30, 35-38 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Note, Provocation’s 
Privileged Desire:  The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent 
Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 201-03, 210-13 
(2000); Kara S. Suffredini, Note, Pride and Prejudice:  The Homosexual Panic Defense, 
21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279, 279, 302 (2001). 
 11 Gay panic arguments have been called the Homosexual Advance Defense, the 
Homosexual Panic Defense, and the Homosexual Rage Defense. 
  
476 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:471 
so upset by a homosexual’s advances to him that he becomes 
temporarily insane, in which state he may kill the homosexual.”12  
More recently, the term “gay panic” has been deployed to refer to the 
alleged loss of self-control provoked in a heterosexual man by a gay 
man’s unwanted sexual advance.   
In this Article, I examine the use of gay panic defense strategies in 
the criminal courtroom.  I argue that such strategies are problematic 
because they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes about gay 
men as sexual deviants and sexual predators.13  Gay panic defense 
strategies are also troubling because they seek to capitalize on 
unconscious bias in favor of heterosexuality that is prevalent in today’s 
heterocentric society.14   
Most critics of the gay panic defense have proposed that judges or 
legislatures should bar gay panic arguments from the criminal 
courtroom.15  I take a contrary position and argue that banning gay 
 
 12 Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 13 See Gregory M. Herek, The Social Context of Hate Crimes:  Notes on Cultural 
Heterosexism, in HATE CRIMES:  CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 
96 (1992) (noting that gay sexuality is stereotyped as “pathological, predatory, and 
compulsively promiscuous”); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?  
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. 
MIAMI L.  REV. 511, 541-44 (1992) (discussing portrayals of gay people as child molesters 
and predatory, promiscuous sex addicts); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and 
Tomboys:  Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in 
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 66 n.170 (1995) (discussing images of 
gay men as sexual predators who exploit children, lust after non-gay men, and are 
indiscriminately promiscuous with each other); Suffredini, Pride and Prejudice, supra 
note 10, at 312 (noting that “men who engage in homosexual behavior are stereotyped 
as sexual predators”); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “Gay 
Whites”?:  Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 
1382 (2000) (discussing “gay as white and privileged” stereotype); Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Out yet Unseen:  A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Theory and Political 
Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 608-09 (1997) (discussing “gay as promiscuous” 
stereotype and “gay as white and wealthy” stereotype). 
 14 See Kathy Miriam, Toward a Phenomenology of Sex-Right:  Reviving Radical 
Feminist Theory of Compulsory Heterosexuality, 22 HYPATIA 210, 211 (2007) (noting 
that “most people cleave to the idea that heterosexuality is natural”); Mison, supra 
note 10, at 147 (“American society is heterocentric in that it is dominated by and 
centers around a heterosexual viewpoint.”); see also DEREK MCGHEE, HOMOSEXUALITY, 
LAW AND RESISTANCE 3 (2001) (“[H]eteronormativity is . . . the term used to specify 
the tendency in the contemporary Western sex-gender system to view heterosexual 
relations as the norm, and all other forms of sexual behaviour as deviations from this 
norm.”) (citation omitted); Tiina Rosenberg, Out Of the National Closet:  Show Me 
Love, in SEX, BREATH, AND FORCE:  SEXUAL DIFFERENCE IN A POST-FEMINIST ERA 111 
(Ellen Mortensen ed., 2006) (“Heteronormativity is the supposition that everyone is 
heterosexual, and that the natural way of life is heterosexual.”). 
 15 See Mison, supra note 10, at 176-77 (arguing that judges should rule as matter 
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panic arguments from the criminal courtroom is a bad idea.  When gay 
panic arguments are forced to take a covert turn — when they are not 
explicit or out in the open — they may actually be more effective than 
they would be if out in the open.  Social science research on implicit 
bias suggests that making race salient can diminish the otherwise 
automatic effect of racial stereotypes on perception and beliefs.16  
Conversely, pretending that race is irrelevant allows unconscious 
racism to operate without any constraints.17  It appears the same is 
true of other types of bias, including sexual orientation bias.18  Rather 
than precluding defendants from making gay panic arguments, I argue 
that the criminal courtroom is the place where such arguments can, 
and should, be aired and battled.   
This Article proceeds in four parts.  In Part I, I review the historical 
origins of the concept of gay panic.  Gay panic — the idea that a non-
violent homosexual advance by a gay man can cause a heterosexual man 
to panic and respond with fatal violence — has roots in theories about 
latent homosexuality as a mental disorder.  The term “homosexual 
panic” was coined in 1920 by a psychiatrist who saw a pattern in many 
of his patients who self-identified as heterosexual but were attracted to 
individuals of the same sex.19  These patients experienced a heightened 
sense of anxiety in same-sex environments between their feelings of 
attraction to others of the same sex and what they felt were the socially 
acceptable feelings they were supposed to have.20   
In the 1960s, criminal defense attorneys representing male 
defendants charged with murdering male victims began using the idea 
of gay panic to explain why decision makers should find their clients 
not guilty.21  They argued that their clients panicked and killed only 
 
of law that non-violent homosexual advances do not constitute legally adequate 
provocation); Victoria L. Steinberg, Book Note, A Heat of Passion Offense:  Emotions 
and Bias in “Trans Panic” Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD WORD L.J. 499, 523-24 
(2005) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY (2004)) (arguing 
that judges should not allow gay or trans panic arguments); Suffredini, supra note 10, 
at 309-13 (arguing that use of Homosexual Panic Defense should either be limited by 
application of new evidentiary rules or eliminated altogether).  But cf. Dressler, When 
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra note 10, at 726-29 (arguing against 
Mison’s proposal). 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 378-419. 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 378-419. 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 425-37. 
 19 EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477 (1921). 
 20 Id. at 479. 
 21 Joshua Hammer, The ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 40, 
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/90113/page/2 (last visited Oct. 16, 2008) 
(noting that gay panic defense “often resulted in acquittals or reduced charges in the 
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after the victim made a homosexual advance.22  I explain why 
importing the concept of Homosexual Panic Disorder into the criminal 
arena to excuse or justify the killing of a gay man is problematic. 
In Part II, I first examine the doctrinal underpinnings of the gay 
panic defense.  Initially, heterosexual male defendants charged with 
murdering gay men linked claims of gay panic to criminal law 
defenses based on mental deficiency, such as temporary insanity or 
diminished capacity.  More recently, such defendants have used gay 
panic to bolster claims of provocation and self-defense.  I also examine 
the “trans panic” defense,23 a fairly recent modification of the gay 
panic defense under which a male murder defendant charged with 
murdering a male-to-female transgender individual claims that he 
panicked upon learning that his sexual partner was biologically male, 
not female.  Just as the defendant claiming gay panic tries to blame the 
gay male victim for his own death (“if he hadn’t made a pass at me, I 
wouldn’t have killed him”), the defendant claiming trans panic tries to 
blame the transgender victim by claiming the victim’s deceit provoked 
him (“if he hadn’t lied about being a woman, I wouldn’t have killed 
him”).24  Gay panic arguments linked to claims of mental defect have 
largely been unsuccessful,25 whereas gay panic arguments linked to 
claims of provocation have been relatively successful.26 
Next, I theorize about why gay panic provocation arguments have 
enjoyed relative success in the criminal courtroom.  First, lenient 
verdicts in gay panic provocation cases may reflect the jury’s view that it 
is reasonable for a heterosexual man to react violently to a non-violent 
homosexual advance.  Given that reasonableness in the context of 
provocation doctrine is usually understood to mean typicality, if the 
jury believes that the average man would have been provoked by a non-
violent homosexual advance, then the jury might conclude that the 
defendant was reasonably provoked.  I question whether the current 
understanding of reasonableness as that which is typical makes sense.   
Related to the above argument, lenient verdicts in gay panic 
provocation cases may be a reflection of dominant norms of 
 
murders of homosexuals during the 1960s and 1970s”). 
 22 Suffredini, supra note 10, at 292 (noting that first reported judicial mention of 
homosexual panic disorder came in 1967 case of People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)). 
 23 See Steinberg, supra note 15, at 501 (arguing that judges should decline to 
instruct juries on manslaughter when trans panic is claimed because trans panic does 
not fulfill requirements of heat of passion). 
 24 See infra text accompanying notes 211-34. 
 25 See infra text accompanying notes 118-32. 
 26 See infra text accompanying notes 140-210. 
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masculinity that legitimize the use of physical violence in response to 
non-violent homosexual advances.  Men in this society are supposed 
to be attracted to women, not other men.  Men in this society are 
supposed to be the sexual aggressors, not the ones aggressed upon.  
When a heterosexual man is the object of a homosexual advance, the 
tables are turned.  The heterosexual man’s masculinity is called into 
question.  He is not the sexual aggressor in this situation; instead, he is 
the target.  In rejecting the homosexual advance in a physically violent 
manner, the heterosexual man attempts to reclaim his masculinity in a 
socially acceptable way.   
Additionally, lenient verdicts in gay panic cases may reflect the 
influence of negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and 
sexual predators.  Despite positive advancements in the recognition of 
civil rights for gays and lesbians, negative stereotypes about 
homosexuals still persist.  In gay panic cases, the defendant seeks to 
use such stereotypes to his advantage. 
In Part III, I strike a different path from that of other critics of the 
gay panic defense.  Other critics have proposed essentially the same 
remedy:  barring defendants from arguing gay panic.  In contrast, I 
argue that judges should as a general rule allow such arguments as 
long as some evidence supports the traditional criminal law defense 
that the defendant is asserting through the gay panic lens.  This is the 
same standard many jurisdictions currently use to decide whether a 
trial court must allow a proffered defense.27   
To bolster this potentially unpopular position, I start with a micro-
argument:  attempts to ban gay panic from the criminal courtroom will 
not work because gay panic arguments can and will be made sub rosa.  
I use the Matthew Shepard case to show how defendants can still 
promote gay panic arguments even when a judge formally bans a gay 
panic defense.  In the Shepard case, the judge ruled against the defense 
presenting a “homosexual rage” defense.28  Nonetheless, the defense 
promoted a gay panic argument by calling two witnesses to the stand 
who testified that Shepard made sexual advances upon them, which 
made them uncomfortable.29  The defense also included reference to 
Shepard’s alleged homosexual advance upon defendant Aaron 
McKinney in closing arguments.30   
I then turn to several macro-arguments to support my theory that 
banning gay panic defense strategies from the criminal courtroom is a 
 
 27 See infra text accompanying notes 470-80. 
 28 See infra text accompanying notes 285-88. 
 29 See infra text accompanying notes 289-305. 
 30 See infra text accompanying note 307. 
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bad idea.  Three broader frameworks support my position:  (1) First 
Amendment theory; (2) recent social science research on implicit bias; 
and (3) institutional competency arguments.   
First Amendment scholars often argue that banning offensive speech 
is not good policy because this merely allows bad ideas to fester below 
the surface.31  Open discussion of pernicious ideas is a better way to 
deal with such ideas than banning such discussion outright.  Along the 
same lines, banning gay panic arguments from the criminal courtroom 
is not a good idea because this simply allows bias against 
homosexuality to fester in the subconscious realm.  Open discussion 
about whether it is reasonable for a heterosexual man to respond to a 
non-violent homosexual advance with fatal physical violence is a 
better way to ensure that such bias is mediated by cognitive processes. 
Recent social science research indicates that despite a marked decline 
over the last several decades in self-reported expressions of racial bias, 
implicit bias is still very prevalent today.32  Even individuals who self-
identify as egalitarian tend to respond more negatively toward Blacks 
than Whites when racial stereotypes are activated and there is little or 
no time to consciously recognize that such stereotypes have been 
activated.33  Several studies, however, have found that when race is 
made salient, most individuals are able to consciously mediate their 
responses and, instead of invoking automatic stereotype-congruent 
responses, respond in egalitarian ways.34   
I suggest that if making race salient — bringing race to the surface 
and making people conscious of the racial aspects of the situation — 
helps individuals to act in less biased ways, the same may also be true 
when sexual orientation is made salient.35  One recent study, which 
measured the effect of making non-prejudiced norms about sexual 
orientation salient, provides support for this position.36  This study 
found that hearing another person publicly express positive opinions 
about gay-related issues influenced subjects to express positive 
 
 31 See infra text accompanying note 337. 
 32 See infra text accompanying notes 351-78. 
 33 See infra text accompanying notes 351-78. 
 34 See infra text accompanying notes 378-419. 
 35 Here, I am not making the claim that gays and lesbians are the “same as” Blacks 
and other racial minorities.  See Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. 
REV. 379, 382 (2007) (critiquing mainstream lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
or LGBT political advocacy that invokes “same as” mantra by comparing LGBT rights 
to Black civil rights).  Rather, I am merely suggesting that insights from social 
cognition research on race and implicit bias may suggest helpful ways to deal with 
sexual orientation bias against gays.   
 36 See infra text accompanying notes 426-37. 
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opinions about gay-related issues themselves, even when completing a 
questionnaire form in private.   
Finally, I consider which institutional actor — the legislature, the 
judge, or the jury — is best suited to determine whether to grant 
leniency to the criminal defendant who claims gay panic.  I argue that 
the legislature is the least competent to make this determination 
because it cannot imagine all possible factual scenarios in advance.  
The legislature can only enact one-size-fits-all rules, which are 
particularly ill suited for criminal matters where factual context is 
critical to a fair adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.   
As between judge and jury, I argue that a jury of twelve individuals 
is better suited to weigh the issues when a heterosexual man charged 
with murdering a gay man claims gay panic.  At least with a twelve-
person jury, chosen after each side has had a chance to strike jurors on 
either extreme, there is a good chance that some jurors will have a 
positive attitude about homosexuality and express that attitude, 
making non-prejudiced norms about sexual orientation salient.   
It is also better to let twelve individuals deliberate the merits of such 
claims than to leave this power in the hands of one lone judge.  This is 
because questions such as whether it is reasonable for a heterosexual 
man to be provoked into a heat of passion by a gay man’s non-violent 
sexual advance, or whether it is likely that a non-violent sexual 
advance caused the defendant to go temporarily insane, are the kinds 
of matters about which reasonable minds may disagree.  In the end, 
our society will be better off if juries representing the conscience of 
the community decide these volatile issues.  If we want to rid society 
of the cultural norms that make gay panic arguments persuasive, we 
need to openly battle the assumptions that underlie such claims.  The 
best way to engage in this battle is to allow defendants to raise such 
arguments, make sure prosecutors expose the flaws in such 
arguments, and encourage jurors to deliberate consciously on these 
arguments and their underlying assumptions. 
In Part IV, I offer some tentative suggestions for reform.  To 
encourage jurors to leave stereotypes and prejudice outside the jury 
room, I suggest that prosecutors adopt a two-pronged strategy.  On the 
front end, during jury selection, the prosecutor should request specific 
questions aimed at both reminding egalitarian jurors of their 
commitment to fairness and equality and ferreting out closet 
homophobes.  During opening statements, the prosecutor should 
make sexual orientation salient by warning jurors that the defense may 
try to appeal to stereotypes about gay men as sexual deviants and 
sexual predators.  The prosecutor should ask jurors to guard against 
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any unconscious bias they might have against the victim on the basis 
of sexual orientation.   
On the back end, after the jury has heard all the evidence and before 
it retires to deliberate, prosecutors should suggest during closing 
arguments that jurors engage in sexual orientation and gender 
switching by imagining the same facts but with the victim a female 
making a sexual advance upon a gay man who responds by killing her.  
The prosecutor should also ask the trial court to give a role-reversal 
jury instruction.  This jury instruction would warn jurors against 
allowing sexual orientation bias to influence their decision-making 
and encourage jurors to imagine the facts of the case with the 
defendant as a gay man (rather than a heterosexual man) who kills a 
heterosexual woman (rather than a gay man) after she makes a non-
violent sexual advance upon him.  The judge could also instruct jurors 
to imagine the same facts but with the defendant as a heterosexual 
woman who kills a heterosexual man after he makes a non-violent 
sexual advance upon her.  The judge would tell jurors that if they 
come to a different conclusion about the culpability of the defendant 
in either of these role-reversal exercises, they should go back to the 
case to make sure they have not allowed sexual orientation bias to 
influence their decision-making.   
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF GAY PANIC 
The use of gay panic in murder cases has its roots in theories about 
latent homosexuality as a mental disorder.  The term “homosexual 
panic” was coined by Dr. Edward Kempf, a clinical psychiatrist, in 
1920.37  After treating many patients who exhibited similar 
characteristics, Kempf came to the conclusion that certain troubled 
individuals who thought of themselves as heterosexuals were actually 
latent homosexuals.38  These individuals suffered from an internal 
conflict between their feelings of attraction to individuals of the same 
sex and societal views of such feelings as perverse.39  They also 
experienced a heightened sense of anxiety in same-sex environments, 
caused by this tension between their true feelings of attraction to 
members of the same sex and what they perceived as the socially 
 
 37 KEMPF, supra note 19, at 477; see also Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual 
Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 82 (citing KEMPF, supra note 19, at 477). 
 38 KEMPF, supra note 19, at 477-515. 
 39 Id. 
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acceptable feelings they were supposed to have — attraction to 
members of the opposite sex.40 
According to Kempf, the male patient afflicted with homosexual panic 
would be attracted to same-sex associations and horrified by the 
amorous female.41  After heterosexual failure, the patient would become 
anxious, depressed, and sometimes suicidal.42  Interestingly, separation 
from an individual of the same sex to whom the patient was attracted, 
rather than a homosexual advance, would precipitate a panic state.43 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the 
official list of psychiatric disorders published by the American 
Psychiatric Association, listed “Homosexual Panic Disorder” in its 
1952 edition, but the term has not appeared in that Manual since 
then.44  Even in 1952, many of the standard psychiatric and 
psychological dictionaries did not recognize Homosexual Panic 
Disorder as a psychiatric disorder.45 
While Kempf’s original theory has been stretched almost beyond 
recognition in its use as a defense in the criminal courtroom today, 
modern support does exist for the idea that men who self-identify as 
heterosexual and express hostility toward gays may actually be latent 
homosexuals.  In 1996, Henry Adams conducted a study to find out 
whether heterosexual men who exhibited strong anti-gay sentiments 
would be aroused by homosexual erotica.46  Adams started by measuring 
sixty-four Caucasian male participants’ feelings toward gays.47  All 
participants self-identified as heterosexual.48  After evaluating their 
responses, Adams divided the participants into two groups which he 
labeled “homophobic” (those who seemed hostile toward gays) and “not 
homophobic” (those who were not hostile toward gays).  He then placed 
a sensor on the penises of all the participants, and measured penile 
response to erotic videotapes involving heterosexuals, lesbians, and gay 
men engaging in sexual activity.  Only the men in Adams’s homophobic 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 511. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 87-88 
(citing LELAND E. HINSIE & ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 348-49 
(1970)). 
 44 Id. at 83 (citation omitted). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Henry E. Adams et al., Is Homophobia Associated With Homosexual Arousal?, 105 
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 440, 440 (1996); see also Michael Segell, Homophobia Doesn’t 
Lie, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1, 1997, at 35. 
 47 Adams, supra note 46, at 441. 
 48 Id. 
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category showed an increase in penile erection in response to male 
homosexual erotic stimuli.49 
Even if some self-identified straight men who express strongly 
negative feelings about homosexuality are actually latent homosexuals 
repressing their own homoerotic desires, the idea that gay panic 
should excuse the killing of a gay man is problematic for several 
reasons.  First, treating gay panic as a mental disorder suggests that 
homophobia50 linked to latent homosexuality is a mental illness.51  
 
 49 Id. at 442-43.  In contrast, heterosexual women do not appear to display the 
same kind of physiological bias against gay men as heterosexual men.  Amanda L. 
Mahaffey et al., Sex Differences in Affective Responses to Homoerotic Stimuli Evidence for 
an Unconscious Bias Among Heterosexual Men but Not Heterosexual Women, 34 
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 537, 543-44 (2005).  In another study, Jeffrey Bernat 
measured physical aggression toward gay and straight individuals after self-identified 
heterosexual college males viewed a homoerotic videotape.  Jeffrey A. Bernat, 
Homophobia and Physical Aggression Toward Homosexual and Heterosexual Individuals, 
110 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 179, 179 (2001).  Bernat found that after watching the 
video, the homophobic males were significantly more aggressive toward gay male 
opponents than the non-homophobic men.  Id. at 185.  It is not clear whether these 
men were actually unable to control their aggressive behavior or whether they simply 
chose not to do so. 
 50 Critics of the term “homophobia” note that attaching the prefix “homo” to the 
word “phobia” suggests that individuals with negative attitudes about homosexuality 
are fearful of homosexuals when anti-homosexual sentiments are often driven more by 
prejudice than fear.  See generally Colleen R. Logan, Homophobia?  No, Homoprejudice, 
31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 31 (1996) (investigating nature of anti-homosexual responses in 
male and female undergraduate university students).  Colleen Logan warns that “the 
continued use of homophobia as a descriptor for anti-homosexual responses may be 
seen by society as implicit permission to continue the oppression of homosexuals, 
excused by its being the result of inescapable fear.”  Id. at 32.  Similarly, Gregory 
Herek remarks, “Characterizing hostility toward homosexual persons in terms of a 
phobia implies that those attitudes are based upon an irrational fear, similar to the fear 
some people experience when confronted with snakes, spiders, or open spaces.”  
Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”:  A Social Psychological Perspective on 
Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1, 2 (1984).  Stephanie 
Shields and Robert Harriman note: 
The great difference between the unreasonable fear of spiders (or mutilation, 
snakes, etc.) and fear of homosexuality lies in the assignment of 
responsibility for such acquired pathologies.  Whereas spider phobics 
typically accept responsibility for their fear and even seek treatment, 
homophobics do not.  To the homophobic it is homosexual men who are 
“sick.”   
Stephanie A. Shields & Robert E. Harriman, Fear of Male Homosexuality:  Cardiac 
Responses of Low and High Homonegative Males, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 66 (1984); 
see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Dissecting Axes of Subordination:  The Need for a 
Structural Analysis, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15-16 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hutchinson, Dissecting Axes of Subordination] (differentiating “homophobia” which 
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Studies, however, indicate that negative attitudes about homosexuality 
tend to come from two sources:  sexual conservatism and prejudice.52  
Although some mental health practitioners might feel otherwise,53 
sexually conservative individuals and prejudiced individuals are not 
necessarily mentally ill. 
The idea that homosexuality, latent or otherwise, is a mental illness 
has long been discredited.  In December 1973, after a review of the 
scientific literature and consultation with experts in the field, the 
Board of Trustees for the American Psychiatric Association deleted 
homosexuality from the second edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.54  The Board recognized that 
“[a] significant proportion of homosexuals are apparently satisfied 
with their sexual orientation, show no significant signs of manifest 
psychopathology . . . and are able to function quite effectively.”55  The 
American Psychological Association followed suit in January 1975, 
adopting the following resolution:  “Homosexuality per se implies no 
impairment in judgement [sic], stability, reliability, or general social 
and vocational capabilities; Further, the American Psychological 
Association urges all mental health professionals to take the lead in 
removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated 
with homosexual orientations.”56 
Even though more than thirty years have passed since both the 
American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological 
Association rejected the characterization of homosexuality as a mental 
illness, the idea that it might be normal for someone to be sexually 
attracted to another person of the same sex is not yet accepted 
universally.  For example, the Boy Scouts of America, which boasts 
nearly 2.9 million youth members and more than 1.1 million adult 
 
involves “pronounced emotional animus” and “heterosexism” which involves 
“institutionalized domination of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals”). 
 51 See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 34 (Harvard Law Review eds., 1990). 
 52 See Thomas J. Ficarrotto, Racism, Sexism, and Erotophobia:  Attitudes of 
Heterosexuals Towards Homosexuals, 19 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 111, 115 (1990).   
 53 In 2005, some mental health practitioners began arguing that extreme forms of 
racism, homophobia, and other prejudice ought to be recognized by the American 
Psychiatric Association as mental disorders.  Shankar Vedantam, Psychiatry Ponders 
Whether Extreme Bias Can Be an Illness, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at Al. 
 54 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbance:  Proposed 
Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44, Position Statement (Retired), APA Document 
Reference No. 730008, at 2 (1973), available at http://www.psychiatryonline.com/ 
DSMPDF/DSM-II_Homosexuality_Revision.pdf  (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
 55 Id. 
 56 APA Online, APA Policy Statement:  Discrimination Against Homosexuals, 
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/discrimination.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008). 
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members,57 openly prohibits gay males from membership in the 
organization because it believes “homosexual conduct is inconsistent 
with the traditional values espoused in the Scout Oath and Law.”58  
According to the Boy Scouts of America:  “homosexual conduct is 
inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout oath that a Scout be 
morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word 
and deed.”59 
Apparently, the Department of Defense also considers 
homosexuality a mental abnormality.  In June 2006, a think tank at 
the University of California at Santa Barbara discovered a 1996 
Department of Defense Instruction that classified homosexuality as a 
mental disorder, along with mental retardation, impulse control 
disorders, and personality disorders.60  Both the American Psychiatric 
Association and the American Psychological Association wrote to the 
Department of Defense, pointing out that homosexuality is no longer 
regarded as a mental disorder and requesting that the Instruction be 
corrected.61  The Department of Defense subsequently released a 
 
 57 Boy Scouts of Am., BSA at a Glance, http://www.scouting.org/Media/FactSheets/ 
02-501.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2008). 
 58 Press Release, Boy Scouts of Am., Boy Scouts of America Resolution (Feb. 6, 
2002), available at http://www.scouting.org/Media/PressReleases/2002/resolution.aspx 
(last visited May 19, 2008). 
 59 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 652 (2000).  James Dale 
unsuccessfully attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Boy Scouts of 
America’s anti-gay policy.  Dale joined the Boy Scouts when he was eight years old and 
remained a Boy Scout until he turned 18.  Id. at 644.  Dale was an exemplary Scout 
and achieved the rank of Eagle Scout, one of the Boy Scouts’ highest honors, in 1988.  
Id.  In 1989, Dale applied for adult membership in the Boy Scouts and a position as an 
assistant scoutmaster.  The Boy Scouts approved Dale’s application for adult 
membership and made him an assistant scoutmaster.  About this time, Dale left home 
to attend Rutgers University where he came out of the closet.  He eventually became 
Vice President of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.  When the Boy Scouts 
of America found out that Dale was gay, they revoked his adult membership.  Dale 
sued the Boy Scouts, arguing that they had violated New Jersey law prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.  
While the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with Dale, the United States Supreme 
Court did not.  In a closely divided 5-4 opinion, the Court in 2000 held that applying 
New Jersey’s public accommodation law to require the Boy Scouts to readmit Dale 
would violate the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association.  Id. 
 60 Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Lawmakers 
Dispute Pentagon Document Calling Gays Mentally Ill (June 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/lawmakers_dispute_pentagon_docume
nt; see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION NO. 1332.38 (Nov. 14, 1996). 
 61 Beyond Homophobia:  A Weblog About Sexual Orientation, Prejudice, Science, 
and Policy by Gregory Herek, http://www.beyondhomophobia.com/blog/2006/11/19/ 
military-psychology/ (Nov. 19, 2006, 13:49 PST). 
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revised Instruction, which removed homosexuality from the category 
of mental disorders.62  Nonetheless, the Instruction still lists 
homosexuality as a “defect” along with dyslexia, motion sickness, 
enuresis (bed-wetting), and repeated venereal disease infections.63 
Another problem with using Kempf’s Homosexual Panic Disorder 
theory to support a mental defect defense in a murder case is that not 
one of Kempf’s patients was aggressive toward another because of a 
sexual advance.64  Indeed, separation from an individual of the same sex 
to whom the patient was attracted would often cause the onset of 
“homosexual panic” and lead to increased passivity and an inability to 
function.65  Moreover, if physical at all, Kempf’s patients tended to inflict 
punishment upon themselves, not others.66  Adrian Howe observes: 
[T]here was a considerable discrepancy between cases 
reported in the psychiatric literature and the cases involving 
immediate reaction or sudden panics described in the legal 
defences.  Patients diagnosed with acute homosexual panic 
demonstrated a helplessness, passivity, and inability to be 
aggressive far removed from the picture of the explosively 
violent man constructed by lawyers deploying a HPD 
[Homosexual Panic Disorder] defence.  The legal argument 
that this disorder was likely to result in extreme violence 
therefore had no psychiatric basis.67 
Similarly, Gary Comstock notes: 
As a psychological disorder in which neither sexual advance to 
the patient by another person nor violent attack by the patient 
of another person are causal or symptomatic, acute 
homosexual panic would seem to be inappropriate as the basis 
of a legal defense for men who claim to have killed another 
man to ward off his sexual advance.68 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 84. 
 65 See id. at 87-88 (citing LELAND E. HINSIE & ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC 
DICTIONARY 348-49 (1970)).   
 66 Id. at 87. 
 67 Adrian Howe, More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence and 
Sexed Excuses – Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual 
Advance Defence), 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 336, 342 (1997). 
 68 Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 86.   
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A final discrepancy between Kempf’s theory and the use of gay panic 
in the criminal courtroom is that the murder defendants who claim 
gay panic made them kill have been almost exclusively male,69 
whereas Kempf’s patients were both male and female.70  Comstock 
questions why we should accept claims of gay panic made by men who 
kill in response to gay male sexual advances when women apparently 
do not kill in response to lesbian sexual advances: 
[I]f the homosexual panic defense is premised on the 
disorder’s causing murderous behavior in those it afflicts, why 
have female patients not been driven to kill? . . . To be used 
convincingly as a cause for killing, the disorder would have to 
be documented with evidence that both male and female 
patients have killed.71 
While it is not inconceivable that a woman might panic and respond 
violently to a lesbian sexual advance, homicide cases involving claims 
of lesbian panic are rarely seen.  In one unusual case, a woman named 
Melissa Burch Harton argued that she killed her friend Natasha 
Bacchus in self-defense after Bacchus told Harton that she was in love 
with Harton and wanted to kiss her.72  The jury rejected Harton’s 
claim of self-defense, but showed leniency by finding her guilty of 
involuntary manslaughter, rather than murder.73  While it is certainly 
possible that Homosexual Panic Disorder, if it exists at all, manifests 
differently in men and women,74 the dearth of lesbian panic cases 
suggests that gay panic is not the product of a mental disease or defect.  
Instead, gay panic seems to stem from a specific construction of 
masculinity, one that values heterosexism and violence as traits of the 
masculine and implicitly rejects homoerotic desire.   
 
 69 See id. at 89. 
 70 KEMPF, supra note 19, at 506-11. 
 71 Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 89-90. 
 72 Amit R. Paley, Murder Jury Will Hear A Claim of Obsession, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 
2006, at B5. 
 73 Amit R. Paley, Md. Woman Convicted of Killing Female Friend, WASH. POST, Feb. 
11, 2006, at B4. 
 74 It is undisputed that men are responsible for most violent crime.  See UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:  ARRESTS BY SEX (2006), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_42.html (reporting that of 10,472,432 
persons arrested in 2006, 7,985,505 were male and only 2,486,927 were female).  See 
generally Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes 
and What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 (1996) (noting that in 
1993, one man out of every 50 men in workforce was incarcerated). 
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II. GAY PANIC IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 
Borrowing from Kempf’s Homosexual Panic Disorder theory, male 
defendants charged with murdering gay men have sought mitigation 
or exoneration by claiming gay panic, either as a manifestation of 
mental disease or defect or as support for a claim of provocation or 
self-defense.  In this part, I first consider whether gay panic, if allowed 
as a defense, should be recognized as an excuse or a justification.  
Next, I unpack the doctrinal underpinnings of gay panic defense 
arguments.  Finally, I theorize about why gay panic provocation 
claims have enjoyed relative success compared to gay panic arguments 
linked to mental incapacity defenses. 
A. Excuse or Justification? 
A preliminary question is whether gay panic, if allowed as a defense 
argument, should be recognized as an excuse or a justification.  An 
excuse defense is one in which the actor’s conduct is viewed as 
wrongful, but the actor himself is not seen as morally blameworthy.75  
A justification defense, in contrast, focuses on the actor’s conduct 
more than the individual characteristics of the actor.76  A justification 
defense says the actor’s conduct was appropriate under the 
circumstances.77  Examples of excuse defenses include insanity, 
duress, and intoxication.  Necessity, self-defense, and defense of others 
are usually considered justification defenses. 
It is difficult to argue that gay panic should be called either a 
justification or an excuse.  Justification suggests the defendant did the 
right thing or took the course of action that society would have 
wanted him to take.  A man who kills a gay man just because that man 
made a pass at him does not act the way a civilized society should 
want its men to act.78  Gay panic should not be recognized as a 
justification defense. 
 
 75 Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra note 10, at 763 
n.17 (“[A]n excuse is in the nature of a claim that although the actor has harmed 
society, she should not be blamed . . . for causing that harm . . . .  [A]n excuse negates 
the moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.”). 
 76 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) (“A justification 
speaks to the rightness of the act . . . .”); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the 
Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law:  A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and 
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 66, 68 n.37 (1984) (discussing distinction between 
justifications and excuses). 
 77 FLETCHER, supra note 76, at 759 (“A justification speaks to the rightness of the act.”). 
 78 If the victim does more than just make a pass — if, for example, the victim tries 
to forcibly rape the defendant, then ordinary self-defense principles would allow the 
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An excuse defense suggests that the defendant is not as morally 
blameworthy as one who does the same action without the excusing 
condition.  It is difficult to say that the man who kills a gay man in 
response to a non-violent homosexual advance is not as morally 
blameworthy as someone who kills for any other reason. 
In any event, answering the justification-excuse question is 
unnecessary because gay panic is not a separate, freestanding 
defense,79 and I do not argue that courts should recognize it as such.  
Gay panic is merely an argument used to bolster a traditional criminal 
law defense such as insanity, diminished capacity, provocation, or self-
defense.  Therefore, whether a gay panic argument will operate as an 
excuse or a justification will depend on which traditional defense it is 
used to support.  While one can debate whether the doctrine of 
provocation is appropriately characterized as a partial excuse (as I 
have done in previous work),80 the general consensus is that 
provocation is a partial excuse defense, self-defense is a justification 
defense, and insanity and diminished capacity are excuse defenses. 
 
defendant to protect himself from the imminent threat of grievous bodily injury. 
 79 There are numerous examples of other defenses, which, like the gay panic 
defense, are not officially recognized defenses but are known in the popular culture.  
See, e.g., PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 2 (1997) (“The black rage 
defense is a legal strategy used in criminal cases.”); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE 
CULTURAL DEFENSE 5 (2004) (“This study analyzes the cultural defense, which, were it 
to be established, would require judges to consider the cultural background of litigants 
in the disposition of cases before them.”) (emphasis added); Anne M. Coughlin, 
Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994) (discussing “battered woman 
syndrome defense” even though not a freestanding, officially-recognized, defense); see 
also Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial:  Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and 
Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 62-65, 72-73 (1999) (evaluating when 
identity impact evidence, such as cultural defense evidence, evidence of black rage, 
and battered woman syndrome evidence, should be admissible).   
 80 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:  PASSION AND FEAR IN THE 
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 227-30 (2003) [hereinafter LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE 
MAN] (arguing that doctrine of provocation contains elements of both justification 
and excuse); see also A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
292, 307 (1976) (arguing that provocation has elements of both justification and 
excuse); Joshua Dressler, Provocation:  Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. 
L. REV. 467, 469 (1987) (arguing that provocation is generally viewed as partial 
excuse); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense? Some Reflections on a 
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 971 (2002) (arguing that provocation should 
not be understood in justficatory terms); Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate 
(Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse not Justification, 42 MICH. J. L. REFORM 
(forthcoming 2009) (on file with author) (arguing that provocation is excuse, not 
justification); Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past:  The Defence of Provocation in 
Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 133 (1987) (arguing that provocation ought to be 
viewed as partial justification). 
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B. Insanity 
Beginning in 1967, male defendants charged with murdering gay 
men began to utilize the concept of homosexual panic to support 
mental defect defenses such as insanity and diminished capacity.81  
Insanity, a complete defense which results in a not guilty by reason of 
insanity (“NGI”) verdict, is defined differently depending on whether 
the jurisdiction follows the M’Naghten test or the American Law 
Institute’s (“ALI”) test, also known as the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) 
test.  Under the M’Naghten test, the accused can be found not guilty by 
reason of insanity if, at the time of the act, the accused “was laboring 
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, 
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”82  The ALI test, 
found in Section 4.01 of the MPC, provides a defense when, as a result 
of mental disease or defect, the actor “lacks substantial capacity . . . to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct.”83  
Heterosexual men charged with killing gay men have argued that the 
victim’s (homo)sexual advance triggered in them a violent psychotic 
reaction, causing them to lose control over their mental abilities.84 
There are several problems with defense attempts to claim insanity 
linked to gay panic.  First, to be found not guilty by reason of insanity, 
a defendant must not have understood the nature and quality of his 
act or appreciated that what he was doing was wrong.  In other words, 
either he did not know that he was stabbing, choking, or kicking the 
victim, or he did not know that it was wrong to do so.  The male 
defendant claiming that a homosexual advance made him lose his self-
control often cannot claim convincingly that he did not know that he 
was kicking, beating, or punching the victim or that he did not 
understand what he was doing was illegal or immoral.   
 
 81 See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) 
(describing how psychiatrist testified for defense that defendant did not know nature 
and quality of his act at time of attack and was acting as result of acute homosexual 
panic brought on by fear that victim was sexually molesting him); People v. Parisie, 
287 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (noting proffered defense was “insanity 
based on ‘homosexual panic’”); State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 44 (Mo. 1975) 
(noting that psychiatric evidence offered by defense suggested defendant was in state 
of “homosexual panic” at time of stabbing). 
 82 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1966).  Seventeen states 
and the federal government have adopted a version of the M’Naghten test.  Clark v. 
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749-50 (2006). 
 83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2001).  Fourteen states have adopted tests for 
insanity inspired by the MPC.  Clark, 548 U.S. at 751-52. 
 84 Osborne, supra note 10, at 4. 
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Second, to be found not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant 
must have been suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of 
his act.  The male defendant claiming that a homosexual advance 
made him crazy often cannot prove he was suffering from a mental 
disease or defect at the time of his act because the American 
Psychiatric Association does not recognize Homosexual Panic 
Disorder as a mental disease.85  Additionally, the American Psychiatric 
Association no longer considers homosexuality a mental disorder.86  
This makes it difficult for a defendant to claim latent homosexuality as 
a mental disease or defect.   
Most claims of insanity based on homosexual panic have not been 
successful.87  In People v. Parisie,88 for example, the defendant, John 
Parisie, was charged with murder and argued he should be found not 
guilty by reason of insanity based on “homosexual panic.”89  Parisie 
testified that he was walking down the road when the victim, whom 
he had met some time earlier at an automobile dealership, offered him 
a lift.  According to Parisie, after he got in the car, the victim drove a 
while before turning down a gravel road.  He then parked, turned off 
the lights, slid the seat back, and made an unspecified sexual advance, 
telling Parisie that if he refused, he would have to walk.90  Parisie 
claimed he went crazy and vaguely remembered struggling with the 
victim and hearing a noise that sounded like gunshots.91 
At trial, the defense called a clinical psychologist who testified that 
Parisie was a highly latent homosexual with strong feelings of 
inferiority.  The defense also called a psychiatrist who testified that 
“‘homosexual panic’ is severe panic or fear reaction that is provoked 
by extreme anxiety or psychological trauma, and this often takes the 
form of a state of amnesia, in which the person sets aside or forgets 
unconsciously something that his conscious mind cannot tolerate.”92  
 
 85 Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 83. 
 86 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 54, at 1-3. 
 87 Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the 
Court System:  Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 501 (1984) (asserting that “[c]ases involving the defense of 
homosexual panic which have reached the appellate level have never resulted in a 
defendant’s acquittal by reason of insanity”). 
 88 287 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). 
 89 Id. at 313. 
 90 Id. at 313-14. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 314. 
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The jury rejected Parisie’s claim of insanity,93 finding him guilty of 
murder, and Parisie’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. 
A more recent example of a failed attempt to link gay panic to an 
insanity defense is reflected in the killing of Billy Jack Gaither.  In the 
summer of 1998, Charles Butler and his friend, Steven Mullins, beat an 
openly gay man named Billy Jack Gaither to death and set his body on 
fire atop a pyre of tires.  The men claimed they killed Gaither because 
he propositioned them.94  At his arraignment on capital murder 
charges, Butler pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.95  
Before trial, however, Butler withdrew his mental defect defense,96 
arguing instead that it was Mullins who actually killed Billy Jack 
Gaither.  Even though Butler formally withdrew his mental defect 
defense, gay panic was prominently featured at his trial.  Butler 
claimed he hit Gaither only after Gaither told him he was interested in 
a sexual threesome with Butler and Mullins.  Mullins too asserted that 
the reason he killed Gaither was because Gaither had propositioned 
him two weeks earlier. 
Gaither’s friends, however, said it was highly unlikely that Gaither 
would proposition either man.  According to one friend:  “[Billy Jack] 
didn’t walk around acting, looking, or talking gay.  If anybody was 
asking for sex, it wasn’t him — it was them.  We’ve got a lot of 
rednecks in here.  You don’t make advances with them around.”97  
Marian Hammonds, owner of The Tavern, a straight bar which Gaither 
frequented, described Gaither as a likeable man who, while never 
denying he was gay, “made a point of never doing the gay thing when 
he was at our place . . . My husband, Larry didn’t even know he was 
 
 93 Id. at 315. 
 94 See Trial of Man Accused of Gay Hate Crime Slaying Begins with Defendant Blaming 
His Cohort, COURT TV ONLINE, Aug. 4, 1999, http://www.courttv.com/trials/ 
butler/080499_ctv.html; see also Phillip Rawls, Man Convicted of Capital Murder in Slaying 
of Homosexual, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 5, 1999; Phillip Rawls, Skinhead 
Describes Beating Death of Gay Man, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Aug. 4, 1999; Phillip 
Rawls, Witness Describes Defendant in Gay Murder as Joking Afterwards, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRES, Aug. 6, 1999; Jay Reeves, Prosecutor to Recommend Life Without Parole in 
Killing of Gay Man, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 25, 1999 [hereinafter Jay Reeves, 
Prosecutor to Recommend Life Without Parole in Killing of Gay Man]. 
 95 Val Walton, Two Plead Not Guilty in Killing of Gay Man, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 
21, 1999, at A1 (noting that “Gaither’s sister gasped when Butler’s attorney, William 
R. Hill Jr., told Circuit Court Judge John Rochester that his client pleaded not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of mental defect”). 
 96 Jay Reeves, Prosecutor to Recommend Life Without Parole in Killing of Gay Man, 
supra note 94. 
 97 Daniel Pedersen, A Quiet Man’s Tragic Rendezvous with Hate, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 
15, 1990, at 65. 
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gay until about a year ago, and I had to tell him.”98  Hammonds 
further remarked, “He [Gaither] didn’t ever put anybody in [an 
awkward] position.”99 
Mullins’s claim that he killed Gaither because Gaither propositioned 
him is suspect for another reason.  Friends of Gaither asserted that 
Mullins and Gaither had had a sexual relationship which Mullins did 
not want anyone to know about, and that Mullins wanted Gaither dead 
to ensure that he never would tell anyone about their homosexual affair.  
At Butler’s trial, Mullins adamantly denied having sex with Gaither or 
any other man.  Butler’s attorneys, however, presented several witnesses 
who testified that Mullins had a secret gay sex life.  One man, Jimmy 
Lynn Dean, testified that he and Mullins had had oral sex about four 
months before Billy Jack Gaither was killed.100 
In Butler’s case, neither gay panic nor the “it wasn’t me” argument 
worked.  The jury convicted Butler of capital murder.  Gaither’s 
family, however, requested that Butler be spared the death penalty.101  
Accordingly, the judge sentenced Butler to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.102 
C. Diminished Capacity 
Another doctrinal hook for defendants charged with murdering a 
gay man is the diminished capacity defense.  Diminished capacity, a 
partial defense to murder, generally requires proof that the defendant 
was acting under the influence of a mental disease or defect which 
affected his capacity to premeditate and deliberate or form the 
requisite intent to kill.  There are two variants of the diminished 
capacity defense.  Under the mens rea variant, “evidence that [the 
defendant] suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of his 
conduct is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that he lacked a 
mental state that is an element of the charged offense.”103  Under the 
partial responsibility variant, the charge is reduced from murder to 
 
 98 Sue Anne Pressley, 2 Accused of Killing, Burning Gay Man, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 
1999, at A1. 
 99 Cops:  Men Plotted Gay Man’s Grisly Slaying, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 5, 1999, at 26. 
 100 Frontline, Assault on Gay America:  The Life and Death of Billy Jack Gaither, Steve 
Mullins’ Homosexual Behavior?, Aug. 5, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/assault/billyjack/mullet.html. 
 101 Killer of Gay Man in Alabama Gets Life in Prison Without Parole, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
17, 1999, at A14. 
 102 Id. 
 103 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 26.02[B][2], at 320 (3d ed. 
2001) [hereinafter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW].   
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manslaughter because the defendant is seen as “less blameworthy and 
therefore less deserving of punishment, than a killer who acts with a 
normal state of mind.”104   
A diminished capacity defense was successfully used in the Jenny 
Jones murder case in which a heterosexual man named Jonathan 
Schmitz killed his gay friend Scott Amedure after an appearance on the 
Jenny Jones Show in 1995.105  Schmitz had been invited to appear on the 
show and knew the show’s theme that day was Secret Admirers.  Schmitz 
thought an ex-girlfriend was going to be revealed as his secret admirer.  
In fact, Schmitz’s male friend Scott Amedure appeared on the show as 
his secret admirer.106  Even though he was surprised and apparently 
embarrassed to find that his secret admirer was a man, Schmitz hugged 
Amedure on the air and even laughed when Amedure recounted a 
fantasy that involved Schmitz, whipped cream, strawberries, and 
champagne.107  Schmitz even offered to give Amedure and Donna Riley, 
Schmitz’s neighbor who had arranged Schmitz and Amedure’s 
appearance on the Jenny Jones Show, a ride home.108  Before they left 
the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Amedure snatched a flashing 
construction light and stashed it in Schmitz’s car.109   
On March 9, 1995, three days after appearing on the show, Schmitz 
came home from work and found the flashing construction light and 
an unsigned note in front of his apartment that read, “John.  If you 
want it ‘off’ you’ll have to ask me.  P.S. It takes a special tool.  Guess 
Who.”110  Believing the note to be a crude sexual come-on from 
 
 104 Id. § 26.03[A][2], at 325-28. 
 105 See People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (noting 
Schmitz was initially charged with first-degree murder, argued diminished capacity, and 
was found guilty of second-degree murder); Court TV Online, Court TV Verdicts:  
Michigan v. Schmitz (Aug. 25, 1999), http://www.courttv.com/archive/verdicts/ 
schmitz.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that jury on November 12, 1996 opted 
against finding Schmitz guilty of first-degree murder, instead finding him guilty of 
second-degree murder and illegal possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony). 
 106 See Keith Bradsher, Talk-Show Guest is Guilty of Second-Degree Murder, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1999, at A14. 
 107 See Court TV Online, Court TV Verdicts:  Michigan v. Schmitz (Aug. 25, 1999), 
http://www.courttv.com/archive/verdicts/schmitz.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
 108 See Michelle Green, TV’s Fatal Attraction:  A Surprise Meeting on ‘Jenny Jones’ 
Ends in a Shocking Shotgun Murder, PEOPLE, Mar. 27, 1995, at 40, available at 
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20105369,00.html (last visited Oct. 
15, 2008). 
 109 See id. 
 110 Aldina Vazao Kennedy & Bryan Robinson, Schmitz Found Guilty of Second-
Degree Murder, COURT TV ONLINE, Aug. 26, 1999, http://www.courttv.com/ 
archive/trials/schmitz/082699_verdict_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008); see also 
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Amedure, Schmitz drove to his bank, withdrew money from his 
savings account, then purchased a twelve-gauge pump action shotgun 
and some ammunition.111  He drove to Amedure’s house, and after 
Amedure admitted to writing the note, Schmitz shot Amedure twice in 
the chest, killing him.112 
Schmitz was charged with first-degree murder.  At trial, Schmitz’s 
attorney argued Schmitz was suffering from diminished capacity when 
he shot and killed Scott Amedure, stemming from his embarrassment 
on the Jenny Jones Show when Amedure appeared as his secret 
admirer.113  At that time, diminished capacity was allowed in Michigan 
as a partial defense to first-degree murder.114  Despite the 
overwhelming evidence of premeditation and deliberation, the jury 
found Schmitz’s claim of diminished capacity stemming from 
homosexual panic credible and found him guilty of second-degree 
murder rather than first-degree murder.115 
Karen Franklin and Gregory Herek have opined that the verdict in 
the Jenny Jones case reflected “[t]he sense of cultural permission to 
engage in antigay violence.”116  Offering another possible explanation 
 
Jenny Jones with Patsi Bale Cox, Fatal Attraction, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 30, 1997, at 48. 
 111 L.L. Brasier, Jury Hears Tape of 911 Confession Schmitz Upset During Call, 
Dispatcher Says, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 16, 1996, at B1; Megan Garvey, The Aftershock 
of Shock TV, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1995, at D1; Stephen Seplow, Talk TV on Trial:  A 
Taping, a Killing, One Guest Killed the Man Who Liked Him.  The Jury is Still Out., 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 10, 1996, at A1. 
 112 Frazier Moore, Critics Blame ‘Jenny Jones’ Show for Murder, BALT. SUN, Mar. 11, 
1995, at D1; Frazier Moore, ‘Retailing of Emotional Conflict’ Blamed in TV Talk-Show 
Tragedy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at A3; Frazier Moore, Talk Show Is Blamed 
After Guest Shot to Death Critics Charge that Programs Place Subjects in Unexpected, 
Upsetting Situations for Lively TV, AKRON BEACON J., Mar. 11, 1995, at A1; Police Say 
Talk Show Led to Murder, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1995, at N8. 
 113 People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); see also Teresa 
Wiltz & David Farhi, Death Follows Ugly Scene Played out on ‘Springer,’ WASH. POST, 
July 27, 2000, at C1. 
 114 Diminished capacity is no longer recognized as a defense to first-degree murder 
in Michigan.  People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Mich. 2001).   
 115 Jonathan appealed his second-degree murder conviction and was granted a retrial 
because the trial court had not allowed the defense to remove a juror they found 
problematic.  Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 769-72.  On retrial, the defense was not able to 
argue diminished capacity again because that defense was only available against a first-
degree murder charge.  People v. Biggs, 509 N.W.2d 803, 805-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).  
Instead, Jonathan’s attorney argued that Jonathan was provoked into a heat of passion by 
Amedure’s sexual advance in an attempt to reduce his conviction to voluntary 
manslaughter.  The jury rejected Jonathan’s provocation defense and he was again found 
guilty of second-degree murder.  Talk Show Guest Convicted of Murder for a 2nd Time:  
Jury Rejects Killer’s Crime-of-Passion Defense, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 27, 1999, at 6. 
 116 Franklin & Herek, supra note 9, at 148. 
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for the second-degree murder verdict, Franklin and Herek comment, 
“[p]articularly revealing in that case was the popular perception that 
the television show’s producers had humiliated the heterosexual man 
and thus were responsible for the murder.”117 
Over time, the use of mental defect defenses in gay victim homicide 
cases has fallen out of favor for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which is the difficulty of securing a favorable jury verdict with a mental 
defect defense.118  Jurors are often skeptical of defense claims of 
insanity.119  Even if the defendant is able to convince jurors that he was 
suffering from a mental disease or defect, it is often difficult to prove 
that the defendant did not know that what he was doing (killing the 
victim) was wrong or that the defendant could not control his actions.120   
Additionally, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity (temporary 
or otherwise) does not mean the defendant goes free.  The defendant 
who is found insane is usually committed to a mental institution for 
an indefinite period of time.  This period of confinement can exceed 
the length of the prison sentence the defendant would have received if 
he had been convicted.121  Many individuals would rather serve a 
definite prison sentence than endure the stigma and uncertainty of an 
indefinite period of commitment in a mental institution.  Moreover, 
asserting a mental defect defense is often seen as an unacceptable 
admission of mental deficiency in the eyes of the defendant.122 
Another possible reason for the gradual shift away from the use of 
gay panic to support a mental defect defense may be the unavailability 
of those defenses in certain jurisdictions.  At least three states do not 
 
 117 Id. 
 118 Lisa A. Callahan, The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas:  An 
Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 331, 337 (1991) (“Although there 
was considerable variation among the eight states in the acquittal rate (percentage of 
successful pleas), overall, just one-quarter of [defendants] who raised the [insanity] 
defense were successful.”). 
 119 JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS 89 (1992) (noting that “[o]ne study found 
that out of about two million criminal cases dealt with in American criminal courts in 
a single year, only 1,625 produced verdicts of not guilty on the basis of insanity”). 
 120 See Suffredini, supra note 10, at 295.   
 121 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (noting that when criminal 
defendant establishes that he is not guilty of crime by reason of insanity, government 
may commit him to mental institution until he regains his sanity or is no longer 
danger to himself or society and that this period of commitment may exceed time he 
could have been incarcerated had he been convicted). 
 122 Unabomber Ted Kaczynski, for example, refused to plead not guilty by reason 
of insanity even though his attorneys told him this was the best defense possible.  
William Glaberson, Lawyers Drop Mental Defense for Kaczynski, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
1997, at A1. 
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recognize the defense of insanity.123  A number of states have either 
abolished the defense of diminished capacity or substantially restricted 
its use.  For example, California124 and Wyoming125 do not recognize 
the defense of diminished capacity.  In Michigan, diminished capacity 
was allowed as a defense to first-degree murder126 until 2001 when the 
Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that “evidence of mental incapacity 
short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal 
responsibility by negating specific intent.”127  The United States 
Supreme Court has encouraged these restrictions on the use of mental 
defect or deficiency evidence, ruling that states are free to fashion their 
own rules regarding the admissibility of evidence of mental disease or 
defect and can bar a defendant’s use of such evidence to negate the 
requisite mens rea without violating due process.128 
A final reason why there might be fewer gay panic claims linked to 
insanity or diminished capacity today compared to thirty years ago 
could be because the American Psychiatric Association removed 
homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1973, “thus 
stripping homosexual panic of its medical-scientific legitimacy as a 
defense and as an illness premised upon homosexual latency.”129  
Christina Pei-Lin Chen explains that “[u]nder both the insanity and 
diminished capacity variants of the homosexual panic defense, the 
defendant’s acute psychotic reaction of homicidal violence was 
explained by the medical-scientific discourse as directly premised 
upon the latent homosexual’s mental disorder of repressed sexual 
 
 123 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004) (providing that “mental condition 
shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 
(1995) (allowing defendant to present evidence of mental disease or defect to prove he 
lacked mental state required for commission of offense, but otherwise mental disease 
or defect not a defense); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-102 to -311 (2005) (permitting 
mental disease or defect evidence only to prove defendant lacked necessary mens rea, 
or for consideration at sentencing); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003) 
(allowing “guilty but mentally ill” verdict).  But see Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 84 
(Nev. 2001) (holding that abolition of insanity defense violates due process). 
 124 CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (2003).  But see Miguel A. Mendez, Diminished 
Capacity in California:  Premature Reports of Its Demise, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 216, 
222 (1991) (arguing that while diminished capacity is not available as defense, very 
similar defense of diminished actuality is still possible). 
 125 Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639, 643-45 (Wyo. 1983). 
 126 People v. Biggs, 509 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that 
“diminished capacity is not a defense to general intent crimes such as second-degree 
murder”). 
 127 People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Mich. 2001). 
 128 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 779 (2006). 
 129 Chen, supra note 10, at 202. 
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perversion.”130  According to Chen, once the psychiatric community 
stopped recognizing homosexuality as a mental disease or defect, 
insanity and diminished capacity stopped being useful vehicles to 
transport the message of gay panic.131 
Because of the above-described difficulties, male defendants charged 
with murdering gay victims today tend to assert the defense of 
provocation rather than insanity or diminished capacity, claiming that 
they were provoked into a heat of passion by the victim’s homosexual 
advance.132  Some even claim they acted in self-defense to protect 
against a violent sexual assault.  Both provocation and self-defense 
require a showing of reasonableness.133  The defendant who claims 
provocation will not succeed unless the jury finds that the defendant 
was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion.  The defendant who 
claims self-defense will not succeed unless the jury finds that a 
reasonable man in the defendant’s shoes would have believed it 
necessary to use deadly force in self-defense.   
Using the concept of gay panic to support a claim of provocation or 
self-defense is even further removed than insanity or diminished 
capacity from Kempf’s original idea of Homosexual Panic Disorder, 
which suggested that some men have secret homosexual desires they 
try to repress, causing psychiatric disorder.  Claims of provocation and 
self-defense suggest the defendant acted the way most men would 
have acted.  One problem with this move is that the reasonableness 
requirement in the doctrines of provocation and self-defense allows 
male defendants claiming gay panic to rely on social norms that favor 
heterosexuality over homosexuality to bolster their claims of 
provocation and self-defense.134 
D. Provocation 
Under the provocation doctrine, a defendant charged with murder can 
be convicted of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter if the jury 
finds that the defendant was actually and reasonably provoked into a heat 
of passion.  At early common law, only certain acts constituted legally 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See generally Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra 
note 10; Mison, supra note 10 (discussing provocation defense in homosexual advance 
prosecutions). 
 133 LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80, at 3. 
 134 See id. at 67-95. 
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adequate provocation.135  One of the categories of legally adequate 
provocation was a serious crime committed against a close relative.136  
Perhaps foreshadowing the use of gay panic in future provocation cases, 
early English courts limited this category to cases in which a father 
discovered someone committing sodomy on his son.137  Today, 
provocation is considered legally adequate if the reasonable person in the 
defendant’s shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion.   
Some jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code’s extreme 
emotional disturbance test for provocation, under which “a homicide 
which would otherwise be murder is [mitigated to manslaughter if] 
committed under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.”138  
The Code goes on to explain that “[t]he reasonableness of such 
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a 
person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be.”139   
In several cases, heterosexual men who have killed gay men in 
response to an unwanted non-violent homosexual advance have 
successfully argued either that a non-violent homosexual advance 
reasonably provoked them into a heat of passion or that they acted 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse — a gay man’s 
sexual advance.  For example, in Schick v. Indiana, seventeen-year-old 
Timothy Schick met thirty-eight-year-old Stephen Lamie while trying 
to hitchhike.140  Schick climbed into Lamie’s car, and asked if Lamie 
knew where they could find some girls.141  When Lamie said he could 
not help him with this, Schick then asked Lamie if he knew where he 
could get a blow job.142  Lamie told Schick, “No, but I will,”143 and 
then drove to a local high school baseball field.144 
 
 135 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 103, § 31.07. 
 136 Id. §31.07[8][2][a]. 
 137 Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Crim. App.) (U.K.). 
 138 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001). 
 139 Id. 
 140 570 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); see also Fran Jeffries, Teen Convicted in 
Dugout Death, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 19, 1988, at 6A. 
 141 Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 921. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 922. 
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According to Schick, as the two men were walking toward the field, 
Lamie pulled off his shorts and pulled his underwear down to his 
ankles, grabbed Schick around the waist, and tried to touch Schick’s 
penis.145  Schick responded by kneeing Lamie in the stomach and 
hitting Lamie in the face.146  Lamie fell to the ground, and Schick 
continued to kick and beat Lamie until he heard gurgling sounds 
coming from Lamie’s chest and throat.147  Schick then removed 
Lamie’s watch, some cigarettes from Lamie’s pocket, and twenty-six 
dollars from Lamie’s wallet.148  He raced back to Lamie’s car and wiped 
the dashboard and seat to get rid of his fingerprints, then ran away.149 
At approximately 2:30 a.m., Schick knocked on the door of a 
friend’s house.150  He told his friend and his friend’s father that he had 
met a man while hitchhiking, asked the man where he could get a 
blow job, and the man offered to provide the service requested.151  
Schick said they went to a local high school baseball field and he tried 
to run away, but the man caught up to him and a struggle ensued.152  
The friend’s father placed an anonymous call to the police, reporting 
that there was a dead or injured person at the baseball field.153  Police 
found Lamie’s body at the field.154 
Schick was charged with murder and other offenses.155  At his 1991 
trial, Schick claimed Lamie’s unwanted sexual overture provoked him 
into a heat of passion and, therefore, the jury should convict him of 
manslaughter rather than murder.156  The jury found this argument 
persuasive and found Schick guilty of voluntary manslaughter.157 
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provided another version of the events.  In this version, Schick stated that initially, 
Lamie knocked him unconscious.  When Schick awoke, Lamie was trying to force his 
penis into Schick’s mouth.  Schick had to fight Lamie off to avoid the sexual attack.  
Schick eventually broke free and while Lamie was stumbling toward him with his 
underwear around his ankles, Schick knocked Lamie down.  As Lamie lay on the 
ground, Schick beat and kicked him to death.  Id. at 927. 
 150 Id. at 921. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 922. 
 156 Id. at 926. 
 157 Id. at 922. 
  
502 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:471 
In analyzing the jury’s verdict, it is important to consider the 
relative ages of the defendant and victim.  More than 50 % of the 
perpetrators of anti-gay and anti-lesbian violence are under the age of 
twenty-nine years.158  Given the stereotype of the gay man as a violent 
sexual predator who preys on young boys, Lamie’s status as a gay man 
more than twice Schick’s age may have influenced the jury to see 
Schick’s violent reaction as reasonable.  Additionally, Lamie’s explicit 
sexual advance (as described by Schick) may have convinced the jury 
that Schick’s violent acts were necessary to protect himself from a 
sexual assault.  If an older man pulled down his underwear, and 
grabbed a teenage girl around the waist in an attempt to engage in 
sexual relations, we would probably sympathize with the girl if she 
used non-lethal force, perhaps a kick or a punch, to escape the older 
man’s sexual advance. 
The problem is that even under Schick’s version of events, Schick 
did more than simply use violence to escape Lamie’s alleged sexual 
advance.  After Lamie was down on the ground with his underwear 
around his ankles, Schick proceeded to punch, kick, and stomp Lamie 
to death.  If Schick had been a teenage girl, it is doubtful that a jury 
would find such a response ordinary or reasonable.  Moreover, in light 
of the fact that Schick had sufficient presence of mind to take Lamie’s 
watch, cigarettes, and cash, and wipe his fingerprints from Lamie’s car 
before fleeing the scene, one might question Schick’s claim that the 
alleged homosexual advance provoked him into such a heat of passion 
that he completely lost his self-control.   
In Mills v. Shepard, another seventeen-year-old named David Mills 
successfully argued he was provoked into a heat of passion by an older 
man’s attempt to have sex with him.159  Mills met forty-three-year-old 
Billy Francis Brinkley at a bar.160  According to Mills, Brinkley offered 
to pay Mills twenty dollars if Mills would “commit a homosexual act” 
with Brinkley.161  Mills agreed, and the two men drove to Paw Creek 
Cove in Brinkley’s car.162  Once there, according to Mills, Brinkley 
 
 158 NAT’L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANTI-LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN 2004:  A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-
VIOLENCE PROGRAMS 33 (2005), available at http://www.ralliance.org/files/ 
2004NCAVPReport.pdf (reporting that 20% of anti-gay violence offenders were 18 
years or younger and 37% were between ages of 18 to 29 years of age); see also GARY 
DAVID COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 59-60 (1991) [hereinafter 
COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN]. 
 159 445 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (W.D.N.C. 1978). 
 160 Id. at 1234. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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proceeded to grab Mills’s privates.163  Mills demanded his twenty 
dollars, but Brinkley said he did not have twenty dollars with him, so 
Mills pushed Brinkley out of the car, chased him, knocked him down, 
kicked him, and pulled Brinkley’s clothes down to hinder his 
escape.164  Mills then took Brinkley’s jewelry and fled in Brinkley’s car.   
Brinkley’s body was later found in a cove in Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina.165  Brinkley had died from head injuries and a massive 
crushing injury to his chest consistent with having been kicked and 
then thrown against rocks.166  According to one of Mills’s roommates, 
Mills came home around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. that night with Brinkley’s 
automobile, watch, ring, and bracelet.167  Mills told his roommate that 
he met Brinkley at a bar, Brinkley offered him twenty dollars to 
commit a homosexual act, they drove out to Paw Creek Cove in 
Brinkley’s car, Brinkley did not have as much money as he had 
promised, Brinkley made a pass at him, and  he fought Brinkley off.168 
Mills was charged with second-degree murder.169  At trial, Mills 
maintained the older man’s attempt to have sex with him provoked 
him into a heat of passion.170  Despite the fact that Mills had agreed to 
“commit a homosexual act” with Brinkley and beat Brinkley only after 
Brinkley refused to pay Mills the agreed upon twenty dollars, the jury 
found Mills’s claim credible and convicted him of voluntary 
manslaughter.171   
Mills’s voluntary manslaughter verdict is troubling for several 
reasons.  First, it suggests that the jury believed it was reasonable for 
Mills to become enraged at Brinkley’s conduct (grabbing Mills’s private 
parts and making a pass at him), even though Mills had previously 
agreed to engage in sexual activity with Brinkley.  Mills willingly 
accompanied Brinkley to Paw Creek Cove, knowing that the purpose 
of the trip was sex.  Generally speaking, the criminal law does not 
excuse a defendant who creates the conditions of his own defense.172 
 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 1233. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 1234. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 1232. 
 170 Id. at 1234. 
 171 Id. at 1232. 
 172 Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense:  A Study of the 
Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-7, 14-17 (1985) (noting 
that criminal law defenses are often withheld or limited if actor somehow contributed 
to need for conduct).   
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Second, the verdict suggests the jury believed Mills’s claim that he 
was genuinely afraid of being sexually assaulted by Brinkley, even 
though Mills’s behavior — pushing Brinkley out of the car, chasing 
him, knocking him down, kicking him, and pulling his pants down to 
hinder his escape — seems more consistent with the behavior of 
someone who intends to kill or seriously injure than the behavior of 
one who is afraid.  If Mills had truly been afraid of Brinkley, he might 
have tried to get away by driving off in Brinkley’s car as soon as he 
pushed Brinkley out of the car.  Instead, Mills chased after Brinkley, 
knocked him down, and kicked him repeatedly.  Once Brinkley was 
down, he no longer posed an immediate threat to Mills.  Nonetheless, 
Mills proceeded to pull down Brinkley’s clothes to hinder his escape.  
He then either pushed or threw Brinkley into the rocks in the cove 
where his body was later found. 
Finally, Mills’s claim that the alleged sexual advance by Brinkley so 
provoked him that he lost his ability to control his actions is belied by 
his having the presence of mind to take several of Brinkley’s 
possessions, including his watch, ring, bracelet, and car.  Given all of 
these inconsistencies, the jury’s willingness to acquit Mills of murder 
suggests the influence of deeply rooted negative feelings about 
homosexuality, which enabled the jury to empathize with the 
defendant rather than with the victim. 
One pattern that emerges from gay panic cases is that the 
perpetrator who claims he was provoked into a heat of passion often 
takes money or other items of value from the victim after killing him.  
Stealing the victim’s belongings suggests an economic motivation for 
the killing, rather than panic or fear.  Timothy Schick took Steven 
Lamie’s watch, cigarettes, and money, then wiped off his fingerprints 
from the dashboard of Lamie’s car in an attempt to avoid detection and 
arrest.  David Mills took Billy Francis Brinkley’s watch, ring, bracelet, 
and car.  As one observer of gay panic killings has noted, “the number 
of cases where [gay] murders have been accompanied by robbery 
suggests that criminal opportunism is a frequent motive for these 
killings.”173 
Further undermining claims of provocation in gay homicide cases is 
that the defendant often places himself in a situation in which a 
 
 173 Steve Tomsen, Hatred, Murder & Male Honour:  Gay Homicides and the 
“Homosexual Panic Defence,” 6 CRIMINOLOGY AUSTL. 2, 4 (1994).  Lu-in Wang notes 
that gay men are often targeted for robbery because of the perception that gays are 
wealthy and “would prefer to part with their property than to fight back or report the 
crime and risk revealing their sexual orientation.”  Lu-in Wang, Recognizing 
Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1399, 1416, 1431-32 (2000). 
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homosexual advance is likely.  Timothy Schick hitched a ride from 
Stephen Lamie, a total stranger, and stayed in the car even after Lamie 
suggested he could handle Schick’s request for a blow job.  David Mills 
agreed to have sex with Billy Francis Brinkley in exchange for twenty 
dollars.  Yet in case after case, jurors overlook facts that undermine 
the defendant’s claim that he was actually and reasonably provoked.   
Why might gay panic provocation claims resonate with juries?  
First, lenient verdicts in gay panic provocation cases may reflect the 
jury’s view that it is reasonable for a heterosexual man to react 
violently to a non-violent homosexual advance.  If the average 
heterosexual man would react violently to a gay man’s sexual advance, 
then arguably such a response is reasonable.   
Given that reasonableness in provocation doctrine is usually 
understood to mean that the average or typical person in the 
defendant’s shoes would have been provoked into a heat of passion,174 
this argument has much persuasive value.  One can see how a juror 
might think that the average heterosexual man might become incensed 
if another man were to make a pass at him.  Equating reasonableness 
with typicality, however, is problematic because it enables entrenched 
social norms that may embody messages of bias based on race, gender, 
or sexual orientation to govern outcomes in provocation cases.175  As I 
have argued elsewhere, I believe the currently employed positivist 
conception of reasonableness, which equates reasonableness with 
typicality, should be supplemented with a normative conception of 
reasonableness.176  Normative reasonableness asks the “should” 
question:  should society call what the defendant did reasonable?  If 
the jury asks whether the beliefs and acts of the heterosexual man who 
kills a gay man in response to a non-violent sexual advance are 
normatively reasonable, they will likely reach a different conclusion 
than if they just ask whether the defendant’s acts are reasonable in an 
empirical sense.177 
One might question whether a normative conception of 
reasonableness is fair to the individual defendant, invoking the 
 
 174 Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra note 10, at 753. 
 175 See generally LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80 (discussing 
problems with positivist conception of reasonableness). 
 176 Id. at 226-59. 
 177 This is particularly likely to occur if the jury is given an instruction directing 
them to consider the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of the defendant’s acts if 
the defendant had been a heterosexual woman who responded with fatal violence to a 
heterosexual man’s unwanted non-violent sexual advance or a gay man who 
responded with deadly force to a heterosexual woman’s unwanted non-violent sexual 
advance.  See infra text accompanying note 498. 
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longstanding debate over whether the criminal law should reflect 
current societal mores or push individuals to behave better than they 
might otherwise choose.178  While reasonableness standards reflect the 
view that the criminal law should be lenient towards those who act the 
way ordinary people in their shoes would have acted, the criminal law 
often holds individuals to a higher standard than the one that ordinary 
persons might choose.  For example, in the famous cannibalism case, 
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, the court rejected the defendants’ 
necessity defense while acknowledging that the defendants had acted 
the way any ordinary man in their shoes would have acted.179  As 
 
 178 Introducing a normative conception of reasonableness raises the question 
whether the criminal law should reflect empirical (positive) realities or be more 
normative.  In support of positivist (empirical) reasonableness, one might argue that 
certain men, such as the homophobic men in the Adams and Bernat studies, see 
generally Adams, supra note 46 (studying whether heterosexual men who exhibited 
strong anti-gay sentiments would be aroused by homosexual erotica); Bernat, supra 
note 49 (measuring physical aggression toward gay and straight individuals after self-
identified heterosexual college males viewed homoerotic videotape), may in fact be so 
repulsed by a non-violent homosexual advance that they actually would lose their self-
control.  One might ask whether it is really fair to punish such men as murderers 
when the provocation doctrine exists to mitigate in cases where the defendant 
succumbed to human weakness.  On the other hand, if we want the criminal law to be 
more normative, barring gay panic arguments might be the best way to express 
society’s disapproval of killings in response to non-violent (homo)sexual advances.  
My proposal can be viewed as a compromise between these two views.  In recognition 
of the argument that some men may in fact be so repulsed by a non-violent 
homosexual advance that they might lose their self-control, my proposal allows such 
defendants to present a gay panic-provocation argument to the jury.  On the other 
hand, in recognition of the fact that gay panic arguments rely on misguided 
masculinity norms and negative stereotypes about gay men, my proposal includes a 
role-reversal jury instruction that seeks to make jurors aware of the double-standard 
that a gay panic argument seeks to employ.  My proposal does not depend on the 
adoption of a normative conception of reasonableness.  In other words, even if 
provocation doctrine continues to utilize a positivist conception of reasonableness, I 
still believe it is better to allow defendants to make gay panic-provocation arguments 
than to bar such claims. 
 179 R. v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287-88 (U.K.).  In Regina v. 
Dudley & Stephens, two seamen, Thomas Dudley and Edwin Stephens, were indicted 
for the murder of Richard Parker, a 17-year-old crew member.  The defendants, 
Parker, and Ned Brooks, a fourth crewmember, were cast away in a storm on the high 
seas, 1,600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope.  They were able to survive for 20 days 
on a dinghy with no supply of water and no food except for two one-pound cans of 
turnips and a turtle which they caught.  On day 12, they finished eating the turtle and 
had nothing to eat for the next eight days.  On day 20, Dudley and Stephens suggested 
that someone should be sacrificed to save the rest.  Dudley proposed that lots should 
be cast to determine which of them would be sacrificed, but Brooks refused to 
consent.  Ultimately, Dudley and Stephens decided it would be best to kill Parker 
since he was the only one with no family and was already weak and sickened from 
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Chief Justice Lord Coleridge explained, “We are often compelled to set 
up standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which 
we could not ourselves satisfy . . . .”180 
Another problem with this argument is that it is not clear that the 
average heterosexual man would, in fact, respond to a non-violent 
homosexual advance with fatal violence.  The ordinary man’s reaction 
to a non-violent homosexual advance might well stop short of physical 
force.  I can think of many reasonable men who would simply say, 
“No, I’m not interested,” and walk away, rather than respond to a non-
violent homosexual advance with physical force. 
Lenient verdicts in gay panic cases might also be understood to reflect 
dominant norms of masculinity.181  A male-on-male sexual advance 
threatens a heterosexual man’s sense of identity as a man in several 
ways.182  First, men in this society are supposed to be interested in 
women, not men.183  Second, men are supposed to be the sexual 
aggressors, not the ones aggressed upon.184  A gay man making a sexual 
 
drinking seawater.  Dudley, with Stephens’s help, killed Parker.  Dudley, Stephens, 
and Brooks ate Parker’s remains for the next four days.  Four days after Parker’s 
demise, the men were rescued by a passing ship.  Id. at 273-74.  “If the men had not 
fed upon the body of the boy when they did, they would have died of famine within a 
few days.”  PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES 15-19 (3d ed. 2007). 
 180 Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. at 288. 
 181 See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”:  Masculinities and Police 
Stops (Aug. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (applying 
insights from field of masculinity studies to Terry v. Ohio); see also Jennifer Dumin, 
Superstition-Based Injustice in Africa and the United States:  The Use of Provocation as a 
Defense for Killing Witches and Homosexuals, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 145, 174 (2006) 
(noting that strong cultural and religious beliefs explain leniency shown in South 
Africa to those who kill witches and in United States to men who kill gay men and 
claim homosexual provocation). 
 182 As others have noted, gays and lesbians “threaten the differentiation between 
genders and the social roles associated with them.”  William A. Jellison et al., Implicit 
and Explicit Measures of Sexual Orientation Attitude:  Ingroup Preferences and Related 
Behaviors and Beliefs Among Gay and Straight Men, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 629, 631 (2004).  “By derogating gay men who . . . do not conform to . . . 
cultural standards of masculinity, straight men can affirm their own beliefs that these 
cultural expectations are appropriate.”  Id. 
 183 MICHELLE MARY LELWICA, STARVING FOR SALVATION:  THE SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF 
EATING PROBLEMS AMONG AMERICAN GIRLS AND WOMEN 25 (2002) (“[M]en are 
supposed to be sexually attracted (to women), women are supposed to be sexually 
attractive (to men).”); AYALA MALAKH-PINES, FALLING IN LOVE:  WHY WE CHOOSE THE 
LOVERS WE CHOOSE 114 (1999) (“Men are supposed to be attracted to ‘feminine’ 
women, and women are supposed to be attracted to ‘masculine’ men.”). 
 184 See SARA L. CRAWLEY ET AL., GENDERING BODIES 102 (2007) (“So there is a 
general surveillance for all men to be sexually aggressive and for all women to be 
sexually passive or guarded.”); Deborah S. David & Robert Brannon, The Male Sex 
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advance upon a heterosexual man violates both of these conditions.185  
In doing so, the gay man turns the tables on the heterosexual man, who 
finds himself acted upon, rather than the one acting.186  The 
heterosexual man’s feelings of fear and loathing are thus viewed as 
reasonable in the context of a pervasively heterosexist social world. 
Masculinity norms also work to bolster the heterosexual male’s 
claim that he was reasonably outraged by the non-violent homosexual 
advance.  Angela Harris notes that “not being a ‘faggot’ is as important 
to being a man as not being a woman.”187  Men in this society are 
supposed to be “fearful and disdainful of homosexuals,” and “are also 
taught to reject any personal same-gender sexual feelings.”188  Many 
heterosexual men are so terrified of being perceived as gay that they 
avoid expressing qualities that they think seem feminine, like the 
enjoyment of beauty or a loving, caring, gentle or nurturing nature.189  
 
Role:  Our Culture’s Blueprint of Manhood and What It’s Done for Us Lately, in THE 
FORTY-NINE PERCENT MAJORITY:  THE MALE SEX ROLE 31 (Deborah S. David & Robert 
Brannon eds., 1976) (“Both men and women grow up in our culture thinking of male 
aggressiveness as natural and normal, and of men as the sexual aggressors . . . .”); 
Cynthia Petersen, Envisioning a Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence, in LEGAL INVERSIONS:  
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLITICS OF LAW 118, 120 (Didi Herman & Carl Franklin 
Stychin eds., 1995) (“Heterosexual men are supposed to be sexually aggressive, and 
heterosexual women are supposed to be ingratiatingly submissive.”). 
 185 See CRAWLEY, supra note 184, at 102 (“[M]en are expected to be always sexually 
aggressive, but not toward other men.”) (citation omitted). 
 186 Pepper Schwartz notes that in some cultures, men who have sex with both 
women and men are not considered gay as long as they are the sexual aggressors.  
Pepper Schwartz, The Social Construction of Heterosexuality, in THE SEXUAL SELF:  THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL SCRIPTS 80, 86 (Michael Kimmel ed., 2007) (“If you are a 
man who wants to have sex with men in Greece, yet do not want to be thought of as 
homosexual, you can accomplish this goal, as long as you do not blunder into the 
‘female’ sexual role.”).  As one Greek man explained, “The queers are the ones who get 
fucked.”  Id. 
 187 Angela P. Harris, Gender Violence, Race and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
777, 786-87 (2000); see also David Wyatt Seal & Anke A. Ehrhardt, Masculinity and 
Urban Men:  Perceived Scripts for Courtship, Romantic, and Sexual Interactions with 
Women, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND SEXUALITY:  A READER 375, 393 (Richard Parker & 
Peter Aggleton eds., 2007) (“Men also have traditionally been socialized to avoid 
evaluative disclosure so as not to appear weak or homosexual.”) (citations omitted). 
 188 Roy Scrivner, Gay Men and Nonrelational Sex, in MEN AND SEX:  NEW 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 229, 233 (Ronald L. Levant & Gary R. Brooks eds., 
1997); see also John Ibson, Don’t Look Gay:  Why American Men are Afraid of Intimacy 
with Each Other, AM. SEXUALITY MAG., July 4, 2007, available at 
http://www.alternet.org/story/55816 (noting that “countless American boys and the 
men that they become are afraid of intimacy with each other, fearful of how intimacy 
might be construed — of what others and maybe even they themselves might decide 
that the closeness suggests”). 
 189 See James Harrison, Roles, Identities, and Sexual Orientation:  Homosexuality, 
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When a gay man makes a sexual advance upon a heterosexual man, 
the heterosexual man may fear that others will think he is gay if he 
does not do something to clearly express his heterosexuality.  
Responding with violence, in the heterosexual man’s mind, is a clear 
and unambiguous rejection of homosexuality.190   
Masculinity norms also help legitimize the use of physical violence 
in response to non-violent homosexual advances.  Men in this society 
who are physically strong, aggressive, and willing to use force when 
necessary are generally admired.191  When a heterosexual man finds 
his masculinity threatened by a homosexual advance, aggression and 
violence are considered appropriate ways to respond.192  The feeling of 
threat in such cases is analogous to the threat to male identity and 
honor that allegedly arises when a wife is unfaithful.193   
 
Heterosexuality, and Bisexuality, in A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MEN 359, 378-79 (Ronald F. 
Levant & William S. Pollack eds., 1995) (citation omitted); see also Susan M. 
Alexander, Stylish Hard Bodies:  Branded Masculinity in “Men’s Health” Magazine, 46 
SOC. PERSP. 535, 538 (2003) (“Masculinity, then, stems from the fear of being seen as 
sissy, feminine, or anything less than a man.”); Cooper, supra note 181, at 19 (citing 
Michael S. Kimmel, Macsulinity as Homophobia:  Fear, Shame, and Silence in the 
Construction of Gender Identity, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE:  ESSAYS ON MALE SEXUALITY 
25, 30 (2005)) (noting that “masculinity” is repudiation of “femininity”). 
 190 See BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF HATE:  UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES 108 
(2001) (noting that “violence against gays provides visible, documented proof of 
offenders’ unquestionably straight sexuality”); Cooper, supra note 181, at 19 (noting 
that “the repudiation of homosexual men is part and parcel of the hegemonic 
masculinity”).  As Jana Bufkin notes, “the offender becomes what the victim is not by 
attacking him/her.”  Jana L. Bufkin, Bias Crime as Gendered Behavior, 26 SOC. JUST. 
155, 159 (1999). 
 191 See PERRY, supra note 190, at 108 (noting that gay-basher “proves, by his 
actions, that he is unafraid to fight, as any real man must be”); Harrison, supra note 
189, at 378; see also Alexander, supra note 189, at 538 (noting that “men today wear 
the mask of the ‘Tough Guise’ . . . a performance in which violent masculinity is the 
norm.”); Seal & Ehrhardt, supra note 187, at 393 (“[M]any men learn by a very young 
age that part of being a man is to compete and to conquer, as well as to be ‘strong’ and 
to suppress emotional expression or feelings.”) (citations omitted).  For a historical 
account of male identity norms, see John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (discussing image of man as 
hypermasculine brute consumed by propensity for atavism, violence, and domination 
as reflected in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan). 
 192 See DEBORAH CAMERON & DON KULICK, LANGUAGE AND SEXUALITY 39 (2003) (“To 
a heterosexual man, such an advance is said to constitute a kind of assault, and acts of 
violence committed in the resulting state of panic must therefore be regarded as 
justifiable self-defence.”); Franklin & Herek, supra note 9, at 148 (noting that 
assumption underlying claims of gay panic is “that violence is the appropriate 
response to any type of sexual advance from a person of one’s same sex”); Tomsen, 
supra note 173, at 2, 5. 
 193 Schwartz, supra note 186, at 88 (commenting that Dustin Hoffman who plays 
  
510 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:471 
The perceived threat to male identity may be heightened if the 
advance occurs in front of other people, rather than in a private 
setting.  Writer JoAnn Wypijewski recounts the following 
conversation she had with a young man from Laramie, Wyoming, the 
town where Matthew Shepard was killed: 
“If a guy at a bar made some kind of overture to you, what 
would you do?” 
“It depends on who’s around.  If I’m with a girl, I’d be worried 
about what she thinks, because, as I said, everything a man 
does is in some way connected to a woman, whether he wants 
to admit it or not.  Do I look queer?  Will she tell other girls?” 
“If my friends were around and they’d laugh and shit, I might 
have to threaten him.” 
“If I’m alone and he just wants to buy me a beer, then okay, 
I’m straight, you’re gay – hey, you can buy me a beer.”194 
The claim of reasonableness linked to anti-gay violence is the 
product of a culture that privileges heterosexual male violence over 
other types of violence.195  A man who responds to a (homo)sexual 
advance with deadly violence claims he acted as the average 
heterosexual man would have acted.  A woman who tries to make a 
similar claim would find it extremely difficult to succeed.  A woman 
who responds with deadly force to a man who kisses her or fondles 
her breasts is not at all typical.  Women in this society are supposed to 
accept a certain amount of unwanted male attention, and while they 
might frown, struggle, or protest, they are not supposed to use 
violence to dissuade or thwart men who suggest sexual interest.   
Moreover, women are taught to believe that a man who aggressively 
expresses his sexual attraction for a woman is merely behaving the 
way a man is supposed to behave.196  The woman who is the target of 
 
main character in film, Straw Dogs, is perceived as not adequately heterosexual 
because he cannot control his flirtatious wife). 
 194 JoAnn Wypijewski, A Boy’s Life:  For Matthew Shepard’s Killers, What Does it 
Take to Pass As a Man?, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 1999, at 61, 74. 
 195 See Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 99. 
 196 David & Brannon, supra note 184, at 31 (“Both men and women grow up in our 
culture thinking of male aggressiveness as natural and normal, and of men as the 
sexual aggressors . . . .”); Lois Pineau, Date Rape:  A Feminist Analysis, in APPLICATIONS 
OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES:  SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK AND 
REPRODUCTION 484, 486-87 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) (discussing normal 
aggressiveness of male sexuality); see also Comstock, Dismantling the Homosexual 
Panic Defense, supra note 10, at 99-100 (noting that “approval of violence against gay 
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male attention is supposed to be flattered.  Even if the woman is just 
as offended by a non-violent heterosexual advance as a heterosexual 
male might be by a non-violent homosexual advance, she is unlikely 
to convince the average juror that a violent response is reasonable 
because women just are not expected to be violent.  David 
Wertheimer, former Executive Director of the New York City Gay and 
Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, wryly points out, “If every heterosexual 
woman who had a sexual advance made to her by a male had the right 
to murder the man, the streets of this city would be littered with the 
bodies of heterosexual men.”197 
The heterosexual man’s claim of reasonableness does more than 
privilege men over women.  It privileges heterosexual men over gay 
men.  If a heterosexual man responds violently to a homosexual 
advance, he enjoys a presumption of reasonableness.  A heterosexual 
man is supposed to be disgusted and outraged when another man 
attempts a sexual advance.198  If, however, a gay man were to respond 
violently to a heterosexual female’s sexual advance, he would have a 
difficult time convincing anyone that he was reasonably provoked into 
a heat of passion, even if a heterosexual woman’s sexual advance is 
just as disgusting to him as a gay man’s sexual advance might be to a 
heterosexual man.  Men in this society are supposed to be happy if a 
woman shows she is sexually attracted to him.  If a man, however, 
shows his sexual interest in another man by acting in a similar 
manner, he supposedly is asking for a violent response. 
Charles Butler, the man convicted of capital murder for his part in 
the slaying and burning of Billy Jack Gaither on a pyre of tires, 
admitted he would have reacted differently had Gaither been a 
woman.199  In an interview with Frontline, Butler admitted that Billy 
 
men contrasts sharply with the freedom and lack of vulnerability to attack with which 
heterosexual men make sexual advances toward women”); Francisco Valdes, 
Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:  Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual 
Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 179 (1996). 
 197 Peter Johnson, ‘More Than Ordinary Men Gone Wrong’:  Can the Law Know the 
Gay Subject?, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 1152, 1178 (1996) (quoting Kendall Thomas, 
Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1466 n.188 (1992)).  To be 
precise, the male defendant who claims that a non-violent homosexual advance 
constitutes legally adequate provocation and is convicted of manslaughter rather than 
murder is not justified in having killed another person.  Provocation is generally 
considered an excuse defense, which means that the act is still considered wrong. 
 198 See Suffredini, supra note 10, at 284-85 (arguing that American culture suggests 
that violence is appropriate and necessary response to any homosexual advance 
because heterosexual men are supposed to be aggressors in all sexual interactions). 
 199 Interview with Charles Butler, in Kilby Prison, Ala., PBS Frontline (Feb. 15, 
2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/interviews/ 
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Jack did not attempt to grab him.200  It was Billy Jack’s verbal 
suggestion of a sexual threesome that made Butler feel disrespected 
and led him to beat Billy Jack.  Butler admitted that had a woman 
made a similar suggestion, he would not have viewed her remarks as 
disrespectful.201  Because the verbal come-on came from a man, Butler 
felt he had to react with physical violence. 
Race, gender, and age also seem to play a part in gay homicide cases.  
The perpetrators of anti-gay violence tend to be White and male.202  
The majority are in their teens or twenties.203  In many cases, the 
victim is much older than the defendant.204  These young White males 
are often described at their murder trials as well-liked, normal, young 
men.205  Jurors may be more inclined to view the claims of these young 
White men as reasonable because they seem to represent the ordinary 
all-American boy next door. 
A final reason why gay panic provocation claims may resonate with 
juries is the prevalence of negative stereotypes about gay men as 
 
butler.html. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 59, 
61 (reporting that 67% of  perpetrators of anti-gay violence are White and 94% are 
male); see also NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 158, at 34-35 
(reporting that 47% of anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender violence offenders in 
2004 were White and 82% were male).  According to the Uniform Crime Report 
published by the Department of Justice, approximately 44% of the perpetrators of anti-
gay hate crimes in 2006 were White. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 8 (noting that 620 of 1,415 anti-gay offenses in 2006 were committed 
by White offenders). 
 203 See COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 59 
(“[N]early one half of all perpetrators [of anti-gay/lesbian violence] are twenty-one 
years of age and younger, with the great majority less than twenty-eight years old.”); 
see also NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 158, at 33 (reporting that 
57% of all offenders whose age was known were under age of 30:  20% of offenders 
were 18 years or younger and 37% were between ages of 18 and 29). 
 204 See COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at 78  
(“Consistent with findings reported earlier in this chapter, the perpetrators are fifteen to 
twenty-two years of age; they are predominantly white; and their victims are older.”). 
 205 COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 158, at  82 
(“Typical of the defenses for middle-class perpetrators was the use of character 
witnesses to provide anecdotal evidence of ‘good family backgrounds,’ exemplary 
behavior in school, and participation in organized athletics.”); see also Stephen 
Tomsen, Hate Crimes and Masculinity:  New Crimes, New Responses and Some Familiar 
Patterns, AUS. INST. OF CRIM., June 2001, at 1, 5, available at http://www.aic.gov.au/ 
conferences/outlook4/Tomsen.pdf (noting that “[r]esearch indicates that most acts of 
racist or ‘homophobic’ harassment and violence are perpetrated by psychologically 
normal offenders . . .”). 
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sexual deviants and sexual predators.206  Even though cultural 
representations of gay men and lesbians in the popular press have 
changed dramatically over the past fifty years, criminal defense 
narratives today continue to invoke the “specter of the pathological, 
predatory, sexually violent deviant” in an attempt to encourage jurors 
to find that a young heterosexual male defendant’s violent response to 
an older homosexual male’s sexual advance is reasonable.207  The 
underlying theme is that gay men are sexual deviants208 who prey on 
young boys and cannot be trusted to work in positions of supervisory 
authority209 — the message of both the Religious Right and the Boy 
Scouts.210  Even though the concept of reasonableness is usually 
associated with reason and calm deliberation, the opposite of violence 
driven by emotion, a young heterosexual man nonetheless is 
considered reasonable if he responds violently to an older man’s non-
violent homosexual advance. 
E. “Trans Panic” 
Gay panic has recently morphed into another defense strategy called 
the “trans panic” defense.211  In such cases, a male defendant charged 
with murdering a male-to-female transgender person claims he was 
provoked into a heat of passion upon discovering that the person with 
whom he had sexual relations was biologically male rather than female.   
Michael Magidson and José Merel, charged with first-degree murder 
in the killing of Gwen Araujo (born Edward Araujo) used such an 
 
 206 PERRY, supra note 190, at 110-11 (noting that contemporary stereotypes 
resurrect historical construction of homosexuality as sinful and deviant and gays as 
predatory and menacing). 
 207 Michael A. Smyth, Queers and Provocateurs:  Hegemony, Ideology, and the 
“Homosexual Advance” Defense, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 903, 904 (2006); see also supra note 
13 (listing sources that discuss common stereotypes about gay men). 
 208 See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 19, 43 (1990). 
 209 See PERRY, supra note 190, at 115 (noting common refrain, “We don’t want 
‘them’ teaching our children, since they might seduce them”). 
 210 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that forcing 
Boy Scouts to reinstate gay assistant scoutmaster who was expelled after he publicly 
declared he was gay would violate Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of association). 
 211 See Steinberg, supra note 15, at 500-01; see also Bradford Bigler, Comment, 
Sexually Provoked:  Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation as Adequate Provocation, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 783, 798 (2006) (proposing that sexual misrepresentation be 
considered legally adequate provocation if defendant engages in sexual act while 
reasonably deceived regarding fact reasonably material to consent, discovery of which 
would cause reasonable person severe mental or emotional crisis). 
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argument at their murder trial.212  Magidson and Merel met the 
seventeen-year-old Araujo in the summer of 2002 and engaged in 
intimate relations with her.213  Araujo, who was biologically male, 
lived as a female and had assumed the name of her favorite singer, 
Gwen Stefani.214  At a party in October 2002, Merel and Magidson 
began to suspect that Araujo was not biologically female.215  Magidson 
took Araujo into the bathroom and tried to hike up her skirt to check 
whether she was a man or a woman.216  When Araujo told Magidson 
not to touch her, Magidson got a woman from the party named Nicole 
Brown to check.217  Brown went into the bathroom and felt Araujo’s 
genitals.  When she discovered Araujo had a penis, Brown screamed 
 
 212 Initially, four men — Michael Magidson, José Merel, Jaron Chase Nabors, and 
Jason Cazares — were charged with murder and a hate crime enhancement.  See Julian 
Guthrie, Why Did it Take a Murder for the People of Newark to Wake up to the 
Harassment of One of Their Own?, S.F. CHRON., CHRON. MAG., Dec. 22, 2002, at 12.  
Nabors pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for a promise to testify 
against the three others, and was sentenced to 11 years in prison for his role in the 
killing of Araujo.  See Henry K.  Lee, 11 Years for Defendant in Araujo Killing, S.F. 
CHRON., Aug. 26, 2006, at B2.  Cazares pled no contest to a lesser charge and received 
a six-year sentence.  See Henry K. Lee, Prison for 3 in Transgender Teen’s Slaying, S.F. 
CHRON., Jan. 28, 2006, at B1 [hereinafter Lee, Prison for 3].  After a second trial, 
Magidson and Merel were found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 
years to life.  Id.  The jury rejected the hate crime enhancement which could have 
added another four years to their sentence.  See Henry K. Lee, Manslaughter Ruled Out, 
Araujo Juror Says, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2005, at B1 [hereinafter Lee, Manslaughter 
Ruled Out] (“The jury ultimately rejected hate crime enhancements against Merel and 
Magidson because some panelists believed that the defendants killed Araujo not 
necessarily because of her gender orientation, but simply to ‘cover up a situation that 
had gotten out of control.’”); Kelly St. John & Henry K. Lee, Slain Newark Teen 
Balanced Between Two Worlds, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2002, at A1 (noting that hate 
crime enhancement could have added as many as four more years in prison). 
 213 Michelle Locke, Jurors Deliberate in Slaying of Transgender Teen, HOUS. CHRON., 
June 4, 2004, at A7, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id= 
2004_3769144. 
 214 See John M. Glionna, Murder Trial Nears End:  Closing Arguments Begin in the 
Slaying of a Transgender Teenager with the Prosecutor Lashing Out at One of the Alleged 
Killers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at B4. 
 215 See Daisy Hernandez, Young and Out:  Anything but Safe, COLORLINES, Dec. 22, 
2004, at 26.  The question of whether Magisdson knew or suspected Araujo was 
transgender before the attack was a key point in the case because prosecutors argued 
the killing was a premeditated murder while the defense argued it was a crime of 
passion.  See Kelly St. John, Heavy Drinking, Outrage, Man Testifies He’s Accused of 
Killing Transgender Teenager, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 16, 2005, at B3. 
 216 See John M. Glionna, Keeping Focus on Victim in Retrial:  Transgender Advocates 
Publicize the Details of the Latest Proceeding Against Three Men Accused in the Slaying of 
Teenager Gwen Araujo, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2005, at B1.   
 217 See id. 
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and ran from the bathroom.218  Magidson allegedly flew into a rage and 
proceeded to punch, choke, and kick Araujo.219  Merel joined in the 
attack, beating Araujo with a frying pan and soup can.220  Merel, 
Magidson, and two others carried Araujo into the garage where 
Magidson strangled Araujo with a rope and someone else struck 
Araujo with a shovel.221 
Magidson’s attorney, Michael Thorman, told the jury that 
Magidson’s shock at discovering that Araujo was transgender 
provoked him into a heat of passion and therefore the jury should 
convict Magidson of manslaughter, not murder.222  According to 
Thorman, Magidson’s discovery that he had unknowingly engaged in 
homosexual sex incited revulsion and rage in him.223  Thorman 
explained, “This crime didn’t occur because Mike [Magidson] had a 
bias.  It happened because of the discovery of what Eddie [Araujo] had 
done.”224  He continued, “This is a case that tells a story about . . . the 
tragic results when that deception and betrayal were discovered.”225  
The jury, a panel of eight men and four women, deadlocked, and the 
judge declared a mistrial.226 
The claim that a transgender individual’s deception about his or her 
biological sex should constitute legally adequate provocation, like the 
claim that a non-violent homosexual advance should constitute legally 
adequate provocation, rests upon dominant norms of hegemonic 
 
 218 See id. 
 219 See id.; Ivan Delventhal, Prosecutor Cross-Examines Suspect in Araujo Murder 
Trial, TRI-VALLEY HERALD (Pleasanton, Cal.), May 20, 2004 (noting that “Cazares 
testified Tuesday that he intervened repeatedly as Magidson, Merel and Nabors 
punched and kicked Araujo in the Merel home on Oct. 4, 2002”); Transgender Slaying 
Case Ends Without a Verdict, MARIN INDEP. J. (Marin, Cal.), June 23, 2004 (noting that 
“Nabors said Merel hit Araujo with a can and a skillet and Magidson punched, choked 
and kicked her”); Yomi S. Wronge, Judge Reaffirms No-Bail Ruling, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, 
July 25, 2003, at C1 (“According to Nabors, it was Magidson who repeatedly choked, 
hit and kicked Araujo.”). 
 220 See Marisa Lagos, Mistrial Declared in Teen’s Killing:  Prosecutor Says He Will Move 
to Retry Three Men Accused of Killing the Transgender Student, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2004, 
at B1 (noting that Merel struck Araujo’s head so hard that he dented soup can). 
 221 See id. 
 222 See id. 
 223 See Vicki Haddock, ‘Gay Panic’ Defense in Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 
2004, at E1. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See Janine DeFao & Kelly St. John, Retrial in Araujo Case Presents Challenges, 
S.F. CHRON., June 28, 2004, at B3; Lagos, supra note 213, at B1. 
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masculinity.227  Magidson’s attorney was trying to appeal to the 
masculinity norm that suggests real men prefer women, not other 
men, when he claimed Magidson was disgusted and enraged upon 
discovering that he had unknowingly engaged in homosexual sex.228 
There is good reason to reject the argument that a transgender 
person’s deception about his or her biological sex constitutes legally 
adequate provocation.  Under current rape law, a man can use deceit 
to get a woman to have sex with him.  Even if the woman had sex with 
the man only because of a false promise of marriage or a lie about the 
man’s true identity (he pretended to be rich and famous when he was 
actually unemployed), the woman’s consent to intercourse is 
considered valid under the law.  When a man uses fraud-in-the-
inducement to achieve sexual intercourse, the intercourse is not 
considered rape.229  The trans panic theory suggests that the victim’s 
deception about his or her “true” identity should be grounds to 
partially excuse a murder even though using deception to get someone 
to consent to sex is not considered a crime.230 
At their second trial, Magidson and Merel again argued they were 
provoked into a heat of passion upon discovering that Araujo had 
male genitalia and that Araujo’s deception about her true sexual 
identity was what sparked their rage.  This time, after deliberating for 
seven days, the jury rejected the defendants’ claim of provocation and 
 
 227 See PERRY, supra note 190, at 106 (citing ERVIN GOFFMAN, STIGMA:  NOTES ON THE 
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 128 (1963)) (explaining ideal or “hegemonic” 
masculinity is reflected in “a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual 
Protestant father, of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight 
and height, and a recent record in sports”). 
 228 See Haddock, supra note 223, at E1. 
 229 See Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding that fraud-in-the-inducement does not invalidate consent). 
 230 Courts are divided over whether pretending to be a woman’s husband in order 
to have sex with her constitutes fraud-in-the-factum or fraud-in-the-inducement.  See 
Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 54 (1857) (finding that even though woman’s consent to 
sexual intercourse was procured by defendant’s fraudulent impersonation of woman’s 
husband, act of intercourse did not constitute rape); Ledbetter v. State, 26 S.W. 725, 
725-26 (Tex. 1894) (affirming conviction for rape where defendant fraudulently 
impersonated victim’s husband).  The rationale for treating the impersonating-a-
husband case as fraud-in-the-inducement (and not rape) is that the woman knew she 
was engaging in sexual intercourse, and therefore her consent was valid.  Boro, 210 
Cal. Rptr. at 124 (citing PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 9, § 3, 1079 (3d ed. 
1982)).  Other courts have held that husband impersonation to obtain consent to 
sexual intercourse constitutes fraud-in-the-factum (and therefore rape) on the theory 
that “the woman’s consent is to an innocent act of marital intercourse while what is 
actually perpetrated upon her is an act of adultery.”  Id. 
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found both men guilty of second-degree murder.231  Magidson and 
Merel were sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.232 
The second jury’s verdict is comforting.  Apparently, the jury felt it 
was not reasonable for the defendants to have acted the way they did 
upon discovering that Araujo was transgender.  According to Max 
Stern, a San Francisco lawyer who served on the second jury, “This 
was not a manslaughter, because it is not reasonable to accept this 
behavior in response to the circumstances here.”233  Stern continued, 
“Even if the defendants believed they had been sexually deceived, that 
would be ‘no basis, no justification for beating and murder.’”234 
F. Self-Defense 
Gay panic arguments linked to claims of self-defense, although less 
common than gay (or trans) panic arguments linked to claims of 
provocation, are also sometimes successful.235  Self-defense requires a 
 
 231 See John M. Glionna, 2 Guilty of Killing Transgender Teen, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
2005, at B1. 
 232 Lee, Prison for 3, supra note 212, at B1. 
 233 Lee, Manslaughter Ruled Out, supra note 212, at B1. 
 234 Id.  On September 28, 2006, the Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act was signed 
into law.  Assemb. B. 1160, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).  Assembly Bill 1160, 
introduced by Assemblywoman Sally Lieber (D-San Jose), added a new section 1127h 
to the California Penal Code, which requires the judge to give the following jury 
instruction upon request of either party:  “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or 
public opinion influence your decision.  Bias includes bias against the victim or 
victims, witnesses, or defendant based upon his or her disability, gender, nationality, 
race or ethnicity, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation.”  Id.  Recent social 
science research suggests that merely telling jurors not to be biased is inadequate.  
Shari Seidman & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1857, 1864 (2001).  Jurors need to be given tools they can use to counter hidden 
biases.  One such tool is a role-reversal jury instruction, which I propose in Part IV of 
this Article.  See infra text accompanying notes 498-503. 
 235 In a recent case, a 21-year-old man named Stephen Scarborough argued he killed 
a 62-year-old man named Victor Manious by hitting him with a baseball bat to ward off a 
homosexual assault.  Scarborough claimed that Manious walked into Scarborough’s 
friend’s apartment while Scarborough was there alone, knocked him out, and when 
Scarborough came to, Manious was in his underwear on top of Scarborough sexually 
assaulting him.  See Barton Dieters, Opening Statements in Stephen Scarborough’s Murder 
Trial Described Two Scenarios in Victor Manious’s Death, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 26, 
2008, http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/03/opening_statemets_in_steve_s.html; Barton 
Dieters, Scarborough Testifies in Own Defense, Says He Was Being Sexually Assaulted by 
Slaying Victim, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 7, 2008, http://blog.mlive.com/gpress/ 
2008/04/scarborough_testifies_in_own_d.html.  Scarborough was charged with felony 
murder, but was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter on April 10, 2008.  See Verdict 
in Stephen Scarborough Case:  Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter of Victor Manious, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 10, 2008, http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/04/verdict_ 
  
518 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:471 
showing that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed deadly 
force was necessary to protect against an imminent threat of death or 
serious bodily injury.236 
Just as in the provocation cases discussed above, the defendant 
claiming self-defense draws upon masculinity norms, heterosexuality 
norms, and stereotypes about gay men to bolster his claim of 
reasonableness.   
For example, thirty-year-old Stephen Bright argued that he killed 
fifty-eight-year-old Kenneth Brewer in self-defense after Brewer tried 
to force him to have sex.237  Bright met Brewer at a gay bar on 
September 30, 1997.238  Brewer bought Bright some drinks and the two 
men chatted.239  Bright accompanied Brewer back to his Hawaii Kai 
condominium for more drinks.240  According to Bright, he was sitting 
in Brewer’s bedroom having a gin vodka mixed drink when Brewer left 
the room for a short time.241  When Brewer came back into the 
bedroom, he was completely naked with an erection, and said he 
wanted to f ___ Bright.242  Then, Brewer grabbed his throat and 
crotch.243  Bright claimed he got up and started swinging to get Brewer 
off of him.244  Bright said he did not intend to kill Brewer; he just did 
not want to be raped or hurt.245  Bright also testified that he was “in a 
 
in_steven_scarborough.html.  It is unclear whether the jury mitigated the charges 
because they felt Scarborough was reasonably provoked into a heat of passion or because 
they could not agree on a verdict and simply compromised. 
 236 See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine:  A New 
Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 198-99 (1998) 
[hereinafter Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine]. 
 237 Susan Kreifels, Blood in Jeans Evidence of Murder, Says Prosecutor, HONOLULU 
STAR-BULL., Oct. 1, 1998, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1998/10/01/ 
news/briefs.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Kreifels, Blood in Jeans 
Evidence of Murder]. 
 238 See id.  
 239 See id. 
 240 See id. 
 241 See Partial Transcript of Proceedings in State v. Bright, Cr. No. 97-2720, at 23-
25 (September 28, 1998) (direct examination of defendant Stephen Bright by John 
Tonaki). 
 242 Id. at 25-27. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 27-28, 30 (“All I remember is just swinging out of fear of this man.”). 
 245 Id. at 31 (“I was just thinking of getting this man off me and leaving, getting out 
of this room.  I didn’t want to get raped or hurt.”). 
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panic state.”246  When Bright later heard that Brewer had died, he 
surrendered to police.247 
Bright was charged with second-degree murder.248  At trial, Bright 
claimed he acted in self-defense, beating Brewer to ward off a sexual 
assault.249  Self-defense as a defense to murder requires proof that the 
defendant honestly and reasonably believed it was necessary to use 
deadly force to protect against an imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily injury.250  If the defendant could have avoided the threatened 
harm by taking less fatal action, ordinarily the defendant is not 
exonerated.251  Self-defense doctrine also requires proportionality.  An 
individual cannot use deadly force to counter non-deadly force.252   
Interestingly, Bright’s attorney, Deputy Public Defender Jack 
Tonaki, did not argue that his client’s fear of sexual assault was 
somehow worse because his attacker was a man.  Instead, in a 
sophisticated appeal to the women on the jury, Tonaki argued that 
fighting back in self-defense against the threat of sexual assault is the 
same whether by a man or a woman.253  Engaging in a bit of gender 
and sexual orientation switching,254 Tonaki further argued that it 
 
 246 Id. at 32 (“I was in such a panic state.”). 
 247 Id. at 34-35. 
 248 See Murder Suspect to be Arraigned, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 6, 1997, 
available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1997/11/06/news/briefs.html (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2008) (noting that Stephen Bright was charged with second-degree murder in 
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 249 See Susan Kriefels, Beating Death of Hotel Worker Was Self-defense, Defendant Says, 
HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Sept. 17, 1998, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1998/ 
09/17/news/story9.html (“Stephen Bright attacked a homosexual man because of sexual 
advances, killing him in self-defense, his defense attorney says.”). 
 250 See Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine, supra note 236, at 198-99. 
 251 Id. 
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grievous bodily injury.  DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 103, at 
239 (citing Commonwealth v. Klein, 363 N.E.2d 1313, 1316 (Mass. 1977)).  Many 
jurisdictions consider rape grievous bodily injury, such that a woman would be 
allowed to use deadly force to ward off an impending rape.  See, e.g., People v. Maria 
de L.A., 61 Cal. 188, 189-90 (1882) (opining that “[t]he defendant would be justified 
in using a deadly weapon, if the prosecuting witness was attempting to commit any 
rape . . .”); see also Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 876 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding trial 
court erred in failing to instruct jury that defendant would have been justified in using 
deadly force to stop imminent rape). 
 253 Susan Kreifels, Jury Tainted by Homophobia?, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Oct. 7, 
1998, available at http://starbulletin.com/98/10/07news/story2.html. 
 254 In Murder and the Reasonable Man, I propose race, gender, and sexual 
orientation switching as one way to reduce bias in cases involving race, gender and 
sexual orientation.  See LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 80, at 253. 
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makes no difference whether the sexual assailant is gay or straight, 
because an individual has a right to fight off an unwanted sexual 
attack.255  In his closing argument, Tonaki told the jury: 
If a woman were in the same position faced with a man 
coming at them naked, saying the things Kenneth Brewer said, 
and that female pulls out a gun and shoots the guy dead, we’d 
be giving that lady an award for stopping a rape.  There’s no 
double standards under the law, ladies and gentlemen.  . . .  
This case is not about homosexuality.  . . .  It’s about a danger 
of being assaulted, sexually assaulted.  That’s what it’s all 
about.256 
The jury, encouraged to imagine Bright as a woman being sexually 
attacked by an older man, was primed to sympathize with Bright. 
It is true that a woman threatened with imminent rape or other 
forcible sexual assault would be justified in using deadly force in self-
defense if necessary to avoid being killed or seriously injured.257  Use 
of deadly force to protect against death or serious bodily injury is 
considered proportionate force.  It is doubtful, however, that Stephen 
Bright had to kill Kenneth Brewer to avoid the alleged sexual advance.  
Bright was younger by almost thirty years and much stronger than 
Brewer.  According to Wayne Tashima, the prosecutor who tried the 
case, Bright’s body was muscular and stocky.258  Moreover, Bright’s job 
as a construction worker required him to lift heavy objects.259  Brewer, 
in contrast, was overweight and weak.260  Most likely, Bright did not 
have to beat Brewer to death to avoid a sexual assault.   
Further undermining Bright’s claim of self-defense was that police 
found Brewer’s blood on the inside of Bright’s jeans, suggesting Bright 
had his pants off during the beating and may have engaged in some 
form of consensual sexual activity before the killing.261  Bright, however, 
denied taking off his pants during the evening.  His attorney suggested 
 
 255 Kreifels, Jury Tainted by Homophobia?, supra note 253. 
 256 Partial Transcript of Proceedings in State v. Bright, Cr. No. 97-2720, at 29 
(September 30, 1998) (Deputy Public Defender John Tonaki’s Closing Argument). 
 257 See supra note 252. 
 258 Telephone Interview with Wayne Tashima, Senior Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney, in Honolulu, Haw. (Oct. 20, 2007). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id.  See also Partial Transcript of Proceedings in State v. Bright, Cr. No. 97-2720, 
at 13 (September 20, 1998) (Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Wayne Tashima’s Closing 
Argument) (noting that defendant agreed during his testimony that victim was 
overweight and not physically built in comparison to defendant). 
 261 See Kreifels, Blood in Jeans Evidence of Murder, supra note 237. 
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Brewer’s blood could have gotten on the inside of Bright’s jeans after he 
took off his clothes and threw them together in a laundry basket.262  
According to the prosecutor, however, Bright did not remove his clothes 
until at least four hours after the killing.263  Any blood from the beating 
probably would have dried by that time, and could not have transferred 
from one piece of clothing to another.264 
The jury deliberated for three-and-a-half days before acquitting 
Bright of murder, finding him guilty of only third-degree assault, a 
misdemeanor.265  The maximum punishment for third-degree assault 
was one year in jail.266  Bright was sentenced to time served and 400 
hours of community service.267  Because Bright had already been in jail 
for one year pending trial, he was released from jail the same day he 
was convicted.268 
III. WHY GAY PANIC DEFENSE STRATEGIES SHOULD NOT BE 
CATEGORICALLY BARRED 
In light of the troubling stereotypes reinforced by gay panic 
narratives and the obvious attempt by defendants asserting gay panic 
to tap into unconscious homophobia, it is tempting to join calls for 
abolition of gay panic defense strategies.  In 1992, Robert Mison 
issued just such a call.  In his article, Homophobia in Manslaughter:  
The Homosexual Advance As Insufficient Provocation, Mison argues that 
the use of gay panic to support a provocation defense should be 
disallowed because such an argument appeals to irrational fears, 
revulsion, and hatred against gay men, which are prevalent in our 
heterocentric society.269  According to Mison, when judges allow 
 
 262 Telephone Interview with Wayne Tashima, supra note 258. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id.  The blood on the inside of Bright’s jeans suggests Bright may have allowed 
Brewer to engage in sexual relations with him before he beat Brewer to death.  If so, 
Bright’s claim that he was afraid of Brewer and only beat him to ward off a sexual 
attack is suspect.  It seems more plausible that Bright went back to Brewer’s home, 
knowing that Brewer expected some kind of sexual activity in exchange for all the 
drinks he had purchased for Bright that evening.  The two may have started to engage 
in sexual activity.  Bright may have started feeling disgusted with himself, then took 
his feelings of shame and guilt out on Brewer. 
 265 Killer Gets Community Service Hours, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., July 7, 1999, 
available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/07/07/news/briefs.html. 
 266 HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-663 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-712 (2008). 
 267 Killer Gets Community Service Hours, supra note 265. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Mison, supra note 10, at 157-58 (discussing common negative stereotypes about 
gays, including image of loathsome addict who spreads AIDS and other venereal 
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defendants to make such arguments, they reinforce and 
institutionalize violent prejudices at the expense of norms of self-
control, tolerance, and compassion, which the law should 
encourage.270  Therefore, Mison argues, judges should rule as a matter 
of law that a non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute 
legally adequate provocation.271  In short, Mison asks judges to take 
the question of whether a reasonable man would be provoked into a 
heat of passion by a non-violent homosexual advance away from the 
jury and disallow the provocation defense in such cases.  Most critics 
of gay and trans panic arguments have echoed Mison’s call, proposing 
legislative or judicial action barring defense appeals to gay panic.272 
While I agree that claims of gay panic are problematic for all the 
reasons outlined in Parts I and II of this Article, I believe the criminal 
law should not categorically bar gay panic arguments linked to claims 
of provocation.273  In this Part, I provide a defense of this potentially 
unpopular position.  I start with a micro-argument:  attempts to ban 
the argument that a non-violent homosexual advance constitutes 
legally adequate provocation from the criminal courtroom will not 
work because defense attorneys will find more subtle ways to get the 
same idea across to the jury.  When a message that relies on negative 
stereotypes is conveyed covertly, it will often have a more powerful 
impact than if the message had been aired overtly.  This is because an 
explicit argument allows individuals to consciously correct or counter 
otherwise automatic stereotype-congruent responses, while more 
subtle insertions of bias are harder to defend against. 
I then turn to several macro-arguments to support my theory that it 
is better to allow defendants to assert claims of gay panic than to 
 
diseases). 
 270 See id. at 176-77. 
 271 Id.  But see Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men, supra 
note 10, at 728-29 (arguing against Mison’s proposal). 
 272 See, e.g., Steinberg, Book Note, supra note 15, at 502 (arguing that judges 
should not allow gay or trans panic arguments); Suffredini, supra note 10, at 279 
(arguing that use of Homosexual Panic Defense should either be limited by 
application of new evidentiary rules or eliminated altogether). 
 273 I am less opposed to barring gay panic arguments linked to claims of mental 
defect because there is no identifiable mental disease or defect that could support such 
a claim.  Homosexual Panic Disorder is not a recognized mental disease or defect 
today.  Therefore, I would support a categorical ban on claims of gay panic linked to 
insanity or diminished capacity.  With respect to self-defense, a defendant who claims 
he reasonably believed he was threatened with imminent death or serious bodily 
injury has an arguable claim of self-defense.  Being threatened with rape, heterosexual 
or homosexual, generally is considered a threat of serious bodily injury.  Therefore, I 
would not categorically bar all gay panic self-defense claims. 
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preclude such arguments.  Three broad frameworks illustrate why 
allowing defendants to argue gay panic better serves the dual purposes 
of ensuring a fair trial to the defendant and achieving the ends of 
justice that the State seeks:  (1) First Amendment theory; (2) recent 
social science research on race and implicit bias; and (3) institutional 
competency arguments in favor of allowing juries to decide whether to 
be lenient towards a defendant claiming gay panic. 
A. Lessons from the Matthew Shepard Trial 
Formally barring gay panic provocation arguments from the 
criminal courtroom is not a good idea because it will not keep the jury 
from considering gay panic arguments.  The Matthew Shepard case 
illustrates this point.  Matthew Shepard was the openly gay student at 
the University of Wyoming whose bloodied and beaten body was 
found tied to a wooden fence about one mile outside Laramie, 
Wyoming in October 1998.  Police responding to a 911 call about a 
fight between Aaron McKinney and two Latino youths the same night 
found Shepard’s credit card, one of Shepard’s shoes, and the bloody 
gun used to beat Shepard in McKinney’s truck.274  Police arrested 
McKinney and his friend Russell Henderson.  McKinney and 
Henderson were charged with first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, 
and kidnapping with intent to inflict bodily injury or terrorize the 
victim.275  Rather than go to trial, Henderson pled guilty to murder.276  
McKinney decided to take his chances with a jury. 
One of McKinney’s attorneys, Jason Tangeman, raised the specter of 
the gay man as deviant sexual predator during his opening statement 
before the jury of seven men and five women.277  Tangeman argued 
that Matthew Shepard made an unwanted sexual advance upon 
McKinney when they were in McKinney’s truck, allegedly grabbing 
 
 274 BETH LOFFREDA, LOSING MATT SHEPARD:  LIFE AND POLITICS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
ANTI-GAY MURDER 152-54 (2000). 
 275 See Robert W. Black, Brutal Death of Gay Man Stirs Nation, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 14, 1998, at 3. 
 276 2nd Trial Starts in Gay Man’s Death, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 10, 1999, 
at 18. 
 277 See Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, No. 6381, at 
16-17 (Oct. 11, 1999) (defense attorney Jason Tangeman’s opening statement) (on file 
with author) (alleging that “Mr. Shepard reached over and grabbed [Aaron 
McKinney’s] genitals and licked his ear” which made McKinney very upset and caused 
him to beat Shepard); Tom Kenworthy, Wyo. Jury to Weigh Motives in Gay Killing, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at A3 (noting that jury consisted of seven men and five 
women). 
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McKinney’s crotch and licking McKinney’s ear.278  Tangeman argued 
that this sexual advance was particularly upsetting to McKinney 
because of his history with unpleasant homosexual encounters.  
According to Tangeman, when McKinney was seven years old, a 
neighborhood bully forced him to suck his penis and commit sexual 
acts with another little boy.279  At the age of twenty, McKinney was 
traumatized when he accidentally entered a gay and lesbian church in 
Florida and saw men holding hands and kissing.280  Tangeman 
concluded that Shepard’s unwanted sexual advance, McKinney’s 
history of traumatic homosexual encounters, and McKinney’s use of 
alcohol281 and methamphetamines combined to cause McKinney to 
lose his self-control:282 
The evidence is going to show that it is the advance of Mr. 
Shepard — the homosexual advance of Mr. Shepard that was 
significant to Aaron McKinney.  That humiliated him in front 
of his friend, Russell Henderson.  His past bubbled up in him.  
He was fuelled [sic] by drugs.  He was fuelled [sic] by alcohol.  
And in his own words, he left his body.283 
Tangeman’s opening statement was unexpected.  McKinney’s 
attorneys had not mentioned plans to use a gay panic defense in any of 
the pretrial hearings.284  Judge Barton Voigt quickly called a hearing to 
decide whether to allow the defense to introduce evidence of gay panic 
in support of either a provocation or mental disorder defense.  After 
hearing arguments from both sides, the judge did what Robert Mison 
would like all judges to do — he ruled against the defense.285  Judge 
Voigt observed that, despite their protests to the contrary, the defense 
 
 278 Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at 
16-17. 
 279 Id. at 19. 
 280 Id. at 20. 
 281 Jana Bufkin notes that alcoholic consumption “is practically universally 
associated with being a man or achieving manhood.”  Bufkin, supra note 190, at 166 
(noting that “males equate drinking with masculinity and, perhaps more importantly, 
this male bonding exercise is often laced with violence”). 
 282 Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at 
9-11 (discussing McKinney’s addiction to methamphetamine), 16-18 (discussing 
Shepard’s alleged homosexual advance), and 19-20 (discussing McKinney’s history of 
traumatic homosexual encounters). 
 283 Id. at 22. 
 284 See LOFFREDA, supra note 274, at 132. 
 285 Decision Letter, State v. McKinney, No. 6381 (D. Wyo. Oct. 30, 1999).   
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was in fact trying to assert what he called a “homosexual rage” 
defense.  He explained:   
Defense counsel have tried valiantly to convince the Court that 
their defense is not a homosexual rage defense.  But what they 
hope to do is to present testimony that, because of 
homosexual experiences in the Defendant’s past, he flew into a 
rage and killed Matthew Shepard, without specific intent to 
kill, but voluntarily in a sudden heat of passion.  This is the 
homosexual rage defense, nothing more, nothing less.  The 
fact that the Defendant attempts to raise it through lay 
witnesses, rather than through experts, is inconsequential.286 
In barring the defense from asserting a provocation defense based on 
a gay panic argument, the judge ruled that the jury could not consider 
McKinney’s prior homosexual experiences on the issue of provocation.  
He explained that provocation is supposed to be based upon an 
objective reasonable person standard and McKinney’s personal 
experiences bore only upon his subjective state of mind.287  The judge 
also ruled that Wyoming law did not recognize the defenses of 
temporary insanity and diminished capacity, and accordingly those 
defenses were unavailable to the defense.288 
This, however, was not the end of the matter.  Despite the judge’s 
ruling, McKinney’s defense attorneys called two witnesses and used 
their testimony to convey the idea that Matthew Shepard was sexually 
aggressive289 and deserved the beating he got, playing on stereotypical 
images of gay men as sexual deviants and sexual provocateurs.290  One 
witness, Mike St. Clair, testified that he was at the Fireside Lounge Bar 
the night Shepard was killed.  According to St. Clair, Shepard 
 
 286 Id. at 4. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id.; see Michael Janofsky, Gay-Panic Defense Ruled Out, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 
1999, at A3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1999/11/02/ 
MN90537.DTL&hw=nancy+gay&sn=064&sc=265 (last visited Oct. 22, 2008); 
Wyoming Judge Bars ‘Gay Panic’ Defense, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1999, at A7. 
 289 It is interesting that Shepard’s supposed sexual aggressiveness was used to 
convey the idea that he deserved to die when sexual aggressiveness is usually a 
coveted manly trait.  See supra note 184.  Apparently, sexual aggressiveness is viewed 
as a positive manly trait only in heterosexual interactions. 
 290 See Kevin T. Berril & Gregory M. Herek, Primary and Secondary Victimization in 
Anti-Gay Hate Crimes:  Official Response and Public Policy, in HATE CRIMES:  
CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 289, 295 (1992); Lou 
Chibbaro, Jr., ‘Gay Panic’ Defense Used Despite Ban by Judge, Second Witness Says 
Shepard Made Pass, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 3, 1999. 
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approached him and asked if he could sit with him.291  After he agreed 
to let Shepard sit with him, St. Clair testified that he “began to feel really 
uncomfortable.”292  A short time later, Russell Henderson approached 
the table, leaned down towards Shepard, and whispered something in 
Shepard’s ear.293  Shepard then gathered up his things, stood up, and 
said he would be back.294  When St. Clair responded with “what?” 
Shepard “leaned down” and “licked his lips like . . . it was him trying to 
be sexy.”295  St. Clair continued, “I believe it was him showing he was 
interested in me, hitting on me.” 296  St. Clair concluded that Shepard 
“was blatantly gay, and he made advances on me.”297 
A second witness, Chris Hoogerhyde, testified that Shepard made a 
homosexual advance upon him when they went on a midnight trip to 
a lake with others on August 21, 1998.298  According to Hoogerhyde, 
Shepard asked him to go for a walk around the lake.299  Hoogerhyde 
declined, but Shepard persisted and asked him why not.300  
Hoogerhyde told Shepard that he did not want to go because it was a 
big lake and there were bears out there.301  Shepard told him, “[Y]ou’re 
just afraid I’m going to try something.”302  Hoogerhyde testified that he 
took this as a homosexual advance.303  After Hoogerhyde told Shepard 
“no” again, Shepard gave him a little tug on his shirt and said, “Come 
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on,” as if nagging him to go with him.304  Hoogerhyde responded by 
hitting Shepard with his fist twice, knocking him out.305   
It appears that the defense called these two witnesses not only to 
give credibility to McKinney’s claim that Shepard had made a sexual 
advance upon him — a claim which McKinney later admitted was 
false306 — but also to suggest it was reasonable for McKinney to be 
offended by Shepard’s alleged homosexual advance and to respond to 
it with violence.  During closing arguments to the jury, Dion Custis, 
McKinney’s other attorney, repeatedly argued that Shepard’s sexual 
advance upon McKinney triggered the subsequent beating.307 
One might object to using the Shepard case as an example of why 
attempts to ban gay panic defense strategies will not work on the 
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ground that the prosecutor and judge may have simply been asleep at 
the switch.  Presumably, a prosecutor who was paying attention would 
have strenuously objected to the introduction of testimony designed to 
bolster a defendant’s claim of gay panic, and a judge who had ruled 
that the defense could not argue gay panic would sustain such an 
objection.  It is unclear why the judge permitted this testimony in 
light of his earlier ruling.308 
However, even if an alert prosecutor objects and the judge sustains 
the objection, the defense attorney will have largely achieved his goal.  
The defense attorney will have conveyed the message that a male-on-
male sexual advance is something that would offend and disgust the 
average heterosexual man by simply asking the male witness, “And 
how did you feel when Shepard sat down beside you and licked his 
lips suggestively?”  In strenuously objecting, the prosecutor just helps 
the defense by highlighting the question and raising its significance in 
the eyes of the jury.  Even if the judge sustains the objection and 
instructs the jury to disregard the question, the judge cannot unring 
the bell that the jury has just heard.309  The defense attorney may ask 
leave to rephrase the question, which simply gives him another 
opportunity to hammer home his point.  When he then asks the 
witness, “Tell me, in your own words, how you felt when this man 
came up to you,” the defense attorney does not need an answer 
because the question has conveyed the point he wishes to make.  If the 
prosecutor objects again, she just helps the defense by calling 
attention to the fact that the witness, an average man just like the 
defendant, felt uncomfortable having another man expressing sexual 
interest in him. 
 
 308 The prosecutor did not object to having these witnesses testify.  See Partial 
Transcript of Trial Proceedings in State v. McKinney, supra note 277, at 23-47 (direct 
examination of Mike St. Clair and Christopher Hoogerhyde).  During Mike St. Clair’s 
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 309 As Shari Diamond and Neil Vidmar note, “[S]imple admonitions that instruct 
the jury to disregard psychologically compelling but inadmissible testimony . . . often 
fail to unring the bell.”  Seidman & Vidmar, supra note 234, at 1864. 
  
2008] The Gay Panic Defense 529 
One might also object to using the Matthew Shepard case as 
evidence that defense attorneys will disregard explicit court orders not 
to use gay panic on the ground that in most cases, when a judge rules 
that an attorney cannot make a particular argument, the attorney will 
follow the judge’s instructions.  One might further argue that perhaps 
because the Matthew Shepard case was under such intense public 
scrutiny, it is more of an outlier than a typical case. 
The fact that the case received so much public attention, however, 
makes it all the more remarkable that the defense openly flouted the 
judge’s order.  Despite all the media attention, the judge not only 
allowed the two witnesses to testify, but also allowed the defense to 
refer to Shepard’s alleged (homo)sexual advance again in closing 
arguments.  If this could happen in a case like the Matthew Shepard 
case, where all eyes were watching, it could happen in any case. 
Recent behavioral research on juries suggests that attempts to 
control the matters that a jury considers by prohibiting the 
introduction of specific topics at trial simply do not work.  In one of 
the only studies to date based on actual jury deliberations, Shari 
Diamond and Neil Vidmar reviewed videotaped jury deliberations in 
forty civil cases, in an attempt to examine the effectiveness of 
“blindfolding” — the commonly employed technique of withholding 
certain information from the jury.310  Blindfolding is fairly common in 
both civil and criminal cases and includes withholding from juries 
information about the prior criminal convictions of a defendant who 
chooses not to testify, statements made by either party during plea 
bargaining or settlement negotiations, and subsequent remedial 
measures taken by a party after an accident.311  One rationale behind 
blindfolding is the fear that exposing juries to the prohibited 
information may improperly bias them.  The reason juries are not told 
about a non-testifying defendant’s prior convictions is because we fear 
they might find the defendant guilty based on his presumably bad 
character rather than on the evidence presented at trial.312  
Blindfolding may also encourage certain behaviors which society views 
as beneficial.313  For example, statements during settlement 
negotiations are not admissible at trial, in part to encourage the parties 
to engage in attempts to settle the case.314  A rule that precludes the 
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admission of evidence of remedial measures is designed to encourage 
defendants to take remedial measures without having to fear that those 
actions will be used against them.315 
Despite evidentiary rules prohibiting the admission of certain types 
of evidence, Diamond and Vidmar found that prohibited evidence 
often finds its way into the deliberation room.  Sometimes such 
evidence is inadvertently introduced when a witness innocently 
mentions a forbidden subject in response to a question.316  Sometimes 
an attorney is able to convince the judge that she is introducing the 
evidence for an allowable purpose.317  For example, despite the rule of 
evidence that disallows evidence of prior bad acts, a prosecutor might 
argue that she is introducing the prior bad act to show motive, an 
acceptable reason.  Finally, jurors, who bring their prior experiences, 
beliefs and attitudes to the jury room, may think of a forbidden topic 
on their own.318 
Diamond and Vidmar found that despite the general evidentiary 
prohibition reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 411 and numerous 
state evidence codes precluding the introduction of evidence that a 
party carried liability insurance,319 conversations amongst jurors about 
insurance occurred in 85% of the forty tort cases they studied.320  In 
several of the cases in which the jury discussed insurance during 
deliberations, the subject of insurance came up directly or indirectly at 
trial.321  In four-fifths of the remainder of the cases, even though there 
was no mention of the subject of insurance at trial, the jurors 
themselves spontaneously initiated discussions about it.322  Diamond 
and Vidmar also found that despite an absolute prohibition on 
mentioning attorneys’ fees, the topic of whether or how much the 
attorneys would be paid came up in 83% of the cases observed.323 
Diamond and Vidmar’s research suggests that attempts to ban gay 
panic arguments from the criminal courtroom will not keep jurors 
from considering gay panic as a reason for the killing.  Either the 
 
 315 See id. 
 316 See id. at 1864. 
 317 See id. 
 318 See id. at 1865-66. 
 319 Id. at 1875. 
 320 Id. at 1876. 
 321 Id. at 1877-82. 
 322 Id. at 1884. 
 323 Id. at 1897-98. 
  
2008] The Gay Panic Defense 531 
subject will come up inadvertently or purposefully during trial, or the 
jurors may think of the argument on their own.324 
It is unclear whether the gay panic defense strategy used in the 
Matthew Shepard case influenced the jury which found McKinney 
guilty of felony murder.  On the one hand, one could read this verdict 
as a repudiation of the defense’s attempt to paint McKinney’s actions 
as a reasonable response to an unwanted homosexual advance.  Had 
the jury bought this argument, they probably would have found 
McKinney guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  On the other hand, the 
jury did not give the government the first-degree murder conviction it 
sought.  They instead found McKinney guilty of felony murder, an 
offense that does not require proof of premeditation or deliberation.  
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the Matthew Shepard 
case illustrates how easily a claim of gay panic can be made sub rosa 
even when the judge tries to bar the defense.   
The outcome in the Matthew Shepard case may even support my 
argument that making sexual orientation salient can help jurors 
cognitively process and reject the stereotypic assumptions about gay 
men underlying claims of gay panic.  Sexual orientation can be made 
salient in various ways, including through pretrial publicity, questions 
asked during voir dire, opening and closing statements, trial 
testimony, and jury instructions.325  In the Matthew Shepard case, gay 
and lesbian groups made sexual orientation salient when they decried 
the killing as a hate crime based on the victim’s sexual orientation.  
Extensive pretrial publicity and the defense’s promotion of a gay panic 
defense strategy further helped to make sexual orientation salient.  
The jury responded by rejecting McKinney’s claim of gay panic.  In 
finding McKinney guilty of felony murder rather than manslaughter, it 
appears the jury did not resort to stereotypical thinking about gay men 
as sexual deviants, but instead saw Shepard as a human being who had 
suffered a particularly cruel and senseless death. 
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B. First Amendment Theory 
This country has a long history of tolerance for dissent.  Under the 
“marketplace of ideas” theory of free speech,326 the expression of both 
good and bad ideas is encouraged on the ground that lively debate and 
discussion can help both those listening and those arguing determine 
the truth.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in his 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,327 “[T]he ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — . . . the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”328 
Another reason for allowing individuals to express even speech 
thought to be dangerous to a free society is the idea that suppression 
of speech breeds hate, and “hate menaces stable government.”329  
Under the “safety valve” theory, 330 the best way to deal with the threat 
of radical action is to allow individuals to express radical ideas out in 
the open and to permit others to challenge and debate those ideas.  As 
Justice Brandeis explained in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California, “[T]he path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies . . . .  [T]he fitting 
remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”331 
In one of the most eloquent defenses of the right to freedom of 
speech, Thomas Emerson explains that suppression of discussion 
allows force to replace reason.332  The process of open discussion, on 
the other hand, 
promotes greater cohesion in a society because people are 
more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they 
have a part in the decision-making process . . . Freedom of 
expression thus provides a framework in which the conflict 
 
 326 Anna M. Taruschio, The First Amendment, The Right Not to Speak and the 
Problem of Government Access Statutes, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1009 (2000) 
(noting “[t]he concept of the marketplace of ideas entered American jurisprudence as 
a principle of First Amendment liberty in Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United 
States”) (citation omitted). 
 327 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 328 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 329 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 330 See generally Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit:  The Making of America’s 
“First Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 609 (1999). 
 331 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. 
 332 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). 
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necessary to the progress of a society can take place without 
destroying the society.333 
When a heterosexual male murder defendant argues gay panic, he 
seeks to appeal to societal norms that value heterosexuality over 
homosexuality.334  He further seeks to promote the idea of 
homosexuality as deviant and abnormal.335  Such norms are in conflict 
with norms that recognize that gays and lesbians are human beings 
and that responding to a non-violent sexual advance (whether 
heterosexual or homosexual) with fatal physical violence is 
inappropriate.  Though critics of the gay panic defense have argued 
that gay panic arguments should be barred, trying to change social 
norms by suppressing norms with which one disagrees is not the best 
way to bring about lasting change.  As Emerson explains:  “The 
principle that the government cannot restrict expression in order to 
coerce conformity to social norms means that freedom of expression 
must receive full protection in this context.  No matter how deviant 
the expression may be — how obnoxious or intolerable it may 
seem — the expression cannot be suppressed.”336 
Moreover, suppressing speech to enforce conformity to social norms 
can further entrench the existing retrograde norms.  Suppressing 
speech is “likely to bottle up the frustrations, hide the underlying 
grievances, and ultimately end in explosion.”337 
Just as the suppression of obnoxious ideas can give those ideas more 
power by forcing them underground where they can fester and gain 
persuasive force, banning gay panic arguments from the criminal 
courtroom simply forces these arguments below the surface where 
they may actually have more influence.  As explained in the next 
section, recent social science research on race and implicit bias 
suggests that racial stereotypes can automatically influence perception, 
thought, and action when unmediated by an individual’s cognitive 
processes.  Making race salient —  that is, calling more, not less, 
attention to race — can encourage individuals to suppress what would 
otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent responses.  The same is 
likely true when sexual orientation is at issue.338  Open debate about 
 
 333 Id. 
 334 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 335 See supra note 207. 
 336 EMERSON, supra note 332, at 45. 
 337 Id. 
 338 Margo J. Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of 
Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks, 18 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 277 
(1996) [hereinafter Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the 
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the divergent perceptions and feelings heterosexual men have about 
sexual advances by gay men is a better way to deal with potential bias 
against a gay male victim than pretending such bias does not exist.  
Open discussion also allows judges and jurors to consciously mediate 
their attitudes and beliefs about homosexuality, sexual deviance, and 
whether violence is an appropriate response to a non-violent 
homosexual advance. 
Addressing “the selective receptivity of the law to the ‘homosexual 
panic’ defense,”339 Dan Kahan argues that when disgust sensibilities 
are pushed down below the surface of the law, disgust’s influence is 
harder to detect.340  On the other hand, “when we force 
decisionmakers [sic] to be open about the normative commitments 
that underlie their disgust sensibilities, members of the public are fully 
appraised [sic] of what those commitments are.”341  If defendants are 
disgusted by non-violent homosexual advances, it is best that these 
disgust sensibilities be out in the open, so they can become the source 
of open interrogation and inquiry. 
One objection to my First Amendment argument is that adjudicative 
speech, speech which “is both intended and received as a contribution 
to [a court’s] deliberation about some issue,”342  is “regularly and 
systematically constrained by rules of evidence, canons of professional 
ethics, judicial gag orders, and similar devices.”343  Criminal 
defendants have no right to insist on being free to argue whatever they 
like in court.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that the right 
to proffer a defense is not absolute.344  As Frederick Schauer explains: 
Trials, of course, are highly structured affairs, in which there 
appears to be quite little free speech.  There are elaborate rules 
about who goes when, about who speaks, and about who does 
not speak.  There are rules about how to speak, and there are 
rules about what not to say.  All of that part of the law of 
 
Expression of Opinions Concerning Gay Men and Blacks] (finding that when non-
prejudiced norms were made salient, both egalitarian and conservative individuals 
expressed less prejudiced opinions about gay men). 
 339 Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 
1654 (1998). 
 340 Id. at 1655. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 705, 725 n.81 (2004) (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
FREE SPEECH 130 (1993)). 
 343 Id. at 705. 
 344 See infra text accompanying note 469. 
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evidence that deals with relevance and materiality can be 
thought of as a prohibition on speech, a prohibition on saying 
what (a judge believes) is irrelevant to the particular matter at 
hand.  Those who persist in saying irrelevant things after a 
ruling by the judge risk punishment for contempt, and thus it 
is no exaggeration to describe a trial as a place in which people 
run the risk of imprisonment for saying things that a 
government official, a judge, believes to be unrelated to the 
matter at hand.345 
This objection, however, misses the point.  I am not arguing that 
criminal defendants have a First Amendment right to assert gay panic 
arguments in their defense.  Rather, I am simply using traditional First 
Amendment theories to bolster my claim that, apart from promoting 
reprehensible messages, allowing defendants to argue gay panic can serve 
valuable purposes, including defeating the gay panic defense strategy. 
Another possible objection is that encouraging the expression of 
obnoxious views about gay men who allegedly make unwanted sexual 
advances is like hate speech, and can be extremely damaging to the 
gay community at large.346  Hate speech has been defined as “speech 
that degrades an individual or group on grounds such as race, gender, 
nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or sexual orientation.”347  A 
gay panic defense, one could argue, is akin to hate speech because in 
suggesting that gay men are deviant sexual predators to be feared and 
loathed, it degrades and disparages gay men on the basis of their 
sexual orientation.  Allowing such arguments in the criminal 
courtroom lends a judicial stamp of approval to hate speech. 
I have two responses to this argument.  First, even if a gay panic 
defense is akin to hate speech in the ways outlined above, hate speech 
is generally considered protected speech.348  Therefore, equating a gay 
panic defense with hate speech is not a persuasive reason to ban it.  
 
 345 Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 
687, 689 (1997). 
 346 Hate speech “arguably cause[s] harms that cannot be remedied by more speech” 
because it disempowers those who are its targets.  Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 835 (2008). 
 347 John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
752 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006). 
 348 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down 
ordinance used to prosecute individuals who burned cross on black family’s lawn on 
First Amendment grounds).  But see Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 795, 822-33 (1993) (critiquing reasoning in R.A.V. and arguing that some 
hate speech can and should be regulated without violating First Amendment). 
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Hate speech ordinarily cannot be banned unless it falls into the 
category of fighting words.349   
Second, use of a gay panic defense can be distinguished from hate 
speech.  When a defendant utilizes a gay panic defense strategy, there 
are a number of institutional players, including the judge, the 
prosecutor, and even the jurors, who are in a position to either 
counter the gay panic argument or engage in dialogue about its merits.  
In contrast, a victim of hate speech may be in an isolated setting where 
it would be dangerous to respond or may feel so demoralized by the 
speech that he or she cannot respond.350  Given our adversarial system 
of justice, a prosecutor in a case in which gay panic is asserted is more 
likely to challenge a claim of gay panic than an individual on the street 
is likely to counter hate speech directed at him. 
C. Social Science Research on Implicit Bias 
In this section, I borrow from social science research on race and 
implicit bias.  This research suggests that making race salient (i.e., 
calling attention to race) can help individuals to overcome what would 
otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent responses.  I argue that if 
making race salient makes it easier for individuals to battle racial 
stereotypes, then making sexual orientation salient may similarly make 
it easier for individuals to battle sexual orientation bias.  Disallowing 
defendants from arguing gay panic simply forces such arguments 
underground and into the subconscious where stereotypes about gay 
men as deviant sexual predators, and norms that favor heterosexuality 
over homosexuality, are likely to have a greater impact. 
Over the last several decades, self-reported expressions of 
prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups have declined 
substantially.351  It is extremely rare to find an individual who 
 
 349 The Supreme Court has held that states may prohibit fighting words, words 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).  This is 
because fighting words do not contribute to the expression of ideas and have no social 
value in the search for the truth.  Id. at 572. 
 350 See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:  A Tort Action for Racial 
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (examining 
harms caused by hate speech and arguing for recognition of independent tort action 
for racial insults). 
 351 HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:  TRENDS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 191 (1997) (“[T]here has been a strong and generally steady 
movement of white attitudes from denial to affirmation of equality – so much so that 
some questions have been dropped by survey organizations because answers were 
approaching 100 percent affirmation.”); Monica Biernat & Christian S. Crandall, 
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expresses racist beliefs.  Most Americans today pride themselves on 
being egalitarian-minded.  It is common to hear people of all political 
persuasions saying that race does not matter; we are all just 
individuals.   
Despite these public pronouncements, social science research on race 
and implicit bias indicates that Americans today are not in fact color-
blind.  Race does matter, although increasingly at the level of the 
subconscious.352  Social scientists have documented the existence of 
implicit bias through numerous experiments using the Implicit 
Association Test (“IAT”).  The IAT documents the existence of implicit 
bias by measuring the difference between the amount of time it takes to 
process information that corresponds to well-established associations, 
which can include stereotypes based on race, and information which is 
contrary to those associations.353  Researchers have found that even 
individuals who self-identify as holding egalitarian beliefs have a harder 
time performing a simple sorting task when a word that corresponds to 
a negative stereotype is paired with a pleasant word than when that 
same word is paired with an unpleasant word.354 
One of the first implicit bias experiments had nothing to do with 
race.  In that experiment, subjects were given a random list of words 
representing flowers, insects, pleasant words, and unpleasant words, 
and asked to sort these words into the appropriate category.355  If the 
individual saw the word “tulip,” the individual would hit the key 
 
Racial Attitudes, in MEASURES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 291, 297 (John P. Robinson, 
Phillip R. Shaver & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1999) (“Today, there is 
undoubtedly some cause for optimism about black-white relations, as surveys reliably 
show that straightforward antiblack antipathy by whites has been on the 
decrease . . . .”). 
 352 Charles Lawrence notes that “[i]ncreasingly, as our culture has rejected racism 
as immoral and unproductive, [unconscious or] hidden prejudice has become the 
more prevalent form of racism.”  Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection:  Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 335 (1987); see 
also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995); 
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality:  Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 406 (2007). 
 353 See Jerry Kang & Mazharin R. Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1071-72 (2006); Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1509-10 (2005); Kristin A. Lane et al., 
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 431 (2007). 
 354 See Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 23, 2005, at W12. 
 355 Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit 
Cognition:  The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 
(1998).  The experiment also used musical instruments and weapons in lieu of flowers 
and insects.  Id. at 1466. 
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corresponding with the label “flower.”  If the individual saw the word 
“wasp,” the individual was to hit the key corresponding with the label 
“insect.”  If the individual saw the word “love,” the individual was to 
hit the key corresponding with the label “pleasant words.”  If the 
individual saw the word “rotten,” the individual would hit the key 
corresponding with the label “unpleasant words.”   
In the next stage of the experiment, subjects were again given a 
random list of words representing flowers, insects, pleasant words, 
and unpleasant words.  This time, however, they were told to hit one 
key on the left side of the computer if the word on the screen 
corresponded with one of two categories and another key on the 
right side of the computer if the word on the screen corresponded 
with one of two other categories.  When the individuals were told to 
hit one key if the word flashed on the screen fell into the category 
“flower” or “pleasant word,” and told to hit another key if the word 
flashed on the screen fell into the category “insect” or “unpleasant 
word,” the individuals did fine.  When, however, the individuals 
were told to hit one key if the word flashed on the screen fell into the 
category “flower” or “unpleasant word” and to hit another key if the 
word flashed on the screen fell into the category “insect” or “pleasant 
word,” response times became noticeably slower.356  Understandably, 
subjects found it easier to correlate insects with unpleasant words 
than to correlate insects with pleasant words because of well-
established associations between insects, such as cockroaches, 
termites, and bedbugs, and unpleasant things, such as dirt, filth, 
disease, bites, and decay. 
The researchers then decided to replace flower names with white-
sounding names such as Katie and Meredith and insect names with 
black-sounding names such as LaTonya and Ebony.  They found that 
when black-sounding names were paired with pleasant words and 
white-sounding names were paired with unpleasant words, subjects had 
much more difficulty sorting the words into the appropriate categories 
than when black-sounding names were paired with unpleasant words 
and white-sounding names were paired with pleasant words.357  Implicit 
bias in favor of Whites and against Blacks manifested even in subjects 
who self-reported non-prejudiced beliefs.358 
 
 356 Id. at 1468. 
 357 Id. at 1474. 
 358 Id. at 1475; see also John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice:  Automatic 
and Controlled Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 534 (1997) (finding 
that subjects responded faster to positive words following White face than when those 
words followed Black face and that subjects responded faster to negative words when 
  
2008] The Gay Panic Defense 539 
Anthony Greenwald explains the theory behind the IAT.359  
Consider a thought experiment, he suggests, in which a subject is 
shown a series of male and female faces and told to respond as quickly 
as possible, saying “hello” if the face is a male face and “goodbye” if 
the face is a female face.  In the next stage of the experiment, the 
subject is shown either a male face or name or a female face or name 
and instructed to say “hello” to male faces and male names and 
“goodbye” to female faces and female names.  The subject should have 
no trouble responding quickly in either of these conditions.  Next, the 
subject is told to say “hello” if he or she sees either a male face or a 
female name and to say “goodbye” if he or she sees a female face or 
male name.  To complete this task successfully, the subject will likely 
respond more slowly than in the first part of the experiment.  This, 
Greenwald theorizes, “follows from the existence of strong 
associations of male names to male faces and female names to female 
faces.”360  Attempting to map the same response (“hello” or 
“goodbye”) when confronted with opposite associations is 
understandably more difficult than attempting to map the response 
with given correlating associations.  The difference in the time it takes 
to perform the different sorting tasks “measures the strength of 
gender-based associations between the face and name domains.”361   
More than two million people have taken the IAT.362  Ninety percent 
of the test-takers have been American.363  Eighty-eight percent of 
Whites who have taken the IAT have manifested implicit bias in favor 
of Whites and against Blacks.364  Nearly 83% of heterosexuals have 
manifested implicit bias in favor of straight people over gays and 
lesbians.365  More than two-thirds of non-Arab, non-Muslim test-takers 
 
primed with Black face than when primed with White face). 
 359 Greenwald et al., supra note 355, at 1464. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. 
 362 See Vedantam, supra note 354, at W15. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Id.  Studies have found that even African Americans exhibit implicit bias in 
favor of Whites relative to Blacks.  See, e.g., R.W. Livingston, The Role of Perceived 
Negativity in the Moderation of African Americans’ Implicit and Explicit Racial Attitudes, 
38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 405, 411 (2002) (finding that while African 
Americans demonstrated strong evidence of in-group bias on explicit measures, they 
showed out-group, i.e. White, favoritism on implicit measures); B.A. Nosek et al., 
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP 
DYNAMICS 101, 105 (2002) (noting that while Black respondents showed stronger 
preference for Black over White on explicit measures, reversed pattern was observed 
on implicit measures with Blacks showing weak preference for White over Black). 
 365 Vedantam, supra note 354, at W15.  Gay men, however, manifest implicit bias 
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have shown implicit bias against Muslims.366  These results were in 
sharp contrast to the test-takers’ self-reported attitudes.367 
Recent advances in brain imaging techniques have enabled 
researchers to confirm scientifically the implicit bias suggested by IAT 
research.  Functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) offers a 
non-invasive way to examine the functions of the brain.368  Researchers 
interested in measuring racial bias have used fMRI to measure activity in 
the amygdala, a “small, almond-shaped structure in the medial temporal 
lobe that is primarily known for its role in emotional learning and 
memory.”369  Brain imaging research “suggests that amygdala activity 
reflects arousal triggered by fast unconscious assessment of potential 
threat.”370  Activity in the amygdala indicates “relatively automatic social 
evaluation” without conscious awareness or intent.371 
Researchers have found that exposing White subjects to Black faces 
can affect their physiological responses in a number of ways, including 
how much their skin sweats, how fast their hearts pump, and whether 
their facial muscles twitch.372  Brain imaging allows researchers to 
examine differences in amygdala activity when subjects are exposed to 
different stimuli.  In one experiment, Elizabeth Phelps used fMRI to 
record neural activity in the amydgala of White subjects while they 
were being exposed to Black and White faces.373  After the fMRI scan, 
subjects took an IAT.  They then answered questions from the Modern 
Racism Scale, a self-report scale that measures explicit racial 
attitudes.374  Phelps found that subjects with the most negative implicit 
attitudes toward Blacks showed the greatest amygdala activation 
 
in favor of homosexuality relative to heterosexuality.  William A. Jellison et al., supra 
note 182, at 629, 634.   
 366 Vedantam, supra note 354, at W15. 
 367 Id. 
 368 See generally Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Imaging Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 181 
(2005) (noting that fMRI techniques “offer a noninvasive means of examining the 
functioning of healthy brains”); see also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging 
Information:  A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 424-26 
(2006) (discussing fMRI studies involving racial evaluation).   
 369 Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Intact Performance on an Indirect Measure of Race Bias 
Following Amygdala Damage, 41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 203, 203 (2003). 
 370 Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice:  Social-Cognitive 
Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotyped Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56, 56 (2005). 
 371 Id. at 57. 
 372 Eberhardt, supra note 368, at 182. 
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Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 771 (2000). 
 374 Id. at 730. 
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responses toward Black faces as compared with White faces.375  These 
same subjects self-reported little or no prejudice, confirming that there 
is little correlation between stated attitudes and actual implicit bias.  
The fact that the subjects with the strongest implicit bias scores also 
showed the greatest amygdala activity supports the view that the IAT 
is an accurate measurement of implicit bias.376  Other fMRI 
experiments have found that both Black and White subjects show 
greater amygdala activity when exposed to Black faces than when 
exposed to White faces.377 
The fact that individuals consistently self-report more egalitarian 
views than are reflected in their IAT scores and fMRI scans “suggest[s] 
at least two modes of evaluation:  one that involves conscious and 
controlled modes of thinking and another that involves relatively 
automatic processes that operate without deliberate thought or 
sometimes without conscious awareness.”378  When a racial stereotype 
like the “Black-as-Criminal” stereotype379 is activated by exposure to a 
Black face, an individual is likely to experience an automatic stereotype-
congruent response, such as fear.  If, however, the individual has time 
to think about whether it makes sense to equate Blackness with 
criminality under the given circumstances, the individual’s cognitive 
processes can mediate between the automatic stereotype-congruent 
 
 375 Id. at 732. 
 376 Interestingly, these results were not replicated when subjects were shown 
pictures of familiar and positively regarded Black and White individuals.  Id. at 733.  
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 379 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense:  Toward a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 463 (1996) [hereinafter Lee, Race 
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response and the individual’s non-prejudiced beliefs, and control the 
otherwise automatic stereotype-congruent response. 
Given these two modes of evaluation (conscious versus automatic) 
and knowing that the automatic mode tends to dominate when the 
individual does not have time to think, William Cunningham decided 
to test whether the amount of fear-response reflected in activation of 
the amygdala would be different depending on how long subjects were 
exposed to Black and White faces.380  Cunningham used fMRI to 
measure amygdala activation in subjects who were presented with 
Black faces for a short duration of time (30 milliseconds (ms) or barely 
a flash on the screen), Black faces for a longer duration of time (525 
ms), White faces for a short duration of time (30 ms), and White faces 
for a longer duration of time (525 ms).381  After the experiment, all of 
the subjects took the race IAT, which tested for implicit bias in favor 
of or against Whites and Blacks.  Next, they answered questions from 
the Modern Racism Scale and the Motivation to Respond Without 
Prejudice Scale (another self-report scale that measures motivation to 
think and behave without prejudice).382   
The self-reported measures of prejudice demonstrated little or no 
prejudice.  All participants disagreed with prejudiced statements and 
agreed with non-prejudiced statements.383  Nonetheless, on the IAT, 
subjects “showed automatic negative associations toward Black 
relative to White faces . . . .”384  The fMRI results were consistent with 
the IAT results.  The more implicit bias the subject showed on the 
IAT, the greater his or her amygdala activity for Black relative to 
White faces in the 30-ms or short-duration condition.385  When 
subjects were shown Black and White faces for a longer period of time, 
however, there was no significant difference in amydgala activity.386   
These results suggest that when individuals have the opportunity to 
process the fact that they are being exposed to a Black face, their 
cognitive processes can mediate their otherwise automatic stereotype-
congruent responses.  As Cunningham explains: 
Greater Black-White difference in amygdala activation in the 
30-ms condition than in the 525-ms condition is consistent 
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 382 Id. at 808. 
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with the idea that unwanted prejudicial responses are most 
likely to occur under conditions of distraction or cognitive 
overload, when reflective cognitive processes that might 
modulate an automatically activated evaluation are otherwise 
engaged.387 
In another study on stereotypes and prejudice, Patricia Devine 
found that when racial stereotypes about Blacks were made salient, 
low-prejudice individuals seemed to consciously mediate their 
thoughts about Blacks and align their thoughts with their egalitarian 
beliefs.388  When racial stereotypes about Blacks were not made salient, 
both high and low-prejudice individuals responded in stereotype-
congruent ways.389 
To activate conscious awareness of the various stereotypes about 
Blacks, Devine asked subjects to list as many alternate labels of which 
they were aware for the social group Black Americans.390  Subjects 
were told that the researcher was interested in how people think about 
and talk informally about social groups, and were given a minute to 
perform this task.391  Next, researchers asked subjects to list their 
thoughts in response to the social group Black Americans and various 
labels ascribed to Blacks.392  Subjects received two pages with ten 
boxes; different labels associated with Black Americans were at the top 
of each box, and subjects were told to put one thought in each box.393  
They had ten minutes to complete this task.394  Finally, subjects were 
asked to complete the Modern Racism Scale.395 
Devine assigned subjects to either a high-prejudice or low-prejudice 
group based on the subjects’ scores on the Modern Racism Scale.396  
Devine found there was no difference in the proportion of negative 
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labels generated by each group in the first task.397  The proportion of 
negative or pejorative labels generated by high-prejudice persons was 
about the same as the proportion generated by low-prejudice persons.  
This suggested that both high and low-prejudice individuals are 
equally aware of the various negative stereotypes about Blacks.398   
The two groups, however, revealed big differences in their responses 
to the thought-listing task, which took place right after the stereotype 
(label)-listing exercise had made racial stereotypes about Blacks salient 
to the participants.  High-prejudice subjects listed more negative than 
positive thoughts about Blacks and low-prejudice subjects listed more 
positive than negative thoughts about Blacks.399  Moreover, 60% of the 
high-prejudice individuals’ responses to the thought-listing task 
reflected themes of hostility, aggressiveness, or violence, whereas only 
9% of the low-prejudice individuals’ responses reflected similar 
themes.400  Making racial stereotypes salient encouraged the egalitarian 
or low-prejudice subjects to inhibit stereotype-congruent responses. 
In a study published in 2000, Samuel Sommers and Phoebe 
Ellsworth tested whether making race salient would make a difference 
in mock jurors’ perceptions of guilt and in the severity of their 
sentencing recommendations.401  Subjects read a trial summary in 
which the race of the defendant and victim were varied (White male 
defendant and Black female victim or Black male defendant and White 
female victim).  The trial summary revealed that the defendant and a 
group of his friends were at a bar celebrating his recent promotion 
when his girlfriend stood up and started to make fun of his physique 
and sexual performance.402  The defendant yelled at his girlfriend, 
forced her into her chair, and slapped her across the face.  The slap 
knocked the girlfriend onto the ground and the girlfriend injured her 
ankle in the fall.  In the race salient version of the trial, the girlfriend 
testified that the defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk about 
a White (or Black) man in front of his friends” before he slapped her.  
In the non-race salient version of the trial, the girlfriend testified that 
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the defendant yelled, “You know better than to talk that way about a 
man in front of his friends.”403 
Sommers and Ellsworth found that when race was made salient, 
White mock jurors treated the White and Black defendant equally in 
terms of guilt and severity of punishment.404  In contrast, when race 
was not salient, White mock jurors gave the Black defendant a 
significantly higher guilt rating than the White defendant.405  In their 
sentence recommendations, White mock jurors were also more 
punitive towards the Black defendant in the non-race salient 
condition, recommending longer sentences for the Black defendant 
than for the White defendant.  When White jurors were simply aware 
of the defendant’s race, but did not think race was relevant to the case, 
implicit bias trumped their sincerely held egalitarian beliefs.406 
Sommers and Ellsworth suggest the reason why White jurors acted 
in more egalitarian ways when race was made salient stems from 
Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio’s theory of aversive racism.407  
Under this theory, most White Americans hold egalitarian beliefs but 
still have implicit bias against Blacks.408  “[W]hen White people are 
reminded of the possibility of racial prejudice in an interaction, they 
may work to inhibit their own racial biases; if they are not reminded, 
they might not notice, and their biases will often be expressed.”409 
A year later, in 2001, Sommers and Ellsworth conducted another 
study that confirmed that when race is made salient, White mock 
jurors will treat Black and White defendants the same; when race is 
not salient, White mock jurors are more likely to convict Black 
defendants than similarly situated White defendants.410  In the 2001 
study, a White experimenter approached 196 White participants in 
waiting areas of a major international airport and asked if they would 
read and complete a questionnaire about legal attitudes while they 
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waited for their planes.411  Each participant read a trial summary that 
involved either a Black defendant and White victim or vice versa.  In 
all of the cases, participants were aware of the defendant and victim’s 
race, age, height, and weight.  In some of the cases, race was made 
salient.  In others, race was not made salient. 
The trial summary described a high school basketball player charged 
with one count of battery with serious bodily injury after an 
altercation with a teammate in a locker room.412  The government 
argued that the defendant was upset after losing his place in the 
starting line-up and attacked his replacement.413  The defense admitted 
that the defendant verbally confronted his teammate in the locker 
room, but claimed that when a third party tried to intervene and 
restrain him, he panicked and accidentally made contact with the 
victim when he tried to break free.414  In the race-salient version of the 
trial, a defense witness testified that the defendant was one of only two 
Blacks (or Whites) on the team and had been the subject of racial 
remarks and unfair criticism throughout the season from his White 
(or Black) teammates.415  In the non-race salient version of the trial, 
the same defense witness testified that the defendant had been the 
subject of obscene remarks and unfair criticism from many of his 
teammates.416 
In the race-salient condition, conviction rates for the White 
defendant (69%) and the Black defendant (66%) were almost the 
same.417  In the non-race salient condition, when the White mock 
juror subjects were simply aware of race but race was not made 
salient, they voted to convict the Black defendant 90% of the time and 
the White defendant only 70% of the time.418 
These studies by Cunningham, Devine, and Sommers and Ellsworth 
suggest that when race is made salient, individuals who self-report 
non-prejudiced beliefs will consciously mediate and control their 
otherwise automatic stereotype-congruent responses.419  Conversely, 
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when race is not made salient — when race is an obvious fact, such as 
in a case involving a Black defendant or victim, but no one openly 
discusses the racial implications of the case — individuals are likely to 
respond in stereotype-congruent ways. 
An example of how subtle appeals to racial bias can be effective 
when race is not made salient is illustrated by the well-known New 
York subway shooting case.  In that case, Bernard Goetz, a white male, 
shot four black youths after two of them asked him for five dollars on 
a New York subway.420  At Goetz’s trial, no one openly talked about 
the obvious racial dynamics present in the case.421  The defense, 
however, cleverly activated the Black-as-Criminal stereotype by 
referring to the victims as savages, predators, and vultures.422  They 
also reenacted the subway shooting, ostensibly to show the jury the 
path of the bullets.423  George Fletcher, a law professor who observed 
the trial, noted that by bringing in four young, fit, and muscular 
African Americans to play the part of the four victims, the defense 
covertly appealed to racial bias and the jury’s fear of being mugged by 
four young black males.424  The jury found Goetz not guilty on all but 
the least serious charge of unlawful possession of a firearm. 
One might question whether the research on implicit racial bias is 
readily transferable to sexual orientation bias, especially when it seems 
more people hold explicitly anti-gay attitudes than explicitly racist 
attitudes.  Even if more people are openly anti-gay than explicitly 
racist, implicit sexual orientation bias is still a concern.  As discussed 
above, many egalitarian-minded heterosexual individuals sincerely 
believe gays and lesbians should not be discriminated against and self-
report positive attitudes about homosexuality, yet manifest implicit 
bias in favor of heterosexuality and against homosexuality.  Implicit 
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bias is a concern whether one is talking about race, gender, sexual 
orientation, or age (bias against the elderly). 
There are additional reasons to believe that the research on race and 
implicit bias is applicable to sexual orientation bias.425  One study 
specifically examined whether hearing positive opinions about gay-
related issues (in other words, making sexual orientation salient in a 
positive way for gays) would affect whether individuals privately 
expressed bias against gay men.426  Margo Monteith, Nicole Deneen, 
and Gregory Tooman conducted an experiment in which an 
experimenter would approach a student who was walking alone on 
campus and ask whether he or she would participate in an opinion 
poll for a class.427  A confederate would then walk past the 
experimenter and the subject.428  The experimenter would stop the 
confederate and ask whether he or she would also participate in the 
opinion poll.429  The experimenter then administered two 
questionnaires to the confederate and the participant.430  The first 
questionnaire contained questions from a standard measure of 
prejudice against gays called the Heterosexual Attitudes Toward 
Homosexuals scale (“HATH”) and was completed privately by each 
individual.431  The second questionnaire asked for the participant’s 
opinions relating to issues involving gays on campus.432  In some 
cases, the subject answered questions on the second questionnaire 
privately without hearing the confederate’s views.  In other cases, the 
subject answered questions only after hearing the confederate answer 
the same questions out loud.433  In the favorable ratings condition, the 
confederate expressed non-prejudiced opinions about gay-related 
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issues on campus.  In the unfavorable ratings condition, the 
confederate expressed prejudiced opinions about the same issues.434 
Monteith found that participants exposed to non-prejudiced 
confederate opinions expressed opinions that were significantly more 
positive toward gays than those in the no rating condition (where they 
did not hear the confederate give any opinions).435  Moreover, both 
low-prejudice and high-prejudice individuals expressed positive 
opinions after hearing the confederate make non-prejudiced remarks 
about gay-related issues on campus.436  Monteith concluded that 
“making social norms opposing prejudice salient will likely have a 
pervasive effect, curbing expressions of prejudice among people who 
hold less as well as more prejudiced attitudes.”437 
The existing research on stereotypes and prejudice suggests that 
stereotypes, which are deeply entrenched in the subconscious, are 
triggered more readily when not made salient.  If one is concerned that 
stereotypes about gay men will be used by unscrupulous attorneys, it 
would probably be best to have claims of gay panic out in the open and 
subject to the adversarial system.  This would force argument and 
counter-argument about the legitimacy of such claims above ground, 
and allow jurors to cognitively process the validity of such claims rather 
than react without reflection.  Moreover, if jurors are exposed to non-
prejudiced opinions about gay men (by the prosecutor or other jurors), 
Monteith’s study suggests this significantly increases the likelihood that 
even high-prejudiced jurors with negative private views about 
homosexuality will publicly express non-prejudiced views. 
D. Institutional Competency 
A final consideration is which institutional actor — the legislature, 
the judge, or the jury — is best suited to determine whether a 
heterosexual male defendant’s claim of gay panic is credible and 
should result in some kind of mitigation.  This section evaluates the 
strengths and weaknesses of each institutional actor and concludes 
that the jury is best suited to make this determination. 
A critic of the gay panic defense might contend that the simplest 
way to deal with the problem would be for the legislature to pass a 
statute stating that a non-violent homosexual advance does not 
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constitute legally adequate provocation.438  One benefit of legislative 
action is uniformity and consistency.  All judges in the relevant 
jurisdiction would be required to follow the legislative rule, leading to 
uniform results in similarly situated cases.  Another benefit is that 
legislatures can commission studies, take testimony, and conduct 
continuing oversight investigations. 
More than one state legislature has amended its penal code to reflect 
the view that a certain type of arguably provocative act does not 
constitute legally adequate provocation.  For example, Maryland 
provides that “[t]he discovery of one’s spouse engaged in sexual 
intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate 
provocation for the purpose of mitigating a killing from the crime of 
murder to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was 
provoked by that discovery.”439  Minnesota provides that a crying child 
does not constitute legally adequate provocation sufficient to mitigate 
a murder charge to manslaughter.440   
The problem with relying on the legislature to determine what types 
of activities should or should not constitute legally adequate 
provocation is that legislatures tend to enact broad-based legislation 
that will apply to many different cases based on an abstract 
hypothetical set of facts.  A one-size-fits-all rule is particularly ill 
suited to address the question of which defenses the jury ought to hear 
because such a rule, crafted in advance, cannot possibly take into 
account the myriad ways in which an encounter preceding an 
allegedly provoked killing may take place.  The legislature cannot 
possibly know in advance the precise facts of the case which will be 
relevant to whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes 
would have been provoked into a heat of passion.  The judge and jury 
sitting in judgment of a particular defendant, in contrast, can more 
fully consider the factual context in which the killing took place and 
thus are in a better position to decide whether the defendant’s claim of 
gay panic is credible and worthy of some kind of mitigation.441 
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Another problem with having legislatures enact statutes proclaiming 
that a non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute legally 
adequate provocation is that such an approach is a throwback to the 
days when murder defendants had to fit into carefully defined 
categories of legally adequate provocation to claim the provocation 
mitigation.442  Under the early common law approach to provocation, 
a murder defendant could receive the provocation mitigation only if 
he was (1) engaged in mutual combat with the victim immediately 
prior to the killing, (2) subject to an aggravated assault or battery 
immediately before the killing, (3) observed the commission of a 
serious crime upon a close relative immediately before the killing, (4) 
illegally arrested, or (5) caught his wife in the act of adultery just 
before the killing.443  This categorical approach was eventually 
replaced with the modern “reasonable man” test because the 
categorical approach was too restrictive and insensitive to context.444  
Allowing the legislature to prohibit claims of gay panic through 
legislation stating that a non-violent homosexual advance does not 
constitute legally adequate provocation would lead to the same rigidity 
problems inherent in the early common law categorical approach. 
If the legislature is ill suited to the task of deciding whether claims 
of gay panic ought to be allowed, should the judge or the jury make 
this call?  Unlike the legislature, the judge presiding over a given case 
is aware of the factual context in which the claim of gay panic arises.  
Without a superseding legislative rule instructing judges that they 
must rule the same way in all cases, however, judges will have the 
discretion to either take the question of provocation away from the 
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jury or allow the jury to consider the defense.  This type of discretion 
is not necessarily a bad thing, but one obvious problem with this 
approach is that whether a requested defense is presented to the jury 
will depend in large part on the luck of the draw.445  If the defendant 
draws a judge who disapproves of homosexuality, then the 
heterosexual male murder defendant wishing to argue gay panic is 
likely to get the instruction he seeks and evidentiary rulings in his 
favor.446  If the defendant draws a judge who believes gays and lesbians 
should not be discriminated against, then the heterosexual male 
murder defendant claiming gay panic may be less likely to get the jury 
instructions and favorable evidentiary rulings he seeks.   
Inconsistent rulings are to be expected, especially given the different 
factual contexts that may be present under the umbrella of gay panic.  
The bigger problem is that trial judges act alone and often have to 
make evidentiary and other rulings with little time to deliberate.  Trial 
judges, unlike juries, do not have the benefit of co-equal partners 
deliberating with them to ensure the fairest possible outcome.   
There is another reason to be skeptical of relying on a judicial remedy 
in this context.447  Social science research has shown that heterosexual 
men on average manifest more anti-gay prejudice than heterosexual 
women.448  If this is true, then relying on a judge who is likely to be a 
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heterosexual male to decide whether the claim of gay panic has any 
legitimacy seems less desirable than giving the question to the jury.  
According to one source, only 24% of the state judiciary and 19% of the 
federal judiciary is female.449  According to another source, there are 
only 274 female judges (8.65 percent) and 2,894 male judges (91.35 
percent) on the federal bench.450  Given these statistics, the odds of 
drawing a male judge are much greater than drawing a female judge.  
Additionally, it is more likely that a jury will be comprised of a mix of 
men and women than be all male (or all female). 
Even if an egalitarian judge presides over the case, he or she may not 
see through all of the subtle appeals to homophobic bias that the 
defense may try to make.  A jury of twelve persons charged with the 
task of deliberating to a fair and just verdict is better positioned to 
question a claim of gay panic, especially if the defense makes that claim 
openly and then the prosecution counters it.  This is because the jury 
has the distinct advantage of being able to engage in group deliberation. 
In her important Harvard Law Review article on jury decision-
making, Kim Taylor-Thompson describes the benefits of group 
deliberation.451  She acknowledges that while “open communication 
may introduce strongly held beliefs and prejudices into the 
discussion[,] . . . the existence of competing beliefs and prejudices in 
jury deliberations may help to reduce their significance.”452  Taylor-
Thompson also notes that while “[a]n individual juror’s experience can 
affect her perception of and reaction to the evidence[,] . . . interaction 
among jurors will expand the range of issues to be discussed and 
broaden the scope of information shared by the group.”453 
A jury of twelve individuals, selected through a process that enables 
both the defense and the prosecution to strike individuals they believe 
would be biased against them, is likely to have at least one member 
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who is gay or lesbian or sympathetic to gays and lesbians.  That 
individual can remind the other jurors of the homophobic 
assumptions that underlie a defense claim of gay panic. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that this would happen.  A gay 
person who does not want others to know that he or she is gay might 
not to say anything, especially if he or she thinks most of the other 
jurors are homophobic.  It is understandable that an individual juror 
might choose silence in such a situation.  Indeed, a gay person still in 
the closet might become the most vocal supporter of a defendant’s gay 
panic claim in an attempt to divert suspicion that he is gay.   
Monteith’s study, however, suggests that if even one juror speaks up 
and expresses non-prejudiced norms in the jury room, this can have a 
significant effect on the rest of the jury.454  Therefore, as long as the jury 
has at least one gay person who is out (not in the closet) or at least one 
heterosexual who is sympathetic to gays and willing to speak up and 
express non-prejudiced norms, there is a fair chance that the other 
jurors will at least question and possibly reject the gay panic defense. 
I realize that what may be true for gays, may not be true for 
transgenders.  Not all gays and lesbians are sympathetic to transgenders; 
some may even be biased against transgenders.  The odds of a 
transgender person being on a jury where a trans panic claim is asserted 
are fairly slim.  Therefore, what may be a viable solution in the case of a 
gay panic claim may not work against a claim of trans panic. 
There is another reason why it makes sense to allow juries, rather 
than judges, to decide the validity of gay panic claims:  community 
buy-in.  The community where the crime took place and from which 
the jury is drawn is more likely to view the verdict as legitimate if a 
jury considered the gay panic defense and rejected it, than if the judge 
prohibited the defendant from making the argument.  This is because 
the twelve laypersons serving on the jury have been chosen from the 
community’s midst.455  If the long-term goal is changing social 
attitudes about homosexuality, then starting such change in the jury 
box is a better way of accomplishing the goal than trying to force such 
change by legislative or judicial fiat. 
One problem with letting juries adjudicate claims of gay panic is 
that in some parts of this country, homosexual behavior is widely 
viewed as immoral.  If the jury is chosen from such a community, it 
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may be more inclined to believe that the defendant was reasonably 
provoked into a heat of passion by the gay victim’s non-violent 
homosexual advance.  Research suggests that individuals who live on 
the West Coast tend to have the most positive attitudes toward 
homosexuality, while those in the Midwest and the South tend to have 
the most negative attitudes.456  Similarly, individuals with strongly 
religious backgrounds tend to have negative attitudes about 
homosexuality.457 
This problem suggests a reform that would account for regional 
variations in attitudes.  I am not, however, comfortable with proposing 
a rule that would vary depending on the jurisdiction where the case is 
tried.  If the choice is between allowing or disallowing gay panic 
arguments, I think the better choice is to allow gay panic arguments, 
despite the fact that such arguments are reprehensible.  Even if one 
tries to bar gay panic arguments, they are likely to come in through 
the back door as they did in the Matthew Shepard case.458 
Even though there remains a lot of anti-gay sentiment in some parts 
of the country, there is also reason to be hopeful that this will not 
always translate into lenient verdicts in cases where the defendant 
argues gay panic.  First, even individuals who believe homosexuality is 
immoral can be persuaded to see that beating someone to death for 
making a sexual advance is wrongful and illegal.   
Second, attitudes about homosexuality have seen fairly steady 
improvement over the last thirty to forty years.459  A majority of 
Americans today believe it is wrong to discriminate against an 
individual based on his or her sexual orientation.460  In 2003, the U.S. 
Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick by striking down a 
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to 
engage in intimate sexual conduct on the ground that criminalizing 
such conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.461  In addition, despite the controversy over same-sex 
marriage referenced earlier in this Article, many states now recognize 
 
 456 See Loftus, supra note 6, at 765. 
 457 See id. 
 458 See supra text accompanying notes 274-307. 
 459 Loftus, supra note 6, at 778. 
 460 Id. (“While the public still overwhelmingly views homosexuality as wrong, the 
majority is unwilling to restrict the civil liberties of homosexuals.”). 
 461 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court 
reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, the infamous decision in which the Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of Georgia’s sodomy statute as applied to a man arrested for 
having consensual sex with another man in the privacy of his own home.  Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
  
556 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:471 
same-sex civil unions.462  In 2005, Brokeback Mountain, a major 
motion picture about two men who fall in love while working together 
herding sheep near Wyoming’s Brokeback Mountain, won four Golden 
Globe Awards, including Best Motion Picture-Drama, and three 
Academy Awards, including Best Director (Ang Lee), Best Adapted 
Screenplay, and Best Original Score.463   
Third, even prejudiced jurors can be encouraged to act in non-
prejudiced ways.  As discussed above, when non-prejudiced norms are 
made salient by the expression of positive opinions on gay-related issues, 
both low and high-prejudice subjects report less prejudiced opinions 
about gay men.464  Apparently, “even high prejudiced persons . . . view 
general egalitarian ideals as central to their self-concept.”465 
Another problem with allowing juries to decide whether a claim of 
gay panic ought to result in some sort of mitigation is that juries are 
notoriously inconsistent.  One jury may feel a defendant’s gay panic 
claim is legitimate while a differently constituted jury may feel the 
same claim is completely bogus.   
While it is certainly true that an approach that leaves decision-making 
in the hands of the jury will sacrifice consistency in results, I believe the 
benefits of this approach outweigh its costs.466  The only way claims of 
gay panic will lose their appeal in the long run is if the assumptions 
underlying these claims are exposed for what they are:  false negative 
stereotypes about gay males as deviant sexual predators with little basis 
in reality.  One way to ensure that any change in social attitudes is long 
lasting is to allow such change to take place gradually in individual 
 
 462 Six states (Vermont, Connecticut, California, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and 
Oregon) provide the equivalent of spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state.  
Three states (Hawaii, Maine, and Washington) and the District of Columbia provide some 
spousal rights to same-sex couples within the state.  See Human Rights Campaign, 
Relationship Recognition in the U.S., http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_ 
Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited January 11, 2008); see also Anthony Faiola, New 
Hampshire Is Set to Approve Same-Sex Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A1 
(noting that in 2000, Vermont became first state to permit civil unions and that since then, 
other states, including Connecticut, New Jersey, and even relatively conservative state of 
New Hampshire, have established laws permitting civil unions).   
 463 See Brokeback Mountain (2005):  Awards, N.Y. TIMES, http://movies.nytimes.com/ 
movie/301840/Brokeback-Mountain/awards (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). 
 464 Monteith et al., The Effect of Social Norm Activation on the Expression of Opinions 
Concerning Gay Men and Blacks, supra note 338, at 276. 
 465 Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses:  Implications for 
Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 483 
(1993) [hereinafter Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses]. 
 466 The “cost” here is a large one in that it involves allowing someone who has 
killed a gay man to receive a reduced sentence or possibly no sentence at all. 
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courtrooms across the country.  Trying to force such change through 
legislative or judicial bans will only succeed in driving these arguments 
underground where they can appeal to subconscious bias. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
A. Providing Guidance to Trial Courts 
In light of the considerations discussed above, I suggest that when a 
defendant wishes to assert a gay panic argument to bolster a claim of 
provocation or self-defense, the judge should allow the defendant to do 
so as long as there is some evidence to support the elements of the 
defense.467  This approach is consistent with the general principle that a 
defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to present a 
defense.468  While this right is not absolute,469 a considerable number of 
states already require trial judges to give a requested defense instruction 
if there is any evidence (or some evidence) to support the defense.   
For example, in Alaska, “the general rule is that the defendant is 
entitled to a jury instruction on a defense theory if there is ‘some 
evidence’ to support it.”470  As one judge has explained:  “The 
defendant’s burden of producing ‘some evidence’ in support of a 
proposed defense is not a heavy one.  If a defendant produces some 
evidence to support each element of a specific instruction, ‘[a]ny 
weakness or implausibility’ in that evidence is irrelevant.”471  In 
Colorado, “[t]he quantum of evidence that must be offered by the 
 
 467 I have no objection to judges ruling as a matter of law that there is no support for a 
temporary insanity or diminished capacity defense linked to gay panic given that neither 
Homosexual Panic Disorder nor homosexuality constitute recognized mental diseases. 
 468 See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an 
accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity 
to defend against the State’s accusations.”).  For an excellent discussion of one way in 
which the right to present a defense has been eroded, see Doug Colbert, The Motion in 
Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases:  Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
1271, 1316-26 (1987) (arguing against increasing practice of using motion in limine to 
preclude entire defenses). 
 469 See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747-57 (2006) (holding that Arizona’s 
judicial rule limiting evidence of mental disease or defect to proving insanity and 
barring its admission to negate mens rea does not violate due process); Montana v. 
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (upholding Montana statute which precluded 
evidence of defendant’s voluntary intoxication from being admitted to negate mens rea 
against due process challenge). 
 470 Snyder v. State, 930 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1996) (emphasis added). 
 471 State v. Garrison, 171 P.3d 91, 95 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Toomey v. State, 581 
P.2d 1124, 1126 n.10 (Alaska 1978)). 
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defendant in order to be entitled to an instruction on a theory of 
defense is ‘a scintilla of evidence.’472  ‘Some credible evidence,’ an 
alternative statement of the ‘scintilla of evidence’ standard, is necessary 
to present an affirmative defense.”473 
In Florida, the defendant “is entitled to have the jury instructed on 
the rules of law applicable to this theory of the defense if there is any 
evidence to support such instructions.”474  Similarly, in Hawaii, “a jury 
instruction must be given on every defense if there is any support in the 
evidence ‘no matter how weak, inclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence 
may be.’”475  In Illinois: 
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the 
case if there is some foundation for the instruction in the 
evidence, and if there is such evidence, it is an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to refuse to so instruct the jury.  
Very slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify 
the giving of an instruction.476   
Likewise, in Kansas, a defendant “is entitled to an instruction on his 
or her theory of the case even though the evidence thereon is slight and 
supported only by the defendant’s own testimony.”477  In Maryland, a 
defendant need only introduce “[s]ome evidence” to support his or her 
proposed instruction.478  In Nebraska, a defendant is entitled to an 
instruction “if there is any evidence to support . . . giving [it].”479  
Similarly, New Hampshire provides that a “defendant is entitled to a 
jury charge on his theory of defense if it is supported by ‘some 
evidence.’”480  A judge who prohibits a defendant from arguing gay panic 
goes against these rules requiring jury instructions on the defense’s 
theory of the case as long as it is supported by some evidence. 
 
 472 People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 223, 228 (Colo. 1998) (quoting People 
v. Lundy, 533 P.2d 920, 921 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
 473 Id. (quoting People v. Dover, 790 P.2d 834, 836 (Colo.1990)) (emphasis added). 
 474 Bryant v. State, 601 So. 2d 529, 533 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Hooper v. State, 476 
So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1985)) (emphasis added). 
 475 State v. Davalos, 153 P.3d 456, 458 (Haw. 2007) (quoting State v. O’Daniel, 616 
P.2d 1383, 1390 (Haw. 1980)) (emphasis added). 
 476 People v. Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ill. 1997) (citing People v. Crane, 585 
N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill. 1991)) (emphasis added). 
 477 State v. Bell, 80 P.3d 367, 373 (Kan. 2003) (citing State v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 627, 
638 (Kan. 1997)). 
 478 Dykes v. State, 571 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Md. 1990). 
 479 State v. Nguth, 701 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 480 State v. Cote, 725 A.2d 652, 658 (N.H. 1999) (quoting State v. Aubert, 421 A.2d 
124, 125 (N.H. 1980)) (emphasis added). 
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Let me be clear.  I am not advocating official recognition of a 
freestanding gay panic defense.  I am merely suggesting that attempts 
to prohibit gay panic claims are not likely to succeed in shielding the 
jury from considering the forbidden topic.  As modern behavioral 
research demonstrates, attempts to blindfold the jury in other 
contexts, such as insurance and attorneys’ fees, do not work.481  
Implicit bias research suggests that making bias salient can help jurors 
cognitively process and reject stereotype-congruent responses.  For 
these reasons, judges should allow defendants to present gay panic 
provocation or gay panic self-defense arguments to the jury when 
some evidence of each of the elements of the traditional criminal law 
defense is present. 
To limit the effectiveness of gay panic defense strategies, I offer two 
suggestions to prosecutors:  (1) during voir dire, request questions 
designed to identify closet homophobes, and (2) make the possibility 
of sexual orientation bias salient throughout the trial. 
B. Questions to Ask During Jury Selection 
During jury selection, attorneys may have the opportunity to ask or 
request questions designed to flesh out whether a prospective juror is 
likely to be biased against one side or the other.482  If an attorney can 
demonstrate that a prospective juror is biased, that attorney can 
challenge the juror for cause.483  Additionally, an attorney can use one 
of his or her peremptory challenges to strike a prospective juror for 
any reason (other than race or gender)484 or no reason at all.  
Additionally, during voir dire, the attorneys can remind jurors of their 
obligation to decide the case without letting bias or unfair prejudice 
influence their decision-making. 
Prosecutors may wish to ask or request questions that are directly 
relevant to sexual orientation to remind jurors of their duty to be fair 
and unbiased.  Such questions might include the following: 
 
 481 See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 234, at 1865-66. 
 482 See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, The Jury in Practice:  Avoid Bald Men and 
People with Green Socks?  Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Juror Selection, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1184-85 (2003).   
 483 A challenge for cause is a challenge “supported by a specified reason, such as 
bias or prejudice, that would disqualify that potential juror.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
245 (8th ed. 2004). 
 484 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (gender); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (race). 
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This trial involves a gay male victim.  How might this affect 
your reactions to the trial? 
Do you have any biases or prejudices that might prevent you 
from judging this case fairly given that it involves a gay 
victim? 
In your opinion, should the sexual orientation of the 
defendant influence the treatment he receives in the legal 
system? 
Social science research on race and the jury suggests that asking 
prospective jurors about their racial attitudes during voir dire helps to 
reduce racial bias during decision-making by reminding Category 
Three jurors of their egalitarian values.485  In one study, for example, 
researchers divided mock jurors into groups before showing them a 
thirty-minute Court TV video summary of a trial involving a Black 
defendant charged with sexual assault.486  Some groups of mock jurors 
were subjected to racially relevant voir dire questioning and others 
were not.487  The racially relevant questions included the following:   
This trial involves an African American defendant and White 
victims.  How might this affect your reactions to the trial?   
Do you have any biases or prejudices that might prevent you 
from judging an African American defendant fairly?   
In your opinion, how does the race of the defendant affect the 
treatment s/he receives from police?   
In your opinion, how does the race of a defendant influence 
the treatment s/he receives in the legal system as a whole?488   
Only 34.4% of those in the group that received racially relevant voir 
dire voted to convict the Black defendant compared to 47.1% of those 
in the group that received racially neutral voir dire questions.489  If 
making race salient during jury selection helps reduce racial bias 
during jury deliberations, a similar reduction in sexual orientation 
basis may occur if sexual orientation is made salient. 
 
 485 Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 410, at 222. 
 486 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, On Racial Diversity and Group 
Decision-making:  Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury 
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 601-02 (2006). 
 487 Id. at 602. 
 488 Id. 
 489 Id. at 603. 
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Just as few individuals are likely to answer affirmatively if asked, 
“Are you prejudiced against Blacks?,” few individuals are likely to 
admit that they are prejudiced against gays and lesbians.  Most 
heterosexual individuals either will seek to hide their biases because 
they know it is politically incorrect to be biased against gays and 
lesbians, or will say positive things about gays and lesbians because 
they sincerely believe these things.  Even jurors who feel positively 
about gays and lesbians, however, may be implicitly biased in favor of 
heterosexuality and against homosexuality. 
In cases where jurors might try to hide their sexual orientation bias, 
the attorneys will want to think carefully about the different kinds of 
individuals who might be in the jury pool.  Using race as an example, 
individuals are likely to fall into one of three categories.490  In 
Category One are explicit racists, including members of the Ku Klux 
Klan and other White supremacist organizations.  Category One 
individuals are not hesitant to express publicly their belief that the 
White man is superior and the Black man is inferior.  In Category Two 
are closet racists, individuals who know that it is unacceptable to say, 
“I think Blacks are inferior,” but who actually believe Blacks are 
inferior.  Finally, in Category Three are implicit racists, individuals 
who hold egalitarian beliefs about Blacks, but also have implicit bias in 
favor of Whites over Blacks.   
Mapping sexual orientation onto these three categories, Category 
One would include explicit homophobes or individuals who are not shy 
about sharing their belief that homosexuality is abnormal and 
homosexual behavior is immoral.  Some deeply religious individuals 
might fall into Category One.  Category Two would include closet 
homophobes or individuals who will not say publicly that they think 
gays are immoral and deviant, but actually believe gays are immoral 
and deviant.  Category Two individuals might publicly profess to hold 
egalitarian views about homosexuality but privately oppose having a 
gay or lesbian as their child’s teacher.  Finally, Category Three 
individuals, implicit homophobes, would include heterosexuals who 
believe gays and lesbians should be treated equally to heterosexuals 
but who nonetheless would manifest implicit bias in favor of 
heterosexuality and against homosexuality if they were to take an IAT 
measuring sexual orientation bias.   
In a gay panic case, prosecutors will want to weed out individuals in 
Category One (explicit homophobes) and Category Two (closet 
 
 490 See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM:  A PSYCHOHISTORY 54-55 (Pantheon Books 1970) 
(identifying three categories of racists:  (1) dominative racists, (2) aversive racists, and 
(3) unconscious racists). 
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homophobes).  It should not be difficult to find the explicit 
homophobes in Category One because these individuals will not be 
ashamed of expressing negative views about homosexuality in public.  
Category One individuals would likely be subject to a challenge for 
cause.  It may, however, be difficult to ferret out Category Two 
individuals because closet homophobes know that it looks bad to 
appear biased against gays and lesbians.   
To find the closet homophobes, prosecutors will want to ask 
questions that indirectly measure a prospective juror’s attitudes about 
homosexuality.  Drury Sherrod and Peter Nardi conducted a study 
designed to identify potentially homophobic jurors during voir dire.491  
Recognizing that some jurors might try to hide their true biases to 
“save face in the courtroom,” Sharrod and Nardi sought to identify 
proxy or surrogate questions that correlate with homophobic attitudes 
but are more likely to elicit a truthful response than direct questions 
about a juror’s attitudes about homosexuality.492   
Sherrod and Nardi found that as a general matter, the most 
homophobic individuals did not have any close friends who were gay 
or lesbian.  They also thought the world would be a better place if 
more people followed “old-fashioned values,” were politically 
conservative, and attended religious services weekly or believed 
religious beliefs were always important in guiding their daily 
decisions.493  Additionally, many of the most homophobic individuals 
thought that the federal and state governments were doing enough to 
make sure industry does not pollute the environment, did not read the 
local newspaper or any magazines on a regular basis, were not college 
educated, had served time in the United States Armed Forces, and 
lived in the South.494  Sherrod and Nardi concluded that if an attorney 
wants to find out which persons on the venire are the most 
homophobic, the following questions would be helpful to ask during 
voir dire:495 
Do you have any close friends who are gay or lesbian? 
Politically, are you liberal, middle-of-the-road, or 
conservative? 
 
 491 Drury Sherrod & Peter M. Nardi, Homophobia in the Courtroom:  An Assessment 
of Biases Against Gay Men and Lesbians in a Multiethnic Sample of Potential Jurors, in 
STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra note 448, at 27. 
 492 Id. 
 493 Id. at 33-35. 
 494 Id. 
 495 Id. at 36-37.    
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How important are your religious beliefs in guiding your daily 
decisions? 
Do you think the world would be a better place if more people 
followed old-fashioned values? 
Do you try to attend religious services at your church or 
temple every week? 
Are federal and state governments doing enough to make sure 
industry does not pollute the environment we live in? 
How thoroughly do you read your local newspaper every day? 
Please tell me the postal ZIP code where you live. 
What is your current marital status? 
What is your religion? 
Have you ever served in the U.S. Armed Forces? 
Do you feel your life is more controlled by fate than by 
planning? 
Do you read any magazines on a regular basis? 
What is your highest level of education?496 
If prosecutors are able to identify both explicit homophobes and 
closet homophobes, and strike all or most of these individuals, the 
jury will be comprised of mostly egalitarian-minded jurors who want 
to act fairly and not let negative stereotypes about gay men influence 
the verdict.497  If the prosecutor then makes sexual orientation salient, 
 
 496 Social science research suggests that negative attitudes about homosexuality 
tend to diminish with increased levels of education.  See Wright, Adams & Bernat, 
supra note 448, at 345. 
 497 The defense may try to use their peremptory challenges to strike all the openly 
gay individuals on the jury.  If this happens, the prosecutor should file a Batson 
challenge.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (holding use of peremptory 
challenge to discriminate on basis of race violates equal protection); see J.E.B. v. 
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending Batson to prohibit use of peremptory 
challenges based on gender).  The defense will likely argue that Batson should not be 
extended to sexual orientation because sexual orientation has not been recognized as a 
special classification deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The prosecutor can counter that Batson prohibits the use of peremptory 
challenges to strike a member of a cognizable group, and that gays and lesbians are a 
cognizable group because they share a common perspective arising from their life 
experiences and have been singled out for different treatment under the laws.  See 
United States v. Castaneda-Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (defining cognizable 
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the jury is likely to reject the defense appeal to negative stereotypes 
about gay men as deviant sexual predators, and decide the case in an 
unbiased manner. 
C. Making Sexual Orientation Salient Through Gender and Sexual 
Orientation Switching 
Another way a prosecutor can make sexual orientation salient is to 
use gender and sexual orientation switching during opening and 
closing statements.  The prosecutor can ask jurors to imagine the same 
facts but with a gay male defendant who kills a heterosexual female 
victim after she makes an unwanted sexual advance.  If jurors would 
think the gay man unreasonable if he were to respond the way the 
defendant in the actual case responded, they should think twice before 
deciding that the defendant was reasonably provoked.  The prosecutor 
can then ask jurors to imagine the same facts but with a female 
defendant who kills a heterosexual man after he makes an unwanted 
sexual advance.  If jurors would think the female unreasonable, jurors 
should again think twice about whether they should accept the 
defendant’s claim of reasonable provocation. 
Second, the prosecutor can ask the judge to give the jury a role-
reversal jury instruction.498  Such an instruction would tell jurors that 
it is inappropriate to allow bias on the basis of race, ethnicity, national 
origin, gender, religion, or sexual orientation to influence their 
decision-making.  The jury instruction would then help make jurors 
aware of the possibility of anti-gay bias operating at the level of the 
subconscious by asking jurors to imagine the same facts but with the 
defendant a gay man who kills a heterosexual woman after she makes 
a sexual advance similar to the one allegedly made by the actual gay 
male victim.  Alternatively, jurors could imagine the defendant as a 
heterosexual woman who kills a heterosexual man who makes a 
sexual advance similar to the one allegedly made by the actual victim.  
If jurors come to a different conclusion about the defendant’s 
 
group). 
 498 In other work, I have proposed that judges give a race-switching jury 
instruction to limit the influence of racial stereotypes.  Lee, Race and Self-Defense, 
supra note 379, at 481-82; see also LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN, supra note 
80, at 252-59 (suggesting role-reversal jury instructions as means of illustrating 
meaning of normative reasonableness).  In recognition of the fact that racial 
stereotypes and prejudice can adversely affect jury decision-making, the Supreme 
Court has held that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to 
have prospective jurors questioned on the issue of racial bias if the defendant 
specifically requests such voir dire.  Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986). 
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culpability in the imagined scenarios, this would alert them to the 
possibility that they may have allowed anti-gay bias to influence their 
decision-making in the first place.  They would then want to 
reconsider the actual facts of the case.   
Some might doubt the efficacy of telling jurors not to be prejudiced 
against the victim because of his sexual orientation.499  The proposed 
role-reversal instruction, however, goes beyond merely telling jurors 
not to be biased.  It warns jurors of the possibility of sexual 
orientation bias, tells them that such bias is inappropriate, and then 
gives jurors a vehicle for checking themselves for such bias.  It makes 
sexual orientation far more salient than an instruction simply telling 
jurors not to be biased.   
Social science research suggests that the use of mental imagery can 
help reduce implicit bias in all individuals500 and that the first step to 
overcoming implicit bias is awareness.501  A role-reversal jury 
instruction can make jurors aware of the possibility of implicit bias in a 
very tangible way.502  Additional research suggests that motivation to be 
non-biased can curb the otherwise automatic effects of anti-gay bias.503   
It is particularly important in cases involving claims of gay panic to 
allow such claims to be heard.  Suppression of gay panic claims, like 
suppression of bad speech, will not eliminate the underlying 
stereotypes and assumptions that make such claims persuasive.  Open 
 
 499 See, e.g., Bronwyn Statham, Note, The Homosexual Advance Defence:  ‘Yeah, I 
Killed Him, but He Did Worse to Me’ Green v. R., 20 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 301, 302, 311 
(1998-1999) (arguing that jury instructions telling jurors not to be prejudiced against 
defendant or victim on basis of their sexual orientation are unlikely to limit influence 
of homophobic prejudice in Homosexual Advance Defense cases). 
 500 See Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away:  The Moderation of Implicit 
Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 828 
(2001) (finding that participants who engaged in counter-stereotypic mental imagery 
showed weaker implicit bias than those who engaged in neutral, stereotypic, or no 
mental imagery). 
 501 See Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses, supra note 465, at 
472, 477-78 (finding that when low-prejudice individuals were falsely led to believe 
that they had discriminated against gay male law school applicant on basis of his 
sexual orientation and then read essay on reasons why people sometimes respond 
more negatively toward gays than they think they should and how to reduce such 
negative responses, they engaged in self-reflection and concerted attempts to control 
future prejudiced responses). 
 502 The author is currently engaged in empirical research with Donald Braman, Dan 
Kahan, and Jeff Rachlinski to test whether giving mock jurors a race-switching jury 
instruction can reduce implicit bias in cases involving minority defendants. 
 503 See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to 
Behavior:  The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral 
Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 277 (2006). 
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discussion and debate is a better way to combat those assumptions.  
Making sexual orientation salient through role-reversal exercises can 
help jurors consciously mediate and control what would otherwise be 
automatic stereotype-congruent responses. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that when murder defendants argue gay panic, 
they seek to tap into deep-seated biases against and stereotypes about 
gay men as deviant sexual predators who pose a threat to innocent 
young heterosexual males.  The question is what role the law should 
play in mediating the cultural conflict over what constitutes the 
appropriate response to an unwanted homosexual advance.   
Robert Post explains that some believe the law should only enforce 
existing cultural norms, reflecting the current moral judgments of the 
community.504  Post, however, also notes that while the law is 
sometimes used to enforce existing cultural norms, it is also sometimes 
used to revise and reshape, or constitute, culture.505  Because cultural 
norms unfold over time, “law is perennially implicated in cultural 
conflict, so that cultural change and disagreement is the ordinary state 
of affairs rather than the exception.”506 
“Controversies over the status of homosexuality are today the site of 
intense cultural dispute.”507  I believe the law can and should play a 
role in mediating this cultural dispute — not by dictating what jurors 
can and cannot consider, but by making sure jurors are cognitively 
aware of what exactly is at stake when a gay person is the victim of 
fatal violence, and the person who killed him claims he did so in 
response to an unwanted sexual advance. 
 
 504 Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 485-86 (2003) 
(citing PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 10 (1965)). 
 505 Id. at 488. 
 506 Id. at 494. 
 507 Id. at 495. 
